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Foreword
Laura De Giorgi, Guido Samarani
(Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy)
The essays collected in this book were originally presented at the interna-
tional workshop Chiang Kai-shek and His Time. New Historical and Hiss-
toriographical Perspectives, held at the Department of Asian and African 
Studies of Ca’ Foscari University of Venice on October 18th, 2013. The 
workshop was jointly funded by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of 
China at Taiwan (Taiwan Spotlight Project) and Ca’ Foscari University. It 
gathered scholars from Europe, Mainland China, Taiwan and Japan, and 
the scope was to offer an opportunity for debate and reflection among 
historians of different scholarly and intellectual backgrounds on one of 
the most important protagonists of twentieth century history. 
It is true that there are quite a number of studies of Chiang Kai-
shek as one of the most controversial and elusive figures of Chinese 
contemporary history (for an introduction to historiography on Chi-
ang see Taylor 2015). Nevertheless, for a long time this field of study 
was more or less frozen by political and ideological prejudice (Taylor, 
Huang 2012). Cold War alignments affected historical judgement of 
Chiang and his contribution. In mainland China and in Taiwan he had 
been considered as either the worst of villains or the anti-Communist pa-
triotic champion, since along both sides of the Taiwan Straits scholarly 
work on him reflected – and partially still does – the influence politics 
and ideology can bring to bear on historical studies. These positions 
were also echoed in Western historiography. Western studies concerning 
Chiang have been affected by several assumptions following on from 
the victory of the Communist Party in 1949. In most cases, where the 
Communist victory is considered as the necessary outcome of the social 
and economic structural dynamics at play in China since the late nine-
teenth century, Chiang has often been seen mainly as an authoritarian, 
incapable military dictator at the head of a weak, corrupt government, 
doomed to defeat. 
Moreover, scholarly perspectives on his political and military capaci-
ties have also been affected by sources’ bias, not only in China but also in 
the West. The most well-known example is the influence on the historical 
evaluations of Chiang of General Stilwell’s negative opinion regarding 
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the Chinese leader’s political and military capacities, as highlighted by 
Stilwell’s writings on his experience with Chiang in Chongqing during the 
second world war. 
This state of things is gradually changing. In the last ten years, the study 
of Chiang Kai-shek has flourished, producing a better understanding and 
a more nuanced assessment of his personality and role. A reflection on 
recent scholarly production of Chiang is beyond the scope of this introduc-
tion (for a critical overview see Huang 2011; Taylor, Huang 2012), but it is 
worth reminding the reader that reassessment of Chiang Kai-shek has also 
been the consequence of broader shifts in the historiography of twentieth 
century China in the post Cold War era. 
Historical revisionism of Chiang has benefited from the appreciation of 
the importance of the Republican era in the understanding of twentieth-
century China as well as of the development of new studies on post-1949 
Taiwan. The issues concerning historical continuity across the 1949 divide 
in Chinese State-building, the relevance attributed to the war against Ja-
pan as the fundamental turning point in twentieth century China, the cen-
trality acknowledged to mass nationalism as a fundamental issue in shap-
ing Chinese political culture and ideology, a new appreciation of China’s 
world outlook and active role in international politics in the last century 
and, last but not least, the need to investigate and better understand the 
roots of the political and economic development of Taiwan in the post-1949 
era are all factors that contributed to raising renewed scholarly attention 
for Chiang Kai-shek. 
Moreover, one of the main factors which are currently supporting a 
deeper understanding of Chiang is the availability of new sources. From 
Chiang Kai-shek’s diaries to the journals and personal papers of several 
Guomindang military, political and cultural figures, to the opening of local 
archives, new documentation has given scholars world-wide the opportu-
nity to better understand Chiang Kai-shek’s political and military role and 
his connections with other leading figures of his age. At any rate, the par-
ticular features of these new sources have significantly influenced the his-
torical approach, which has often focused on assessing Chiang’s personality 
behind his public image, and his relationships with his family, political and 
military entourage. The outcome has certainly been a more sophisticated 
appreciation not only of Chiang’s inner psychology and of his political and 
military strategic views, but also of the complicated personal dynamics 
which lay behind his bonds with collaborators and adversaries as well. 
The first three essays in this book illustrate this interpretative trend, 
offering new insights into Chiang’s personality and thinking, and his per-
sonal relations within the Guomindang. 
The contribution by Professor Yamada Tatsuo, Emeritus at Keio Uni-
versity and one of the most well-known Japanese historians on Chiang 
Kai-shek, entitled “Chiang Kai-shek’s Study in Japan in His Memories” 
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offers a perceptive analysis of the significance of Chiang’s experience as 
a student in Japan, between April 1906 and October 1911, in the context 
of his later political leadership and political thought. Comparing what is 
known about Chiang’s actual studies in Japan and how the Chinese leader 
later remembered and elaborated on these memories in order to develop 
his own discourse about China’s problems, future prospects and identity, 
Yamada argues that the understanding of Chiang’s experience in Japan 
cannot be separated from the analysis of the context of the political history 
of twentieth century China and of Chiang’s political thought and ideol-
ogy. Chiang drew from his rather limited stay in Japan political ideas and 
concepts which cannot simply be considered as the direct consequence 
of that contact, but rather as the outcome of a personal re-elaboration in 
the light of his subsequent experiences and attitudes. 
Yamada’s problematisation of Chiang’s memories as a historical source 
about his stay in Japan is significant considering the centrality in Chiang’s 
studies currently of his diaries, deposited at the Hoover Institution at Stan-
ford University in 2004. Though the diaries were not written by Chiang for 
publication, they cannot be considered simply a mirror of Chiang’s real 
personality, feelings and thoughts, but rather allowance must be made 
for the influence of Chiang’s self-representation in his account of events, 
thoughts and deeds (see on this point Nathan 2011; Taylor, Huang 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that Chiang’s diaries have shed new light 
not only on his personality, thinking and attitudes, but also on his role in 
several political and military turning points in Chinese history. 
One of these key moments is certainly the second world war and 
consequently Chiang’s role in the military development of the conflict 
against Japan. An analysis of the way Chiang Kai-shek dealt with the 
tragic events of the Japanese military offensive in 1944 is at the fo-
cal point of the contribution of Professor Chen Yung-fa, distinguished 
Research Fellow at the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica 
in Taibei, Taiwan and Professor of History at the National Taiwan Uni-
versity. Chen’s essay “Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese Ichigo Offen-
sive, 1944” offers an assessment of Chiang’s handling of the main battles 
during the 1944 great Japanese military campaigns codenamed Ichigo 
(Number One). Relying on a close reading of Chiang’s personal diaries, 
Chen further weakens the once prevailing view regarding Chiang Kai-
shek’s scant willingness to fight the Japanese invaders. In actual fact, 
Chiang’s diaries reveal that the Chinese Nationalist Army’s difficulties 
and failures when defending the Chinese cities during the Japanese 
offensive, were mainly due to some objective limitations in Chiang’s 
strategic choices, such as bad intelligence, the difficulties of several of 
Chiang’s best generals to accomplish their military mission and, lastly, 
the impossibility for Chiang to carry on his planned military reform. The 
defeats suffered by the Chinese army during the Ichigo offensive greatly 
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endangered the financial and military stability of the Guomindang State, 
in spite of Chiang’s will to resist and fight the Japanese. 
Chiang’s diaries are an important source also for Professor Chen Hong-
min’s essay “The Relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng 
in Taiwan as appears from Chen Cheng’s Diary”. Professor Chen is Direc-
tor of the Centre for Chiang Kai-shek and Modern History Studies at the 
University of Zhejiang University. His contribution to the workshop and to 
this book consists in a detailed analysis of the relationship between Chiang 
Kai-shek and one of his most important supporters, Chen Cheng, after the 
Guomindang’s retreat to Taiwan. Using the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek and 
those of Chen Cheng, recently deposited at the Archive of the Institute 
of Modern History at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, Chen offers a study of 
the interaction between Chiang and Chen, highlighting the differences 
between their political views on some key moments in Taiwan history, but 
also between their personalities and their attitudes towards their recipro-
cal relationship. Chen Hongmin’s essay deepens our understanding of the 
complex personal dynamics within the Guomindang in Taiwan, but also 
helps to better understand the moral code which determined the behaviour 
of both in several important passages of Taiwan’s history. 
The other four essays in the volume have a different perspective on the 
topic, focusing less on Chiang himself or on his close entourage and more 
on the international context in which the political role of Chiang and his 
China developed. 
In her essay, “Chiang Kai-shek’s Diplomats Abroad: Ambassador Fu 
Bingchang’s perspective at the first United Nations Peace Conference 
in 1946 with reference to the ‘Iran Crisis’”, Dr. Yee-Wah Foo, Senior Lec-
turer at Lincoln University, makes use of both diplomatic documents and 
the personal diary of the Chinese delegate to the 1946 conference, Fu 
Bingchang, in order to reconstruct in detail the Chinese perspectives and 
position in the first diplomatic crisis of the Cold War. She demonstrates how 
Chinese diplomats such as Fu Bingchang were able to play an important 
negotiating role between the USSR and the USA, defending at the same 
time, after all, the national interests of the Republic of China in its strategi-
cally vital relations with both powers at the end of the second world war. 
The renewed importance of China in the international dynamics in post 
war years is also highlighted by Professor Guido Samarani’s contribution. 
In his “Difficult Years: Italy’s policy on Chiang Kai-shek’s China, 1945-49”, 
Samarani, Professor of Chinese History at Ca’ Foscari University, analyses 
Italy’s policy regarding Chiang Kai-shek’s China from the end of the second 
world war to Chiang’s defeat in 1949. As a defeated country, Italy was in 
a weak international position, and its policy where China was concerned 
was characterized by the need to avoid being subjected to excessively 
penalizing conditions in the 1947 Peace Treaty and possibly to gain his 
support, or at least, not to incur Chiang’s opposition to Italy’s aspiration 
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to enter the United Nations. After 1947, in spite of Italian diplomats’ per-
ception of a future victory for the Chinese Communist Party, Italy’s policy 
concerning China was further influenced by the wish to not damage its 
relations with the United States. 
Finally, the essays of Dr. Andrea Revelant and Professor Laura De Giorgi, 
both of Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, offer insight, from different view-
points, into the public image of Chiang Kai-shek, studying the role of the 
media and of public opinion in international politics concerning China in 
the twentieth century. 
Andrea Revelant’s “Revolution Deconstructed: Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Northern Expedition in the Japanese Press, 1926-28” is an accurate study 
of the Japanese Press’ coverage of a turning point in the rise to power of 
the Nationalist Party in China, an event which was instrumental in Chiang 
Kai-shek’s own rise from the position of military commander to top political 
leader. Making use of a great number of articles from leading Japanese 
newspapers and magazines on the Northern Expedition, the analysis re-
veals the articulate response of Japanese public opinion concerning Chiang 
Kai-shek during those years. If on the one hand the Expedition gave cause 
for anxiety because of the threat it posed to Japanese interests, on the 
other, it raised the hope that a stable government would emerge after 
years of civil war. While some commentators expressed cautious opti-
mism, however, other observers held strong reservations about Nationalist 
leadership. Furthermore, coverage of the Jinan Incident shows that even 
the advocates of a policy of conciliation could assume a hardline stance 
when the Japanese military took the initiative on the ground. Actually, the 
understanding of Japanese policies involving Chiang’s China should not 
be limited to the study of State relations, but should also be seen from the 
perspective of educated public opinion and their perception of Chiang’s 
personality, ideology and power in the context of the cross-national flow 
of news and images produced by the media. 
Conversely, Laura De Giorgi’s essay, “The Alter Ego of China. Western-
ized Chinese Intellectuals and the Building of Chiang’s Image in the War-
time West” considers the efforts of the Guomindang international propa-
ganda machine to shape Chiang’s image in the eyes of Western educated 
élites during the war years. Focusing first of all on the contribution of 
Chinese intellectuals and diplomats and offering a reading of some biog-
raphies of Chiang Kai-shek in foreign languages, De Giorgi argues that, 
presenting the leader as the personification of the new, modern, national 
identity of the Chinese Republic, these works were connected to a broader 
cultural Guomindang agenda, which envisaged shaping Western discourse 
on China’s civilization and place in world history and culture. 
Together, the essays in this volume offer an overview of the major trends 
in recent studies on Chiang Kai-shek, reflecting also different cultural 
sensitivity and educational backgrounds. While scholars in East Asia have 
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mainly poured their efforts into deepening the understanding of Chiang’s 
personality and relations, scholars from Western backgrounds have mainly 
looked at Chiang and his China from the broader perspective of interna-
tional dynamics and events. Both approaches enrich our understanding 
of Chiang and of his age. 
As we move further away in time from Chiang’s life and times, and new 
historical sources become available to scholars, a better understanding 
of his place in Chinese history will hopefully be acquired. But this will be 
possible only if international scholarly dialogue and exchange develops 
fully. As the organisers of the workshop and the editors of this volume, we 
hope to have contributed to this end. 
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Abstract It is well known that Chiang Kai-shek studied in Japan in his younger days between 
April 1906 and October 1911. His experience during this period had a great influence on his political 
leadership and political thought in his later years. This article aims at confirming the facts concerning 
Chiang Kai-shek’s study in Japan and at analysing Chiang’s memories about that experience. The 
main argument is that, in order to place his experience in Japan within the context of the political 
history of 20th century China and of Chiang’s political thought and ideology, Chiang’s experience 
of studying in Japan should be understood as mixture of the facts themselves, the events related as 
memory in later years, as well as impressions and views about Japan which are from subsequent 
periods.
Summary 1 Reconfirmation of the Facts. – 1.1 First Visit to Japan. – 1.2 Second Visit to 
Japan – Shinbu Gakkō. – 1.3 The 19th Regiment of Field Artillery of the 13th Division. – 2 Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Study in Japan in His Memories – 2.1 Direct Experiences. –2.2 Indirect Experiences. – 2.3 
Interrelations Between Japanese and Chinese Cultures. – 3 Concluding Remarks – Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Study in Japan and His Politics.
Keywords Chiang Kai-shek. Memories. Daikō shugi.
It is well known that Chiang Kai-shek studied in Japan in his younger days 
between April 1906 and October 1911. His experience during this period 
had a great influence on his political leadership and political thought in 
his later years.
One of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate the facts of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s study in Japan. However, his experience in Japan was not only 
limited to his time in Japan but continued to influence his political leader-
ship and political thought throughout his life. This perspective helps to 
place his experience within the context of the political history of twentieth 
century China. 
We must note here that he rarely referred to the facts of his study in Japan 
at that time though we can confirm them partly. Many of his experiences of 
studying in Japan were revealed in later years. When Chiang discussed his 
past, he emphasized one aspect while neglecting others. Chiang’s memory 
and the logic extracted from his experiences of studying in Japan were de-
termined by the environment in which it was remembered and by his politi-
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cal life and the structure of politics of twentieth century China. Therefore, 
Chiang Kai-shek’s experience of studying in Japan should be understood as 
mixture of the facts themselves, the events related as memory in later years, 
as well as impressions and views about Japan which are from subsequent pe-
riods. I would like to begin by reconfirming the facts about his study in Japan.
1 Reconfirmation of the Facts
In order to elucidate the questions raised in this paper, it is necessary to 
review the facts of Chiang Kai-shek’s study in Japan. However, as I men-
tioned, his direct statements and the records of his activities are incom-
plete. First of all, I would like to reconfirm the facts of his days in Japan 
by mainly using the existing studies.
1.1 First Visit to Japan
Chiang Kai-shek first visited Japan for his study in April, 1906 and returned 
to China “in the winter” or “at the end of the year” in the same year. The 
exact date of his return is not known (Qin 1978-2008, 1, 14; Huang 2001, 
3). What was he doing in Japan during this stay?
Chiang left a reminiscence of events prior to 1916 before formally start-
ing to write his diary in 1917. He wrote about this visit as follows:
I went to Japan (at age nineteen) originally intending to study in the 
army. However, as the restriction was very severe, I was not allowed to 
enter the military school without having a recommendation letter from 
China’s Ministry of the Army. That year I was introduced to Sun Zhong-
shan at Miyazaki Tōten’s home by Chen Qimei. I also became acquainted 
with Chinese revolutionaries who were active in Tokyo. My feelingsfor 
the Chinese nation were deepened; moreover I could not contain my 
desire to expel the Manchu Qing and to restore China. (Chiang, n.d.)
Actually Chiang was twenty years old in 1906. Various sources indicate 
that he was studying at Seika gakkō in Tokyo during this year (Qin 1978-
2008, 1, 14; Wang, 1). Thus we must reconfirm some facts from this period.
The first question regards the Seika gakkō. Liang Qichao established the 
Tokyo kōtō daidō gakkō in Tokyo in June, 1899 with the help of Overseas 
Chinese in Japan. He himself became the principal of the school. It was a 
school to introduce Western knowledge and to educate Chinese students 
who came to Japan. Subsequently the school faced financial difficulties 
and was finally taken over by Cai Jun,the Chinese minister in Japan, and 
named Seika gakkō (Feng 1976, 107-8; Ding, Zhao 2004, 305-10).
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What did Chiang Kai-shek learn in this school? He was said to have 
learned his Japanese language there. Japanese, English, algebra, trigono-
metric, geometry, physics, and chemistry were included in the records of 
full-time students; the part-time students could select freely from those 
subjects (Guanbao, 1908, 130-5). It is however not clear that Chiang at-
tended those classes in any capacity.
The second question is whether or not he became acquainted with Chen 
Qimei and associated with the Chinese revolutionaries through Chen’s 
introduction during this stay. There are, for example, some questions re-
garding Chiang’s meeting with Chen.
It was on October 9, 1906 that Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) returned to 
Japan from Saigon. Miyazaki Tōten was publishing Kakumei Hyōron at that 
time. Both Sun’s and Miyazaki’s chronologies record that Sun often visited 
the publishing office of this journal. However, Sun’s visit to Miyazaki’s 
home is ambiguous. The only source to indicate Sun’s visit to Miyazaki’s 
home is found in the records of Miyazaki that refer to “Sun’s visit” (Mi-
yazaki 1971-76, 5, 687; Luo 1969; Chen 1991). Even at that time no record 
is found that Chen Qimei and Chiang Kai-shek visited Miyazaki’s home and 
met Sun Zhongshan. Miyazaki Tōten recalled his visit to Chen Qimei, who 
became the Shanghai military governor right after the 1911 Revolution, 
and treated him cordially. However, Miyazaki said, “Chen says he came to 
my home, but I do not know the fact” (Miyazaki 1973, 4, 312). In this con-
text, the description that Chen Qimei and Chiang Kai-shek visited Miyazaki 
Tōten and Sun Zhongshan is very uncertain. Even though Chen and Chiang 
visited Miyazaki and Sun at that time, it was not a significant event for Mi-
yazaki and Sun. Professor Huang Zijin also observed with reservation that 
“no significant exchange appeared between Sun and Chiang during this 
stay in Japan” (Huang 2011, 16). Those episodes about Chiang’s meeting 
with Chen Qimei mainly had to rely upon Chiang’s memoirs.
The third question is about the reason and circumstances as to why 
Chiang Kai-shek had to return to China at the end of 1906. He wrote that: 
“I was not allowed to enter the military school without having a recom-
mendation letter from China’s Ministry of the Army”.
The “Regulation concerning the foreign-sponsored students in the 
school under direct control of Japanese Educational Ministry” (the Or-
dinance no. 11 of the Ministry of Education) had already been issued in 
Japan on June 4, 1900. Students “were supposed to be allowed only with 
the sponsorship of China’s minister or consulate to Japan”. In addition, 
the “Regulation concerning the public and private schools which allow 
Chinese students” (the Ordinance no. 19 of the Ministry of Education) was 
proclaimed on November 2, 1905. This document was intended to control 
students from China. Article 1 of the 1905 ordinance states, “when the 
public and private schools accept the Chinese students, they must attach 
a letter of introduction from their diplomatic mission to Japan to their ap-
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plication forms” (Sanetō 1981, 186-7, 461-3). Chiang Kai-shek did not have 
the letter of introduction from Chinese diplomatic mission.
This ordinance was considered to regulate the Chinese students, and 
therefore provoked an opposition movement. One of the leaders to protest 
this measure, Chen Tianhua committed suicide at the seashore of Ōmori 
on December 8, 1905. It was during these student movements that Chiang 
Kai-shek came to Tokyo and returned to China at the end of 1906.
1.2 Second Visit to Japan – Shinbu Gakkō 
Chiang Kai-shek went to Japan for the second time in the spring of 1908, 
and entered the Shinbu Gakkō in March the same year. There is a very 
detailed analysis by Professor Huang Zijin about Chiang during the days 
of Shinbu Gakkō (Huang 2001). Here, relying on those achievements, I 
would like to reconfirm some facts from my own perspective.
First of all, the question Chiang Kai-shek had to solve for this second 
visit was that, considering the experience of his first visit in 1906, he had 
to get qualification to study in Japan. For that purpose he entered the 
Tongguo lujun sucheng xuetang in Baoding in June, 1907. The Ministry of 
Army held an examination to select the students to study in Japan from 
among those who were specializing in Japanese language in that school in 
winter of the same year. Although Chiang was not majoring in Japanese, he 
passed the examination. Passing the exam was a guarantee by the Chinese 
government to study in Japan(Liu 2001).
Shinbu Gakkō, established in 1903, was a preliminary school for Chi-
nese students who were going to study military affairs in Japan. Right 
after its establishment Yuan Shikai contributed 20,000 yen for expand-
ing the school. The Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the 
Army shared the expenditures other than the tuitions collected from the 
students. Chiang Kai-shek entered the school with its eleventh class in 
March 1908, using the name Chiang Zhiqing (Huang 2001, 16, 25-6).
Professor Huang Zijin analyzed in detail the curriculum while Chiang 
was a student. According to Professor Huang, the curriculum was di-
vided into military and general courses, with an emphasis on the latter. 
The general course included Japanese language, history and geography, 
mathematics (arithmetic, algebra, geometry and trigonometry), phys-
ics and chemistry, natural science (physiology and hygiene) and draw-
ing. Many hours were devoted to Japanese language and mathematics 
among those subjects. According to Professor Huang’s evaluation, “the 
level of those subjects was on the standard of ordinary Japanese stu-
dents of middle school”, but “for Chiang all of them were new fields 
for learning and the basis for his knowledge of modern civilization” 
(Huang 2001, 26, 30).
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What did Chiang Kai-shek learn in this school? The contents of educa-
tion contained broad fields from humanities to natural sciences. Look-
ing at his school record at his graduation he was 55th out of 62, and 
the average grade point was 68. Incidentally Zhang Qun who followed 
Chiang in later years, was in the same class. His record was 3rd, and 
his average grade point was 95 (Shinbu dai 11-ki hitsugyō-sei kibō heika 
ichiranhyō).
Considering the nature of Shinbu Gakkō, education of Japanese lan-
guage was regarded as important. There are few sources referring to 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Japanese language ability. As he was living among the 
Chinese students in Shinbu Gakkō, he could to a large extent manage 
his daily life in Chinese. However, the teaching was conducted basically 
in Japanese in that school. Training in the 19th regiment at Takada was 
naturally done using Japanese. Therefore, his ability to read and write was 
considered substantially high. Newspaper articles during Chiang’s visit to 
Japan between September 28 and November 8 in 1927 confirm his speak-
ing ability. According to those articles, Zhang Qun served as interpreter 
in many cases, but Chiang responded in Japanese to Japanese reporters 
at Kobe on October 3. The article on this occasion reported that Chiang’s 
Japanese was “fluent” and “skillful”.1
It was also important for Chiang to learn other than Japanese language 
at Shinbu Gakkō. It is important to examine what sort of knowledge he 
acquired and how he placed himself and China in the world by getting 
new knowledge. The question to be examined here is not to reconfirm the 
concrete contents of what he learned, but to find his frame of mind formed 
by the knowledge which he supposedly learned in his Japanese education. 
The four text books used at Shinbu Gakkō will be referred to here,2 though 
their analysis are to be omitted.
After learning systematically about the invasion of foreign powers 
into Asia through those text books, Chiang’s sense of national crisis and 
existence intensified.
1 Professor Iechika Ryōko in her paper “Jiang Jieshi 1927 nianqiu de fang Ri - ‘Jiang Jieshi 
riji’ yu Riben xinwen baodao de bijiao fenxi” (Chiang Kai-shek’s 1927, Travel to Japan: A 
Comparative Analysis of Chiang Kai-shek’s Diary and the Coverage of the Japanese Press), 
presented to the international symposium Chiang Kai-shek’s Diaries and the Study of the 
Republican era held in Taibei, December 2010, includes an extensive research on the Japan-
nese press reports about Chiang’s visit to Japan in 1927. For example, the articles about 
Chiang’s fluency of Japanese language can be found in Tōkyō Asahi shinbun yūkan (1927 
October 4）and Ōsaka Asahi shinbun (1927 October 4). 
2 These books were Naka Michiyo (rev.), Kuwabara Jitzuzō (ed.), Chūtō tōyō shi (A Interme-
diate History Textbook of the East), Dai Nippon Tosho 1898; Yoshikuni Tōkichi; Wada Kanae, 
Seiyō shi (Western History), Uchida rōkakuho, 1899; Yatsu, Shōei, Shinsen gaikoku chiri (A 
New Compiled Geography of Foreign Countries), rev. ed., Maruzen kabushiki gaisha, 1902; 
Yatsu Shōei, Chūchi bungaku (Intermediate Literature), Maruzen kabushiki gaisha, 1899. 
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The last question to be examined about Chiang’s days at Shinbu Gakkō 
is that the author of his chronology stated that Chiang participated in 
the Zhongguo Tongmenghui in 1908 with Chen Qimei’s introduction and 
engaged himself in the publication of a journal, Wuxue zazhi (Bugaku 
Zasshi) (Qin 1978-2008, 1, 16). No document exists concerning Chiang’s 
participation in the Tongmenghui. However, he possibly did so considering 
that he referred to this matter (Chiang, n.d.) and observing his activities 
in later years. 
The question is his participation in Wuxue zazhi. The formal name of 
this journal was called Wuxue (Bugaku) and was published by Bugaku 
Henyakusha in Tokyo. The editors and publishers were Lu Guangxi and 
Fang Rizhong. It was a Chinese journal exclusively devoted to military 
affairs. I personally own several volumes though incomplete, published 
in 1908-09.3 It covered very broad military affairs; building of the army, 
military strategy and tactics, discipline and education of army and soldiers, 
the problems of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and of horse, sapper, military 
police, transport soldiers, problems of land and sea forces, conscription 
system, columns for literature and research. Some of them were transla-
tion from Japanese literature, but Chiang Kai-shek’s name is not found 
among the authors of these literary pieces. It is not probable that Chiang 
who was studying at Shinbu Gakkō, was able to write technical articles on 
military affairs or to be engaged in editing a journal of this sort. We can 
assume that Chiang who was studying military affairs, acquired military 
knowledge through this journal.
1.3 The 19th Regiment of Field Artillery of the 13th Division 
After graduating from Shinbu Gakkō, Chiang Kai-shek entered the 19th 
regiment of field artillery of the 13th Division stationed at Takada, Nii-
gata Prefecture as a second class soldier on December 5, 1910. He be-
longed at that time to the 5th company of the 2nd battalion where Zhang 
Qun was also serving. He was 169.4 cm high and weighed 59.2 kg. He 
was promoted to the first class soldier on June 1, 1911 and to the artil-
lery leader on August 1, but was not promoted to the artillery sergeant 
for unknown reason at the same time with Zhang Qun who attained this 
position on October 1, 1911. Chiang Kai-shek together with Zhang Qun 
and Chen Xingshu slipped out of the regiment after the revolution broke 
out in Wuchang on October 10, 1911, and went back to China. The date 
3 No. 1,3,5,6,9,10 were used here. 
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when they left the regiment is not certain, but three of them “withdrew 
from the army because of the accident”.4
As to the military training in the 19th Regiment, Professor Huang Zijin 
introduced one year of the curriculum of the field artillery by using the 
“Table of One Year Education for Field Artillery” (Huang 2001, 40-1).
The year was divided into four terms, and the contents of each term con-
sisted of “academic subjects” and “military subjects”. Here, the concrete 
contents of training are to be omitted. 
As to the military training during this period, I would like to point out 
several issues in terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s memoirs from later years. The 
first issue is concerned with the table of training program used by Profes-
sor Huang Zijin, which was prepared in 1899. However, Chiang actually 
had his training in 1910-11. As eleven years had passed since its publica-
tion at the time of Russo-Japanese War, we must confirm whether there 
were changes of the contents of training during this interval. 
Although there are not enough materials to thoroughly examine this 
question, we will begin by comparing the table of subjects for training 
with the Yahōhei kyōkasho (Educational Book for Field Artillery) published 
in 1907 (Bajōsei 1907). Although the contents of subjects are almost the 
same between two documents, the most important difference was that the 
latter text book added a supplement about “three-eight field artillery”. This 
field artillery was introduced from Germany into Japanese army in 1904 as 
new weapon (Rikujō Jieitai Fuji Gakkō Tokkakai hen 1980, 81). This fact 
was reflected in the subjects of the academic training.
The introduction of “three-eight field artillery” also influenced the sub-
jects of military training. The military training dealt with the actual educa-
tion and training of the army. The Yasen hōhei sōten (Field Artillery Drills 
Book) which was revised and put into effect on December 19, 1910, prer-
supposed to introduce new weapons (Yasenhōhei sōten, 1911). According 
to the explanation at that time, “three-eight field artillery and cavalry gun 
is very different in its structure from three-one running artillery. Therefore 
the handling of them was also greatly different”. This indicated that the 
revision was made “in order to adapt itself to three-eight artillery” (Riku-
gun kyōiku shi, 1910). Chiang Kai-shek’s training in the 19th regiment was 
practiced within this context.
The second point to be noted is the question of horses. The Yasen hōhei 
sōten describes: “ammunition and horses are important elements for the 
4 Professor Kawashima Shin confirmed and elucidated those facts by using Takada 
shinbun, Takada nippo, Takada-shi shi during that period. I also would like to call attention 
to the existing article of Huang 2001, 37-40. The common materials use by three authors 
including me is “Yasenichi hōhei dai jūku rentai rekishi, Meiji 38-nen 4 gatsu tsuitachi (1905 
April 1) – Taishō 4 nen gatsu tsuitachi (1915 April 1)”  (Field Artillery 19th regiment hiss-
tory, 1905 April 1-1915 April 1), National Institute for Defense Studies Library collection.
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artillery to show their special function. Therefore, they must try to groom 
and protect them”. Seven items are included in the above mentioned cur-
riculum of field artillery. As will be discussed, the question of horses was 
one of the most important interests for Chiang in his memories of his days 
in 19th regiment. In this context, we need to pay attention to the question 
of horses.
The third point was that “Imperial mandate for the military” was in-
cluded in the curriculum. Chiang Kai-shek often referred to the education, 
spirit and discipline of Japanese army in later years in his recollection of 
his student days and the experience in Japan thereafter. The “Mandate” 
was not the only basis for his evaluation of Japanese military men, but still 
was an important source. Within this context, I would like to examine the 
points of the “Mandate” in terms of his memories.5
This document had long sentences, but every soldier was requested to 
learn by heart. However, it is not certain that Chiang Kai-shek as a for-
eigner was able to memorize it. He also never referred to this document. 
What then did this document mean to Chiang?
We must pay more attention to the latter half which generalized the 
spirit of soldiers as “right way of the universe and common practice of 
morality”. It consists of five items:
a. The soldier must be loyal to his duties, which is related to the spirit 
of patriotism. 
b. The soldier must be polite, a clear consciousness of upper and lower 
ranks and solidarity. 
c. The soldier must respect bravery. The importance of justice, cour-
age and consideration. 
d. The soldier must respect faith and loyalty. Faith means to put into 
practice his words and loyalty implies to devoting himself to his 
duties. 
e. The soldier should make it a principle to be modest. It is a warning 
to avoid luxury. 
Lastly, the document concluded that “honesty is the only guarantee” to 
realize the five items. Those five elements were closely related to Chiang’s 
standards used to evaluate Japan in later years. 
The last point to be noted from this period is the “facts” of Chiang Kai-
shek’s life in Takada. Although some episodes about his contacts with 
Japanese society remain, very few of them were confirmed as real facts. 
Through investigation in 1975 Sankei Press found the site of a small 
restaurant at Takada where Chiang often went. They interviewed Ms. 
Watanabe Teru who was the daughter of the restaurant owner, and asked 
5 The “Imperial mandate for the military” was promulgated under the name of Meiji Em-
peror on January 4, 1882 and the original document was broadly promulgated in the past. 
Here I quoted from the document included in Bajosei 1907.
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her to tell her story (Sankei shibunsha 1975, 213-5). I myself had an op-
portunity to visit the site of Takada 19th regiment of field artillery at Jōetsu 
City (former Takada) in Niigata Prefecture in December, 2009. At present 
the Japanese Self-defense Army stationed at Takada occupies that site. A 
part of the barracks from Chiang’s time and a small space for his exhibi-
tion can be found there. 
2 Chiang Kai-shek’s Study in Japan in His Memories
Based on the facts mentioned above, I will examine Chiang Kai-shek’s 
speeches and writings regarding his days in Japan.6 He recollects his days 
in Japan in his memories through speeches and writings. The recollections 
are not the facts themselves, but selective memories of some aspects of 
the facts. His selection is based on his position, thought and necessity. 
Looking at Chiang Kai-shek’s memories of his days in Japan throughout 
his life, we can distinguish three categories of speeches and writings. The 
first is his direct experience in his days in Japan between 1905 and 1911. 
The second is not limited to the above mentioned period, but more gen-
eralized and indirect expression of his experience in Japan. The third is 
a comparison of civilization between Japan and China stemming from his 
perspective as a Chinese leader. What did Chiang Kai-shek try to insist 
through those memories? In my opinion, his characteristics of political 
leadership manifested themselves in those categories. 
2.1 Direct Experiences
Chiang Kai-shek’s speeches and writings about his memories of Japan 
between 1906 and 1911 are already quoted in many writings. Relying on 
the exiting writings, I would like to re-examine this question from my own 
perspective. 
The first problem Chiang Kai-shek was concerned with in his memory 
was a habit of spitting by a Chinese student which he saw on the boat to 
Japan in 1906. 
6 I owe many of Chiang Kai-shek’s writings used in this paper to the existing works. Huang 
(2005) picked up and edited Chiang’s speeches and writings relating to Japan for his entire 
life. And, the quotations of the book edited by Sankei shibunsha (1975) overlap on many 
points with mine. Those overlapping passages were confirmed by Chiang’s speeches as basic 
documents and by using Qin Xiaoyi (1984). Different from the two documents mentioned 
above, I considered the quotations not the facts, but mainly a part of his memories.
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According to my memory, when I went to Japan for the first time at 
age 19 (in 1906), I found that a Chinese student unconsciously spit on 
the forecastle deck. A Chinese sailor discovered it and told him that 
an ordinary Japanese would not spit anywhere. If he did it, he would 
spit in his handkerchief or in the tissue paper, and then put it in his 
pocket, bring it back home to wash or to throw away. (Chiang 1969, in 
Qin 1984, 29, 390)
This speech is a part of Chiang Kai-shek’s long report to the Tenth National 
Congress of the Guomindang made at the beginning of the congress in 
March, 1960. This strong impression remained in Chiang’s memory even 
after over 50 years. Chiang even at that time thought that Chinese people 
lacked a “common sense of modern life”. It was a necessary attitude for 
a party member and ordinary people in general to master in order to pro-
mote ongoing reforms. For Chiang it was indispensable in building state 
and society for the Chinese people to liberate themselves from traditional 
bad habits and to become a polite modern person. Here he took out his 
memories of his days in Japan.
As to his study in Japan, Chiang Kai-shek most often referred to his ex-
periences in the regiment at Takada. Coldness left strong impression on 
him as southern Chinese.
Takada is a city located in Niigata Prefecture near Hokkaido. The cli-
mate of this area is very severe. They have heavy snow every winter. 
Such heavy snow cannot be found even in the northern frontier of our 
country. (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 316)
Coldness was not confined in itself. It had more effect.
I was not physically strong when I was a young boy. I came to Japan 
to study in the army at twenty years old and entered the regiment at 
Takada. I tried hard to train myself. It snowed hard there. I sometimes 
washed my body with snow or cold water. My body became stronger 
after difficult training of washing my body in this way, and the spirit 
also became healthier concurrently with strong body. (Chiang 1933, in 
Qin 1984, 11, 557)
Coldness contributed to strengthening of the human body and spirit. Wash-
ing the face with cold water in the morning was also a Japanese custom 
to be noted for Chiang Kai-shek. For every Japanese
washing his face with cold water became very popular custom all over 
the country. If someone does not do that, the others certainly consider 
him to be barbarous and not patriotic. What we know is that always 
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washing the face with cold water can inspire a man’s spirit and make 
his mind clear. That custom also strengthens his skin and makes him 
immune to colds. More importantly it can save time by doing so. The 
Chinese lack this custom. (Chiang 1934a, in Qin 1984, 12, 77-8)
It is clear in Chiang Kai-shek’s memory that washing the face with cold 
water was closely related with awakening spirit, strengthening the body, 
rationalizing life, resisting against Japan and reviving the nation. In other 
words, choosing the fact of washing the face with cold water of his memories 
in his days in Japan, was based on the challenge of the problems he faced.
As a part of the question of coldness, Chiang Kai-shek also referred to 
cold meals taken by the Japanese people in the army and in daily life.
Ordinary Japanese take cold meals every day. [...] He will carry a packed 
cold meal when he goes out during the daytime. [...] This is, in other 
words, a basic military training and military activities. They have got 
into the habit of working hard and enduring difficulty at home from 
their childhood, because their whole life has been militarized since early 
years and their soldiers could become strong. [...] The New Life Move-
ment which I am advocating now [...] intends to militarize completely 
the life of whole nation. [...] Militarization means good order, sanita-
tion, simplicity and naiveté. [...] Only by accepting these value, one 
can become a member of modern nation who has a sense of propriety, 
justice, honesty and honor, and is fitted to live in the modern world. 
(Chiang 1934a, in Qin 1984, 12, 78)
Thus the Japanese custom of eating cold meals was introduced into the 
targets of Chiang’s New Life Movement, that is, militarization, good or-
der, sanitation, simplicity and naiveté, sense of propriety, justice, honesty 
and honor, and creation of the new nation. Furthermore, this custom was 
considered one of the sources of strength of Japanese army. In this sense, 
eating cold meals by the Japanese people was one of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
choices concerning his memories of Japan. 
Chiang Kai-shek’s memories of his military life in Japan had broader 
implications. Looking over his whole life, the attitudes of “self-cultivation” 
and “self-strengthening” which meant to influence other people were im-
portant (Yamada 2009). In this context, he was attracted by the good dis-
cipline of Japanese army. 
He paid attention to the discipline of “our enemy, Japan” brought about 
by military education. It was in October, 1940 when this speech was made 
during the Sino-Japanese War. His experience in the Japanese army still 
had meaning for Chiang Kai-shek even at this point in time.
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As I saw in my days in Japan years ago, when the senior officer of the 
army examined bedrooms and a hall, at first they would see whether 
or not every corner of the room being clean and tidy, then examine the 
dust of backside of the door. They touched the bar of the door with white 
gloves. If they found dust on the gloves, the room was immediately 
judged not well in order and they had to clean it again. Then examining 
the spittoon, they had not only to see whether it was in good sanitary 
condition, but also to see whether water reached at the regulated level. 
[...] I saw here the key to successful Japanese military education.[...] The 
only secret of the success of education of the Japanese army lies in the 
fact that everything required for their whole daily life from cooking rice 
to washing all charged by soldiers, and need not to turn to outsiders. 
(Chiang 1940b, in Qin 1984, 17, 487, 492)
The military education of Japan penetrated even into the daily life of the 
army, which contributed to maintaining discipline. Chiang Kai-shek found 
the strength of Japanese army in this aspect. Furthermore, military educa-
tion and discipline was related to the problems of sanitation, cleanliness 
and order. These problems constituted in part to the strengthening of the 
Chinese army, party and nation which were compatible with his New Life 
Movement. 
Other elements Chiang Kai-shek abstracted from his memory of disci-
plined life in the army were simple meals and monotonous time. As to a 
simple life of eating, he stated:
[After entering the regiment] each person could eat only a medium-sized 
cup of rice in the Japanese army, and had to eat a boiled mixture of rice 
and barley several times during the week. Three pieces of pickled radish 
or salted fish were on the rice on other occasion. It was only on Sunday 
when we could eat some bean curd, green vegetables and meat. Re-
gardless of being full or not, the amount of rice and vegetables for each 
person was limited to this volume. (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 317) 
Even in this condition, 
the lower officers and soldiers in general were physically very good, 
and there was no health problem. This practice to limit the food was 
tried at Yunnan Chiangwutang earlier. According to their investigation, 
many of the students fell ill before having limited the amount of food, 
but the number of sick students even decreased three months after the 
restriction of food. (Chiang 1942, in Qin, 19, 185)
Thus, limiting the amount of food in the Japanese army resulted in strength-
ening Chiang Kai-shek himself and Chinese soldiers.
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As to monotonous life in the regiment, Chiang Kai-shek stated:
I spent one year in the regiment as mere soldier. The life was extremely 
monotonous and severe. At that time I felt it unreasonable because of 
the restriction of discipline, monotone of life and boringness. However, 
recollecting the past now, the basis for me to be able to live a simple life 
every day, to work constantly and to live a life for forty years as usual, 
was surely established in this one year of training as soldier. I feel that 
my will and spirit of revolution for my whole life thus became patient 
and not afraid of anything thanks to one year’s experience as soldier. 
(Chiang 1946, in Qin 1984, 32, 154)
Enduring a monotonous life also resulted in Chiang Kai-shek’s present 
strength. 
Another question to be examined about Chiang Kai-shek’s memory at 
Takada regiment was grooming a horse. As pointed out, taking care of 
horses occupied an important position in the training of the artillery regi-
ment. As to grooming a horse, Chiang stated as follows:
After washing the face, the senior officer takes us to the stable and leads 
us to rub a horse down. The task of rubbing a horse starts from hoofs 
and thigh to the back. We would rub from the horse’s back to the head 
and tail. We had to rub every joint and muscle of the horse by bundle of 
straws with all our might. Then, the whole body of the horse would get 
warm after rubbing for about an hour, and the pulse would get smooth. 
We ourselves rubbed a horse down with strength and worked hard. 
Thus we came to feel not cold in this cold weather, and our body, hands 
and feet got hot, and sometimes sweated. [...] After finishing rubbing 
a horse, we again take it to the horse bucket outside of the stable cov-
ered with snow and lead it to eat and drink water. After the horse had 
enough food, we finally went back to our barracks and had breakfast. In 
the evening again we went to the stable and rubbed a horse down, and 
after that could finally eat supper. (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 316-7)
This grooming of a horse was for Chiang “the greatest training in my whole 
life. Nowadays I believe that it was on this occasion that I had the inspira-
tion to consider worry to be happiness, and not to be afraid of difficulty” 
(Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 316-7).
Chiang Kai-shek also referred to grooming a horse on another occasion. 
“I found the spirit of Japanese army in this aspect at that time. That is the 
point we especially have to learn” (Chiang 1940a, in Qin 1984, 17, 41). 
That is to say, for Chiang grooming a horse was not confined in itself. The 
experience at that time constituted his spiritual basis. The Japanese army 
was a model to be followed.
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2.2 Indirect Experiences
In this chapter I will deal with Chiang Kai-shek’s life in Japan and with what 
he learned and heard there other than the period when he was a student. 
We must ask what he tried to extract from that experience, and how that 
experience was related with his memories in his student days in Japan. 
The most distinct contrast between his memories of his days in Japan 
and his view of Japan during the rest of his life was his feeling of humilia-
tion toward Japan. The aspect of conflict occupied many years of Chiang’s 
entire life. Needless to say, the conflict was most severe during the time 
of Sino-Japanese War. 
“Wiping out humiliation” (xuechi) toward Japan was related with “saving 
the nation” (jiuguo). “If we try to save our nation, first we must save the 
spirit of our nation. If we try to save the nation, first we must save the na-
tionhood. Therefore, in order to revive the spirit of the nation, then we must 
surely begin by self-governing and self-strengthening” (Chiang 1932a, in 
Qin 1984, 10, 529). Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude confronting the Japanese in-
vasion resulted in wiping out humiliation, saving the nation, self-governing 
and self-strengthening. This showed that Chiang for everything started 
from strengthening one’s own power position. 
The next point to be noted is that Chiang Kai-shek tried to selectively 
extract useful elements for China from his experiences in Japan including 
his life in the army. He got the Soldier’s Handbook of the Japanese army 
in 1940 amid the Sino-Japanese War and chose the following items from “the 
preface” consisting of 20 paragraphs. “Absolute obedience to the military 
officer and acting with courtesy” was required. “Courtesy” meant “keeping 
of discipline”. The soldier “must do his best to help and support his war 
comrades, highly respect mutual courtesy, and further have the spirit to 
sacrifice himself for others” (Chiang 1940a, in Qin 1984, 17, 37-43).
A soldier must deal with the affairs of his family well and get rid of 
worry before going to war. The will to fight beyond life and death was 
important. Keeping the training, sanitation and health while awaiting or-
ders are included with those items. Furthermore, this handbook required 
grooming a horse,having a will not to retreat when wounded, to respect 
the war dead and the wounded, not to be deceived by Japanese army, and 
to highly regard the importance of propaganda and espionage. These were 
general matters for the officers and soldiers to keep in mind when engaged 
in directing the army. However, looking all the items, they have common 
traits with his memories from his student days in Japan such as discipline 
of the army, unity and mutual assistance and the spirit for sacrifice. “We 
must surely pay attention especially to the morals of the army and mili-
tary law” (Chiang 1940a, in Qin 1984, 17, 37-43). Within this context, the 
second volume of this handbook which exclusively dealt with the army 
morals, was important.
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As an extension of this tendency Chiang Kai-shek summarized on other 
occasions what he learned from the Japanese army into the following 
three points: 
a. We “must absolutely obey the law of government, keep strictly to 
the discipline of the army and execute the order of senior officers”. 
b. We “must highly regard the importance of political training, estab-
lish our core principle, fight for Three People’s Principles (sanmin 
zhuyi), engage in the military service with strong will and complete 
the great task of revolution and building the nation”. 
c. We “must try to learn a sort of necessary skill for our daily life and 
train the middle cadres to build the nation and to remodel the soci-
ety” (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 319). 
It is evident that Chiang was trying to directly apply what he learned 
from Japan to the execution of Chinese revolution. 
The third point to be noted about Chiang Kai-shek’s indirect experi-
ence of Japan is that he was trying to find the source of the strength of 
Japanese army. From this perspective he paid attention to the importance 
of education in comparison with China. “Hereafter if we wish to build our 
state and revive our nation, there is no other basic way than developing 
education. Therefore, education is essentially the greatest work for sav-
ing and reviving the nation” (Chiang 1934a, in Qin 1984, 12, 75).
Recollecting his life in the Japanese army at the beginning of the New 
Life Movement, Chiang Kai-shek stated that the education which was 
equivalent to “the sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor” was 
going on in Japanese army. “They (Japanese) nowadays finally built such 
a rich and strong state after carrying out an education of this sort for 
more than several decades” (Chiang 1934a, in Qin 1984, 12, 77). Educa-
tion was the source of the strength of Japanese army. 
I paid attention to three major points Chiang Kai-shek extracted from 
his indirect experiences in his life in the Japanese army. The common 
element of those three points was his attitude to try to find the source of 
strength of Japanese state and army and to apply them to strengthening 
China. As referred to in the previous chapter, it was also related to the 
elements he tried to extract from his direct experiences in his student 
days in Japan. However, it must not be forgotten that war with Japan had 
been going on for most of the years during which Chiang formed these 
attitudes. 
2.3 Interrelations Between Japanese and Chinese Cultures
Chiang Kai-shek referred to the characteristics of Chinese culture on vari-
ous occasions. When he discussed Japanese culture in comparison with 
its Chinese counterpart, he had his own logic. While he based his analysis 
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on his direct experiences in Japan, it revealed his view of Japan beyond 
those experiences. 
Japan’s “national soul” or “Japanese military soul” make up “Bushidō” and 
the “Japanese Spirit”. Its contents consist of “loyalty and patriotism, respect 
for chivalry and fondness for justice” (Chiang 1934b, in Qin 1984, 12, 362). 
Japan’s strength, however, originated “not in the influence of Western sci-
ence but in the philosophy of China”.What then is this Chinese philosophy? 
It is the “Confucian Way”, which can be traced back to “Zhuxi’s Scholarship” 
from the Song Dynasty. Chiang highly evaluated “Wang Yangmin’s Scholar-
ship” and emphasized the concepts of “the unity of knowing and doing” and 
“encouragement of natural knowledge” (Chiang 1950, in Qin 1984, 23, 313-
4; Chiang 1932b, in Qin 1984, 10, 534-5).
Here I will not deal with the contents of the concepts themselves re-
ferred by Chiang Kai-shek. The issue is in his logic. According to Chiang, 
the Japanese way of thinking mentioned above was the source of their 
strength. Supposing that the Japanese thinking and philosophy originated 
in Chinese thought, it is logically appropriate then to return to Confucian-
ism as China’s traditional thought in order to enrich and strengthen China. 
However, when Chiang referred to Chinese tradition for the sake of nation 
building, he did not necessarily presuppose the existence of Japan.
Chiang Kai-shek’s logic concerning the interrelationship between Japa-
nese and Chinese cultures had a complicated nature. On one hand “if both 
cultures have an intimate relation, we should consider how we can be 
friendly and should try to live together in mutual prosperity” (Chiang 1938, 
in Qin 1984, 30, 279). On the other hand, he stated as follows:
The reason why Japan succeeded nowadays as a conquering nation, is 
only because she partially put into practice the philosophy of Wang Yang-
ming. Unfortunately Japan did cut off a part of Chinese philosophy, and 
did not extract its whole essence. (Chiang 1932c, in Qin 1984, 10, 604)
According to Chiang’s logic, Japan became strong relying on distorted 
Chinese philosophy and invaded China by what she stole from China. This 
logic explained Japan’s invasion while he was expecting peace. It also 
manifested his ambivalent feelings of love and hatred toward Japan.
3 Concluding Remarks – Chiang Kai-shek’s Study in Japan  
and His Politics
The words, “Chiang Kai-shek’s politics” sounds ambiguous. Here I intended 
to discuss his psychology and attitude as a Chinese politician. Therefore, 
specific policies, thought and ideology were not the objects of analysis. It 
will, however, define all framework within which the individual policies 
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of Chiang and Guomindang can be understood. Furthermore, it contains 
an element which was universally applied toward the political leaders of 
modern China. 
As is well known, Chiang Kai-shek went to Japan for study twice be-
tween 1906 and 1911. This time includes three periods; Seika Gakkō, Shin-
bu Gakkō and no. 19 Regiment of no. 13 Division Field Artillery at Takada. 
The ‘facts’ regarding Chiang’s activities in Japan during this period are 
not necessarily clear enough. Much of the existing research on Chiang 
during his student days in Japan, is mainly based on his memories from 
later years. That is to say, ‘memories’ were treated as ‘facts’. However, 
‘memories’ are not ‘facts’. ‘Facts’ are chosen through ‘memories’. That 
is to say, some aspects of a fact are deleted, while others are added. The 
‘facts’ chosen through ‘memories’ are not the fact itself, but manifestations 
of the imagined scenery by the people who remembered that scene at vari-
ous times. Thus, I began by confirming the facts about Chiang’s activities 
in his student days in Japan, and tried to reconstruct his memories about 
his days in Japan which were expressed in later years. His later memories 
of Japan are not the facts themselves, but rather showed his psychological 
attitude toward Japan and his own politics. 
What characteristics can we extract from his memories of Japan?
Firstly, he tried to show a strength and superiority obtained through his 
experiences in Japan. Chiang Kai-shek as a leader wanted to show himself 
to be superior to the ordinary masses intellectually and physically and had 
to prove his own strength. It was the logic of “self-strengthening” (ziqiang)
which prioritized his own strength over others. Within this context, he felt 
his experiences in Japan strengthened him and chose those experiences 
from his memories. 
It is very hot during the summer in Takada, and the humidity was high. 
But, Chiang Kai-shek chose coldness, suggesting that he became physi-
cally and spiritually strong and healthy by the life-style experienced in 
this coldness. He noticed the frugal meals instead of luxurious food which 
he failed to get. He felt that this experience contributed to preserving 
himself in good health. Furthermore, he became patient by enduring the 
monotonous daily life in the army.
Secondly, Chiang Kai-shek presented himself as a model for military men 
and the ordinary masses by his spirit of “self-strengthening”. He suggested 
that they behave in the same way. The process of “self-cultivation” leading 
to “self-strengthening” was important for Chiang. Within this context, his 
memories of his student days in Japan were useful. 
Chiang noted that in Japan the senior officer went into the bedrooms of 
soldiers and the halls and directed the arrangement of the rooms, in order 
to keep the discipline of army life. Thus keeping discipline was connected 
with cleanliness and sanitation. For example, his attitude manifested itself 
in his criticism of spitting. 
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Indirectly Chiang’s observations and experiences in Japan influenced his 
New Life Movement beginning in 1934. The aims of the Movement such as 
militarization, order, sanitation, simplicity and naiveté, sense of propriety, 
justice, honesty and honor, were adopted in order to create a new and 
strong modern nation. The various elements indicated in his style of life 
had an important meaning in the process from Chiang’s self-cultivation to 
self-strengthening which were related to his experiences in Japan.
Thirdly, Chiang Kai-shek tried to find the origin of the strength of Japa-
nese army in his memories from his days in Japan. This effort came from 
his desire to understand his own weaknesses and to strengthen the nation. 
His ultimate goal was to create a strong nation and army. This attitude 
was ultimately related to his logic of self-strengthening. He wanted to 
build a nation and an army surpassing Japan during Sino-Japanese War 
while being aware of the experiences of Japan as an enemy. His formula 
included wiping out humiliation, saving the nation, self-governing and 
self-strengthening. As discussed above, this attitude appeared in Chiang’s 
experiences and memories.
According to Chiang,the Japanese customs of washing the face with cold 
water and eating cold meals, and their attitude of saving and simplicity 
were sources of the strength of Japanese army. Ideological education and 
complete penetration of discipline, and diffusion of education throughout 
Japan also contributed to strengthening Japan and Japanese people.
The fourth point is the question of the horse. As referred to earlier, 
training and grooming a horse were among the most important duties for 
field artillery. He established his spiritual basis through his experience of 
grooming a horse. He considered that experience to be a valuable model 
to learn from the Japanese army. 
The fifth point is Chiang’s comparison of Japanese and Chinese cultures. 
Chiang considered that the spiritual basis of Japanese and Japanese army 
was in the “Japanese Spirit”, “Bushidō” and loyalty and patriotism. This 
ideological system was the foundation on Japanese strength. However, 
according to Chiang, the spiritual basis of Japanese was formed under 
the influence of a part of China’s traditional thoughts consisting of Confu-
cianism, Zhuxi’s scholarship and Wang Yangming’s scholarship. This fact 
had two implications. On one hand, it implied that Chinese thought and 
philosophy still had superiority over the Japanese people. On the other 
hand, Japan became strong by a philosophy imported from China. China 
however, experienced humiliation being invaded by Japan. This logic was 
an manifestation of Chiang’s ambivalent feelings of love and hate toward 
Japan. Chiang Kai-shek articulated his political position through positive 
experiences in Japan. However, his humiliation experienced during the 
Sino-Japanese War also must not be forgotten.
The sixth point is that Chiang Kai-shek acquired broad knowledge and 
insight about China and the world through his study in Japan. At the same 
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time it gave him an opportunity to participate in Chinese politics leading to 
the 1911 Revolution through acquaintances with Chinese revolutionaries 
there. In this context, participation in the revolutionary movement was a 
by-product of his study in Japan, and was also the aim itself. 
Lastly, let me consider Chiang Kai-shek’s politics within the whole struc-
ture of modern Chinese politics. In the past I proposed to adopt a concept 
of “Daikōshugi” (substitutionism) as an element of continuity of Chinese 
politics in the twentieth century. It is defined as “a system and style of 
political leadership, in which a group of elite sets up the target of reform 
in place of the people, puts political consciousness into them, mobilizes the 
people for the realization of their targets, but lacks the institutional guar-
antee for the people to participate in politics voluntarily” (Yamada 2007).
This definition involves some questions. The first question is what politi-
cal target the political leaders set up for the people. That is the leader-
ship of political leaders over the people. The second is how the leaders 
put political consciousness into the people. In this case, the conditions of 
politics are to be determined by how the political leaders judge the degree 
of political consciousness of the people. The third point is the degree of 
institutionalization of raising objection by the people against the state 
and the party. The question to be asked is to what extent the government 
and party allow the voluntary political participation of the people. The 
system lacks institutional framework to solve the political conflicts. The 
fourth point concerning substitutionism is that maintaining the power of 
the leadership required absolute priority over the people, and therefore 
the apparatus, means and resources for that purpose must be taken into 
consideration. However, all of these questions were not necessarily con-
nected directly with Chiang’s student days in Japan; for it was before he 
came into power, and in this context he did not confront the question of 
institutionalizing the people’s political participation. Rather, the question 
of what the political leaders should be in substitutionism, was his major 
interest in terms of his experiences in Japan. 
In terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s memories centering around his student 
days in Japan referred to earlier, these do not concludes all aspects of his 
life in Japan. These memories were selected from various aspects of his 
life in Japan. His attitude toward “self-strengthening”, his consciousness of 
intellectual and physical superiority over the people, his desire to create a 
strong China, and his feeling of humiliation constituted a part of leadership 
of substitutionism. In this sense, Chiang Kai-shek’s attitudes discussed in 
this paper are to be located in the broader context of Chinese politics in 
the twentieth century.
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During the second world war, American General Joseph Stilwell severely 
criticized Chiang Kai-shek’s lack of will to fight the Japanese invaders. 
However, as Hans Van de Ven (2003) and Chi Hsi-sheng (Qi 2011) dem-
onstrate in their respective works, such a view, though dominant in the 
field for more than three decades, cannot stand up to a close examina-
tion of relevant archives and other primary source materials, which only 
recently have been made available. Obsessed with his defeat in Burma 
in 1942, Stilwell not only exaggerated the strategic importance of that 
campaign but also misinterpreted Chiang’s wartime strategy, especially 
his determination to fight the Japanese invasion to the end. While rem-
edying the previous deficiency in the field, however, recent scholar-
ship focuses so much attention on the second Burma campaign that it 
largely overlooks the largest offensive ever launched by the Japanese 
army throughout its history. I propose to examine a series of Japanese 
campaigns codenamed Ichigo, and will rely in large part on Chiang Kai-
shek’s diaries to examine how he dealt with them. My essay will be di-
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vided into two parts. The first part deals with the offensive and Chiang’s 
command during it, while the second describes Chiang’s handling of 
defensive failures.
To begin, I want to point out Western observers tend to see Chiang Kai-
shek as a national leader in a mature nation who faced far greater expecta-
tion than he could deliver. Such observations have merit, yet they underes-
timate the impact of the Japanese attacks beginning in 1937, which lasted 
more than four years. The Japanese occupation of the coastal provinces 
and rocketing military spending drove the Nationalist government to a low 
point, while the winter offensive of 1939 clearly showed Chiang’s inability 
to mobilize regional and local forces as he would like. In 1940 the national 
currency fabi fell so dramatically that a stabilization fund of 5 million Eng-
lish pounds could not prevent its depletion within several months. In 1941, 
another stabilization fund supported by American and British credit failed 
to prevent a new wave of devaluation of the fabi, which forced Chiang to 
centralize the collection of land taxes, thereby prompting severe strains 
with provincial governments and encouraging centripetal tendencies. 
Some of his trusted generals seemed to join the ranks of residual warlords 
such as Long Yun of Yunnan, Pan Wenhua of Sichuan, and Yan Xishan, all of 
whom posed serious threats to Chiang Kai-shek’s government and drasti-
cally undermined his ability to make war (Chiang, Riji 1942, May 31). In 
a time of high inflation, Chiang had no choice but to tolerate corruption 
such as trading with enemies and other illegal practices, which further 
diminished the army’s will to make determined resistance.
In 1941, while seeking to stifle Nationalist outside contacts, to take 
advantage of the near destruction of the Nationalist air force, and bomb 
the Nationalist government into capitulation, the Japanese army launched 
military action to pacify areas of the coastal China behind their front 
lines, where the Communist Party had maintained a vigorous presence 
and built grassroots power with the support of mobilized and organized 
peasants. The offensive reduced Communist territory and Communist-
ruled population, forcing the Communist Party centre to evacuate many 
higher-ranking cadres to Yan’an to enjoy a safer environment while also 
simultaneously undertaking rectification campaigns. The Nationalist sus-
pense of appropriations and tightening up of economic blockade in the 
Yan’an area, as well as shrunken territory behind the Japanese lines, 
meant that the Communists also suffered a financial crisis, which re-
sulted in what Mark Selden (1971) called the Yan’an Way. Lowering peas-
ant’s burdens, the Communists initiated a series of reforms that aimed 
to reduce their military and administrative expenses. In desperation, the 
Party even began to plant and sell opium to make ends meet during this 
difficult time period, yet it was also able to implement rectification and 
cadre screening to strengthen the unity of its rank-and-file (Chen 1995, 
263-98; Xiao 2013,1, 399-457; Gao 2000).
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Three years later, in 1944, the Japanese Ichigo Offensive was aimed at 
three provinces of National China – Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi – respec-
tively located in North China, Central China and South China. The major 
commanders of these three provinces can be separated into three groups. 
In Henan, the major commanders came from the Whampoa Military Acad-
emy, where Chiang Kai-shek had served as its first commandant. In Hunan, 
the major commanders came from Guangdong within the Northern Expe-
ditionary Army. In Guangxi, the major commanders were residual warlords 
incorporated into the Northern Expeditionary Army. I will first discuss how 
Chiang Kai-shek directed them to resist the Japanese offensive respectively 
in these three provinces and later examine his measures in coping with 
military debacles and their consequences. The subtitles serve to highlight 
my characterization of the three battles in the three provinces.
1 Commercialization vs Mechanization: the Henan Battles 
While the Imperial Headquarters considered the mobilization of 400,000 
to 500,0000 soldiers to launch the Ichigo Offensive, the largest campaign 
ever undertaken by the Japanese army in its history, Chiang Kai-shek was 
preoccupied with the urging of both America and Britain for the participat-
ing in the Burma Campaign, not to mention the Russian bombing of the 
Xinjiang-Outer Mongolia borders. Actually, the Japanese attack at Impahal 
of India in the spring of 1944 surprised the Allied powers for its scale, and 
both General Stilwell and General Mountbatten urged Chiang to throw in 
his Yunnan forces in coordination with the attack of the Chinese army in 
India, but Britain’s refusal to honour the commitment of a sizable naval 
presence in south Burma led him to refuse to send more troops to north 
Burma. Chiang strengthened his case by citing fears of a possible Japanese 
offensive in China, but his diaries suggest that he consistently underes-
timated Japanese intension and capability. Instead, he was so optimistic 
as to propose other actions to his generals in the China Theatre. Earlier, 
during a military conference in Hunan, Chiang considered it was time for 
his army to prepare for a counteroffensive, asking his field commanders to 
identify geographical goals and telling them what should be taken as guid-
ance (Chiang, Riji 1944, February 9). In early April, he thought Japan had 
transferred its China Theatre troops to the India-Burma region, and that 
it was an opportune time for the Chinese to launch an offensive (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, April 9). Once Japan acted contrarily and began a serious of-
fensive in the China Theatre, Chiang still thought that the Japanese were 
unable to amass an army larger than several infantry divisions. 
The main goal that Japan’s Ichigo Offensive aimed to achieve was the 
linkage of three railroads (Peking-Wuhan, Wuhan-Guangzhou, and Heng-
yang-Guilin), as well as the near destruction of American airbases nearby 
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that made the Japanese homeland and logistical lines vulnerable to strate-
gic bombing. This offensive required the Japanese to mobilize troops from 
Manchuria and other parts of occupied China, particularly withdrawing 
troops fighting against the Communist guerilla forces. The concentrated 
Japanese force would first cross the Yellow River, which was then flowing 
southward to the Huai River and cut the Japanese occupied China into 
the northern and central parts. With the reinforcement of the attacking 
Japanese forces from the North China, the Middle Yangtze Japanese forces 
could then move to conquer and occupy Hunan province, especially its 
capital, as well as the valley and the railroad along the Xiang River. Fi-
nally, this Japanese army would receive support from the Japanese army 
in south China and northern Vietnam, and in a coordinated attack occupy 
Guangxi, especially areas along the railroad piercing its northern part. 
Guangxi was the home province of the Guangxi army, over which Chiang 
had only nominal control.
In early March, Chiang took notice of the Japanese attempt to repair 
the Yellow River Bridge near the railroad junction town Zhengzhou, but 
he thought the Japanese goal was to prepare a retreat route for its army 
in Wuhan, where Japan maintained the only offensive army corps in China. 
In his judgment, repairs would take several months and the best coun-
ter strategy was incessant bombing (Chiang, Riji 1944, March 4). Chiang 
thought it would take the Japanese more than two months to complete the 
reconstruction of the iron bridge, which meant that he had plenty of time 
to request aid from the American air forces in China. Even if the Ameri-
can air forces could not come in time, he thought his army was capable of 
delaying the Japanese offensive and in the meantime launching a counter 
offensive in the Three Gorges Area in the middle Yangtze to harass the 
Japanese army that might began a retreat from Wuhan (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
March 8, March 18). 
In late March, Chiang read a digest of one British newspaper, which 
criticized the poor command of the Chinese army, the inappropriate use 
of the equipment and uneconomic use of human resources, and rampant 
corruption under cowardly leadership. Chiang considered the critical re-
ports a “precious materials” worth pondering by his generals and civilian 
leaders and in the very day he endorsed the plan to reinforce Myitkyina 
from western Yunnan in view of the Japanese attack at the Indian border 
Imphal. He seemed to have been preoccupied himself with the situation in 
Burma rather than inside China (Chiang, Riji 1944, March 31). 
Some intelligence reports about Japanese redeployment of troops failed 
to alert him into reconsidering his military plan about Beiping-Wuhan Rail-
road in Henan. He did not begin to pay serious attention to the Japanese of-
fensive until two days after the Japanese overwhelmed the heavily fortified 
Haiwangcheng in April 17 on the south bank of the Yellow River (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, April 19). It was a serious signal, but still he took it lightly. The 
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Japanese redeployment not only sent serious signals in terms of unusual 
railroad traffic north of the Yellow River, but by the withdrawal of mopping 
up forces from Communist occupied Shanxi and the transfer of units from 
the Yellow River Bend front eastward to the Yellow River Bridge (Nihon 
Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 206-7). It was understandable 
if the Communist army chose to withhold vital intelligence, but Chiang’s 
own intelligence department also failed scandalously. Misled by success-
ful resistance against the westward Japanese army, Chiang believed the 
Japanese meant to primarily attack southward along the Beijing-Wuhan 
railroad. Confident of Tang Enbo’s Henan army, he thought he could stem 
the Japanese offensive, which he called a stupid move (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
April 22). He had secretly amassed a huge army west of the Beiping-Wuhan 
Railroad in the hilly and mountainous areas, and hoped they would win a 
victory in the plain west of the walled city of Xuchang, a key rail junction. 
On 23 April, Chiang asked General Claire Chennault about bombing 
the Yellow River Bridge, but American air bombers went into action four 
days later. It was only ten days after a Japanese division forced the Yel-
low River 25 miles east of the Iron Bridge that the American bombers 
finally appeared, and their strikes proved totally ineffective. Chennault’s 
bombers returned the next day, but this time due to reasons unknown 
they failed to even reach the destination. Far worse was their release 
of the unused bombs on their way to Kunming, southwest China, result-
ing in numerous deaths of Chinese refugees (Chiang, Riji 1944, April 23, 
April 26, April 28). The situation continued to deteriorate when a planned 
third bombing mission was aborted. By this time, Chiang had suffered a 
serious intelligence failure that resulted in his total unawareness of the 
Japanese moving a whole tank division other than infantry units across the 
Yellow River Bridge, preparing to launch a blitzkrieg against a Chinese 
army that had never seen tanks in formation, let alone the possession 
and use of anti-tank weapons. The Japanese army now including at least 
four infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade, kept its intension secret 
as their infantry units moved southward as Chiang had expected by this 
time. Unfortunately for Chiang, this seemingly stupid move by the Japa-
nese army ended up easily breaking the defences of Xuchang, where Tang 
Enbo had assigned a division for the task. With only about two thousand 
men at his disposal, the division commander, a young Whampoa officer, 
fought heroically and committed suicide when his undersized force col-
lapsed on May 1. It was a hard fight lasting slightly more than 24 hours 
(Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 372-84, 389-90; Chiang, 
Riji 1944, April 30), but Chiang did not realize that a much more serious 
debacle lay in store. 
Persistently misjudging Japanese ambition and overestimating the fight-
ing capability of his own troops, Chiang made another strategic blunder. 
Originally he sought to use his Henan army to fight a decisive war near 
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Xuchang. In fact, Tang Enbo had responded to his opinion and asked for 
permission to fight, but after pondering on the fighting capability of Tang’s 
troops Chiang ended up hesitating. Apart from a lack of confidence in 
Tang’s army, he worried such an action might lure the Japanese forces 
away from their intention to link the Beijing-Wuhan railroad and attack 
instead at Luoyang, the ancient capital of China, which was located to 
the northeast of Xuchang along the Yellow River. He thus asked Tang 
Enbo and his army to withdraw to the nearby hilly areas, in the hope that 
constant menace from the west would prevent the Japanese from main-
taining unimpeded railroad transportation, even though he did not doubt 
the Japanese capability to move southward along the railroad (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, May 2). 
But the development of subsequent events surprised him and then 
caused him to panic. Just before Chiang made his strategic decision, a 
Japanese army of at least three infantry divisions had moved southward 
along the Beijing-Wuhan railroad. One Japanese infantry division suddenly 
made a turnabout and, spearheaded by a tank division and a cavalry bri-
gade, launched a blitzkrieg strike along a river valley pointing towards 
Loyang (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 452). According 
to one Japanese estimate, this tank division was half strength of a regular 
one, with only 20 to 30 percent firing power of a Russian tank division 
(Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 163). Nonetheless, having 
never seen such a large tank force, Tang Enbo’s army immediately fell into 
disarray and broke into smaller units, running for safety into the mountain-
ous areas of western Henan. In his own attempt to run for his life, Tang 
Enbo went further west and lost touch with his scattered troops. Chiang 
sought to reach these forces directly through phone calls, ordering them to 
stand and fight, even though the Japanese forces broke their positions. He 
also repeatedly ordered General Tang to return to the fronts and assume 
the actual responsibility of commanding troops. Despite his strict orders, 
the fronts did not stabilize as he had hoped. Instead, a contingent of the 
Japanese tank force followed the footsteps of the retreating Chinese army 
along a river valley, and soon reached the highland guarding the southern 
approach to Luoyang, while the main Japanese force continued to devote 
its energy to searching and destroying Tang Enbo’s beaten and demoral-
ized army (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 4).
In these desperate times, another Japanese division moved westward 
along the right bank of the Yellow River and the Longhai Railroad and 
penetrated the Chinese positions manned by Jiang Dingwen’s troop of 
the First War Zone, thereby prompting another panicky retreat. Chiang 
tried to put a stop to this debacle, making numerous phone calls to the 
two generals, Tang Enbo and Jiang Dingwen, and, disregarding the chain 
of command, directly issuing orders to their subordinates. On May 4, he 
worked until three o’clock of the next day (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 4). With 
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several hours’ rest, he continued to urge and exhort General Jiang, General 
Tang, and their subordinates to stand and fight, while also asking his air 
force to bomb the advancing Japanese vanguard and dropping copies of 
a letter he had written to encourage the front commanders both east and 
south of Luoyang (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 5).
When the Japanese stopped for a respite, Chiang found his army in a 
chaotic state he could not imagine. The Japanese pause in their attack at 
Luoyang did not mean the suspension of their offensive, just that they had 
made the destruction of General Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo’s major 
troops their top priority. Unaware of the Japanese intensions, Chiang sim-
ply determined that his two generals unable to comply with his orders and 
maintain contacts with each other, as well as their scattered combat units. 
Chiang was extremely upset by General Jiang’s false report of a serious 
Japanese breakthrough, which aerial reconnaissance proved otherwise. 
General Jiang also behaved despicably by moving his headquarters from 
Luoyang to further west without informing Chiang and his subordinate 
units. Chiang thought that General Jiang had hidden his whereabouts in 
order to prevent his underlings from looking for his guidance and instruc-
tions (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 7; Liu 1996, 656-7, 661). 
Pained and grieved by the questionable performance of his generals, 
Chiang cursed them for their cowardly and incompetent behaviour. In his 
rage, he cited a long-standing public criticism that Tang Enbo had devoted 
too much time to smuggling with Japanese occupied areas and had failed 
to adequately train his troops (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 4). Though not blam-
ing General Jiang Dingwen on the same grounds, Chiang certainly knew 
the latter had also amassed a fortune through commercial and smuggling 
activities. He instead focused his criticism on Jiang Dingwen’s lack of com-
mandership. Thanks to Jiang Dingwen’s inability to command his troops in 
a military urgency, Chiang found he had to bypass the Ministry of Military 
Command chain and gave orders directly to Jiang’s subordinate officers, 
thus acting like General Jiang Dingwen’s “chief of staff”, and enabling Jiang 
to shed his responsibility (Chian, Riji 1944, May 6, May 31). 
On May 8, an aerial reconnaissance report that 200 Japanese vehicles 
were approaching Luoyang from the east suggested an imminent attack 
at the ancient capital. This information led Chiang to consider a plan for 
the defence of Luoyang. Without considering the serious consequences, he 
rashly ordered the withdrawal of Jiang Dingwen’s motley forces from the 
east. On that night, he prayed five times to God for the defence of Luoyang 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, May 8). The subsequent quietness of the fronts led him 
to regret yielding the area east of Luoyang without a fight, and circum-
stances quickly worsened following a sudden crossing of the Yellow River 
by the Japanese army from Shanxi, threatening to attack Luoyang with 
more than a division from the west (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 10, May 11). 
Chiang now had to worry about a siege of Luoyang from three directions: 
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east, south, and west. Acting on their own and eager for an even greater 
victory, one Japanese tank division launched an offensive at the walled 
ancient capital, but the higher command immediately ordered a suspen-
sion of the assault. It harboured a different plan for conquering Luoyang 
(Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 602-6). 
Still trying to organize a counteroffensive, Chiang conceived of a stra-
tegic plan that would require the assembling of a large force to the south-
west of Luoyang and with Luoyang as bait to lure and divert the major 
Japanese forces. While weakening the assaulting force by a positional war 
at Luoyang, he would then use his regrouped forces to strike a crushing 
blow on the Japanese army in a mobile war outside the walled city (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, May 10-16). To aid in the defence of Luoyang, Chiang urged air 
strikes but no airplanes were available. General Tang obeyed his orders, 
but in the face of Japanese tanks and other infantry units, he found it im-
possible to re-assemble his disintegrated force. He continued to run for 
safety further west. Tang failed dismally, but even if he had reassembled 
his army, he would only have played into Japanese hands, because the 
Japanese forces viewed decimating the Chinese field army far more im-
portant than capturing a well-fortified and already isolated Luoyang. Both 
the forces of Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo preferred to disappear into the 
mountainous regions of western Henan. Facing the same Japanese threat, 
General Jiang Dingwen acted differently from the obedient General Tang, 
making no attempt to regroup his army and running pell-mell for safety. 
In order to prevent Japanese discovery of his whereabouts, Jiang even cut 
radio contacts with the subordinate units and as a result, Chiang had no 
means to assess the condition of forces inside Luoyang. Chiang sought 
desperately to change his fortune. 
By this time, the Japanese had assembled another attack force east of 
the Yellow River Bridge and secretly prepared to attack Luoyang, includ-
ing the fortification in its northern suburbs. This Japanese attacking force, 
consisting of one division and two brigades, had taken advantage of the 
Chiang’s yielding of land east of Luoyang and swiftly moved into the at-
tacking lines while waiting for further orders to launch full-scale assaults. 
Once the offensive was launched, it took no more than two days to occupy 
the Beimang Mountains (the northern shield of Luoyang) and only another 
day to conquer the walled city.
Chiang chose generals Wu Tingning and Zhang Shiguang for the de-
fence of Luoyang. Wu was a native who had made his military career 
in a warlord army, while Zhang was a Whampoa cadet who Chiang did 
not know personally. Wu led two divisions to defend the fortifications on 
Beimang Mountain, while had only one division which had recently been 
evacuated from the Taihang Mountains after serious setbacks at the hands 
of the Communists. Chiang could not reach them via telephone, and his 
attempts to assemble an attacking force did not go well either. General 
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Jiang Dingwen picked up his phone only reluctantly and responded us-
ing what Chiang thought as a disrespectful tone of voice. The attempt to 
reach General Tang failed because the Japanese hunt for his main force 
had driven his headquarters further west (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 11). 
He considered air supremacy vital for the success of strategy, but after a 
day’s successful bombing near Luoyang the weather did not cooperate, 
hampering his use of air power. Unable to reach the defenders of Luoyang, 
Chiang asked his airplane to drop personal letters to them to strengthen 
their resolve (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 12).
Fooled by the Japanese crossing of the Yellow River from Shanxi, Chiang 
worried about a possible Japanese thrust into the neighbouring province 
of Shaanxi, and ordered General Hu Zongnan to prepare for the worse 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, May 13). Actually, by this time, the Japanese full-scale 
attack at Luoyang was still in the making. Luoyang was not in imminent 
danger. Thus, when Chiang dreamed about a bright moon and stars, he 
interpreted them as signs that God meant he would soon see the light 
despite the darkness. He also interpreted the sudden downpour of rain 
which had incapacitated the Japanese tanks as a religious miracle. Even 
more surprising was his promise to God that he would ask his eldest son 
to get baptized should the decisive war near Luoyang turn out to be a suc-
cess (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 14). Through his diary, we can feel Chiang’s 
anxiety in waiting for the Japanese to besiege Luoyang. 
Only two days later, bad news poured in from all fronts. Both Generals 
Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo were still on the run. It was almost impos-
sible to locate their headquarters, so Chiang had no means to reach the 
Luoyang defenders. Ten days later, when Chiang was in optimistic mood, 
the Japanese suddenly broadcast they had occupied the ancient capital, 
prompting both Generals Wu and Zhang to lead their survived troops in 
an attempt to break through the Japanese siege. The Japanese clandes-
tinely moved a division from the east of Luoyang and focused their attack 
on the Beimang Mountains. Once the Beimang Mountains were taken, 
the ancient walled capital could hold out no longer. In reflection, Chiang 
thought he had no personal ties with both generals. Given that Wu was a 
conservative general, he should not have expected him to do more. He said 
nothing about his Whampoa student. In recalling the failure of the defence, 
he criticized himself for interfering in field manoeuvres and especially for 
oral instructions by telephone, admitting he had made strategic blunders 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, May 25).
During the Japanese attack at Luoyang, Chiang realized his plan to urge 
generals Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo to regroup their army was a mis-
sion impossible. Instead, he ordered Hu Zongnan to send reinforcements 
from Xian. The fall of Luoyang made that effort meaningless. As the Japa-
nese pursuit seemed to have reached an end, Chiang gave no more heed to 
his instructions to Hu. In fact Hu Zongnan‘s troop had made no headway 
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in throwing back the Japanese army (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 23, May 31, 
June 3). Realizing that Hu was unable to handle any tank-led offensive, 
Chiang then asked Hu to withdraw his forces back to Lingbao, the gate to 
Xian, and left the surviving troops of the First War Zone to put up further 
resistance (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 6-10). 
By this time, the Japanese army had already started their offensive in the 
Central Yangtze for several days, but to Chiang’s surprise, the Japanese 
army also launched an attack at Lingbao. The Japanese headquarters consid-
ered this campaign an appended job, allowing the Japanese army which had 
crossed the Yellow River to join the attack in Henan to satisfy their eagerness 
for the sweetness of victory. Seriously constrained by both logistics consid-
erations and military man power, the campaign was from its beginning con-
sidered a limited one, which would not last more than several days, but the 
sudden attacks from the flanks with the tank support still caught Chiang by 
surprise and put Hu Zongnan’s army in panicky retreat. The offensive raised 
the possibility for the Japanese army to enter Shaanxi through narrow paths 
along a major tributary of the Yellow River. Chiang expected Hu’s troops 
to make a determined and successful stand. Instead, faced by Japanese air 
bombings and tank assaults, Hu Zongnan’s army held only three days and 
pulled back despite Chiang Kai-shek’s orders to the contrary. 
Chiang could not accept such a performance from troops which Hu 
Zongnan had spent five years training for fierce counterattacks against his 
enemies. Public opinion, both domestic and international, had considered 
Hu Zongnan’s troops to be China’s cream of the crop, which Chiang had 
wasted in watching the Communists in northern Shaanxi. It possessed the 
best-equipped units in the entire Chinese army, and those that retreated 
were the best of the best. Their defeatist attitude and lack of military dis-
cipline shocked Chiang, and embarrassed him to the extent that he felt 
unable to face his fellow countrymen. 
To add to the humiliation, a small Japanese contingent suddenly appeared 
from mountains in the south of Lingbao, when Chiang congratulated for the 
success of air bombing in forcing a Japanese withdrawal. Misled by his field 
commanders, Hu Zongnan not only failed to make an attack as ordered by 
Chiang but also gave up the Lingbao county seat without even a gesture 
of resistance. The Japanese army abruptly halted its advance and began to 
withdraw as planned. Hu Zongnan claimed he had repelled enemy attacks 
and boasted the recovery of the county site. Not knowing that the Japanese 
had called off the fighting as part of their initial plan, however, Chiang ac-
cepted Hu’s false reporting of victory. At any rate, the Japanese army with-
drew as planned and the situation soon stabilized. Chiang deplored that he 
lost a chance to lure the Japanese army into an attack at the gates of Xian. 
Having second thoughts, however, he remarked that even if he had had the 
chance, he would not expect Hu Zongnan to be a triumphant general since 
Hu was both “immature and weak”. Afterwards, he proceeded to shake 
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up Hu’s army with court martial. Three division level officers, all Wham-
poa graduates, were accused of retreating without permission and secretly 
executed by firing squads. In fact, Chiang should have congratulated the 
Japanese army for not being bold enough to conceive an offensive on Xian. 
When the air force told him about the Japanese withdrawal, he gave thanks 
to God for protecting China (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 10, June 12, June 13).
Two days later, he pondered the implications of a Japanese conquest of 
Xian: it would be an end of his rule. He summarized the Lingbao campaign 
in the following words:
In fact it was the last decisive key moment for the anti-Japanese re-
sistance. If Xian or its gate Tongguan were attacked or occupied, it 
would doom our cause. The reason was not simply the geographical 
importance of Xian. It was because Hu Zongnan had devoted himself 
single-mindedly to training a force of ten army corps more than five 
years. If these two places were lost, the Nationalist government would 
be unable to hold the people’s support. That is why the fate of Tongguan 
was far more important than even a warzone. For half a month, I could 
not have meals with a peaceful mind nor sleep well. Thanks be to God, 
who turned danger into safety. No human being could engineer such an 
achievement. (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 15)
In fact he should have thanked the Japanese army high command for its 
failure to push for further victory in the Lingbao campaign. If the Japanese 
generals had had more imagination and acted more boldly, they might 
have inflicted a deadly blow on his government, though they might have 
sacrificed the second stage of the Ichigo Offensive. For Chiang Kai-shek, 
the Henan battle was a disaster. Tang Enbo’s troops fleeing towards west-
ern Henan, like earlier warlord armies, were often attacked by the Henan 
peasants and disarmed. Stories like this further intensified both interna-
tional and domestic criticism of Chiang’s military leadership. He removed 
both Jiang1 and Tang, but spared Hu because he could think of no another 
trustworthy alternative. He knew the deficiencies of Tang Enbo, but was un-
willing to push for further punishment, which means he should bear some 
responsibility for Tang’s failure in strategic designing. He underestimated 
Japanese ambition and determination and never correctly foresaw the Japa-
nese blitzkrieg. Tang Enbo proved loyal and obedient despite all charges of 
corruption, incompetence, and smuggling with Japanese occupied areas.
1 Chiang Kai-shek picked Jiang Dingwen’s former subordinate at Whampoa Military Acad-
emy, General Chen Cheng to be his replacement. On departure, Jiang Dingwen asked his 
junior successor to turn a blind to ledgers of his commercial activities and to turn deaf 
ears to any reports of his wrongdoings, regardless of their source (Chen, Riji 1944, July 9, 
July 10; July 17, July 30).
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2 Empiricism vs Strategic Reform: the Battles in Hunan
Soon after the Battle of Luoyang, the Japanese began to move their troops 
in Central China. In addition to auxiliary forces of two divisions and three 
brigades, they mobilized troops from the homeland, Manchuria and other 
parts of north China to strengthen the only strategically offensive army 
corps in the China Theatre, which had consisted of eight divisions and 
one brigade, into a force of eleven divisions and five brigades. The actual 
attacking forces included ten divisions, supported by an air division and a 
tank regiment. Including the forces used in the subsequent Guangxi bat-
tles, the Japanese army mobilized 326,000 men, 1,282 artillery pieces, 103 
tanks, and 9,450 vehicles and 67,000 horses (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshu-
jo senshishitsu 1987c, 72-3, 117-8). Chiang’s intelligence was not solid 
enough for designing a counter strategy. First, he thought the Japanese 
imperial headquarters had mobilized nine divisions to occupy the Wuhan-
Guangzhou railroad, but soon his military intelligence experts changed the 
estimate of the Japanese attacking forces to only five divisions, perhaps 
excluding the second line divisions that the Japanese later also used for the 
offensive. These attacking forces led him to believe the Japanese aimed at 
only the provincial capital Changsha and its surrounding counties, rather 
than linking the Hunan-Guangdong railroad and destroying the airfields 
nearby. He further inferred from the level of the mobilization that it was 
not difficult for the Japanese army to occupy Changsha, despite the fact 
that they had tried three times without success, but if it could maximize 
advantages in topography and transportation, the Chinese army could 
still win a victory as they had done earlier. The Japanese would have to 
trudge with their artillery pieces and other heavy equipment through nu-
merous rivers and rice paddies. With air supremacy that General Stilwell 
had promised, Chiang had reasons for being optimistic (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
May 28, June 3).
During the earlier Henan battle, Chiang understood very well how vital 
air support was to the defence of his ground troops. He worked very hard 
to seek the cooperation of General Stilwell, but the American general was 
much more interested in wresting the command of several divisions and 
later the whole Chinese army from Chiang’s authority through the lever-
age of controlling Lend Lease materials, on which an adequate operation 
of his air and ground forces would depend. While the Henan battles were 
raging, Chiang twice sent telegrams to Stilwell, only to fall on deaf ears. 
The American general wanted Chiang to commit more troops to North 
Burma, while Chiang saw no military sense for so doing unless Britain and 
the United States honoured their earlier commitment for more ground 
troop and navy support. Chiang swallowed his personal dignity and anger, 
doubling his efforts to enlist the cooperation of General Stilwell, particu-
larly for the supply of airplane fuel (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 31, June 1). 
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 37-74
Chen. Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese Ichigo Offensive, 1944 49
Chiang also urged the commanders of other War Zones, especially the 
Sixth and Ninth, to launch diversionary attacks, but these later proved 
highly ineffective.
Preoccupied with the military situation in Shaanxi until mid-June, Chiang 
entrusted the defence of Changsha to the commander of the Ninth War 
Zone, General Xue Yue, a hero who had made fame for his three success-
ful defences of the provincial capital. Xue Yue delegated the job to the 
recently promoted commander of the Fourth Army, Zang Deneng. In light 
of his earlier successful experiences, Chiang offered General Xue two bits 
of advice which Xue might have adopted anyway: first, fight an attrition 
war and delay Japanese movements; second, avoid the main Japanese army 
and focus the attack on smaller units. However, all this advice turned out 
to be obsolete because the Japanese had devised a strategy that remedied 
their mistakes in the three earlier attempts to occupy the provincial capi-
tal. The Japanese generals also threw much larger forces into this attempt, 
and launched the attack on Changsha twenty days earlier than expected, 
on May 27, before the Chinese forces could prepare an adequate defence 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, June 17). 
The Japanese assembled their attacking force and divided them into 
three columns moving southward, placing their priorities on the eastern 
flank. The best divisions were put on the mountains that served as the 
sources of the waterways flowing westward to the Xiang River, with the 
column west of the Xiang River assigned to prevent reinforcements arriv-
ing from the Sixth War Zone. Only the central column followed the older 
route east of the Xiang, which pointed directly to Changsha (Nihon Boeijo 
boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 206-7). The powerful left flank attack 
freed the central column from falling into what General Xue called the 
“heavenly furnace” by depriving the defenders of the advantage for falling 
back to the hilly and mountainous areas. The central column then moved 
slowly but steadily with its heavier artillery and equipment through the 
rivers, swamps and rice paddies. 
Overconfident in his previous strategy, General Xue Yue made a further 
blunder by situating himself far away from the combat zone, leaving Zhang 
Deneng, the commander of the Fourth Army, to handle the defence of 
Changsha. That force had won the name of Iron Army for its heroic fighting 
during the Northern Expedition, and the commander had obtained his pro-
motion without the benefit of any ties to the Whampoa Military Academy. 
The defence of Changsha constituted of two tasks. The walled area was 
located east of the Xiang River and the Yuelu mountains across the river, 
where Chiang had constructed a supposedly impregnable artillery base 
overlooking the city. Two and half weeks after the beginning of the Japa-
nese offensive, on June 15, General Zhang suddenly found two Japanese 
divisions approaching both south and west of the capital, a challenge he 
could not have imagined based on his previous experiences. 
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Chiang construed the Yuelu mountain artillery base as the guardian of 
Changsha, helping the defenders of the walled city to repel the Japanese 
invaders. Aware of the Japanese attempt to envelop Changsha, he urged 
General Xue Yue to keep open the road traffic to the west and prepare 
for a possible flanking attack from Hengyang in the south. In mid-June, 
Chiang was preoccupied primarily with the fall-out of the Henan battle and 
its impact on domestic and international opinion, particularly the sharp 
criticism within his party and government. Seeking comfort from what Hu 
Zongnan claimed to be a major victory at Lingbao, he paid no attention 
to the actual defence of Changsha (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 15, June 17). 
But to his dismay, two days after a morning radio contact, he was unable 
to reach General Zhang no matter how hard he had tried. The silence was 
then followed by a Japanese radio broadcast that claimed air bombing 
had effectively neutralized the Yuelu mountain artillery base and that the 
provincial capital was doomed. Chiang could not understand the radio 
silence. If the Japanese army still used the propaganda leaflets to urge 
the defenders to surrender, he reasoned, it should mean there was still 
some resistance from the Chinese defenders. Why could he hear nothing 
from General Zhang Deneng’s headquarters (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 18, 
June 19)? Puzzled by the lack of radio communication, Chiang wondered 
whether the Japanese air force had used poisonous gas to knock out all 
of his soldiers, but he quickly realized that no gas attack was so effective 
as to silence a whole army. He then pondered how much truth the enemy 
broadcasting had revealed (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 17, June 18, June 19; 
Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 267).2
To prepare for the Japanese attack, Chiang Kai-shek had strengthened 
the Yuelu Mountains base with the installation of the most advanced heavy 
artillery, as well as the storage of 50,000 artillery shells. General Zhang 
Deneng’s 4th Army consisted of three divisions. Despite the opposition of 
Xue Yue’s chief of staff, he insisted on putting two of his three divisions 
in the city and assigned an under-sized division, only about 3,000 com-
bat soldiers, to defend the Yuelu base. The decision played into Japanese 
strategy which emphasized the attack at periphery rather than the core 
of Changsha, and focused on the occupation of the Yuelu base rather than 
a frontal assault on the walled city. The Japanese army started their at-
tack at the Yuelu base complex on June 16; it took them only two days to 
achieve the victory. Once occupying the base, they immediately used the 
captured artillery and shells to blast Changsha. Exposed to the artillery 
attacks from the rear, General Zhang’s army immediately fell into panic 
2 Japanese compiled military history pays no attention at all to the attack of Changsha. It 
only mentioned 15 or 16 June as the D day, but never specified the real time for the assault. 
No details are provided about the process of offensive. This can be seen as the evidence 
that the Japanese saw it without any importance.
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and he ordered a breakout. The defence of the walled city of Changsha 
did not last more than one day (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 20).
Chiang was so exasperated by the quick fall of Changsha that he ordered 
a court martial for the responsible officers, while blaming himself for not 
managing to know his officers and troops better. For political reasons he 
had to leave General Xue Yue aside, so he ordered the arrest of General 
Zhang Deneng. Later his chief military judge, someone who had made a 
name for winning over residual warlords rather than for the strict imple-
mentation of military law, recommended life imprisonment after protracted 
interrogation and investigation. Evidence suggested that General Zhang 
brushed aside the advice of Xue Yue’s chief of staff that successful defence 
of Changsha should hinge on the defence of the artillery base and refused 
to adjust the deployment accordingly, thus depriving the artillery base of 
necessary infantry protection. Determined to make a show of his anger, 
Chiang overruled the verdict and ordered the execution of General Zhang 
during the subsequent battle in Hengyang (He 1986, 455-6, 464). 
It has been rumoured that Chiang used the military defeat to purge of-
ficers who did not belong to his “faction”. Such a malicious reading is not 
warranted, but it did occur to Chiang that he could not count on foreign or 
co-opt native troops for urgent and important missions. If he had a depend-
able, trained army, together with an air force at his disposal, he believed he 
could still have saved Changsha. Chiang emphasized loyalty and depend-
ability far more than other qualities of his commanding generals (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, June 21). He did not know General Zhang had graduated from 
a military academy in Yunnan and attributed his military incompetence to 
climbing upward through the rank and file (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 26). 
Perhaps for this reason, he chose his Whampoa student General Fang 
Xianjue and his 10th Army for the defence of Hengyang, an important 
transportation centre south of Changsha. His dealings with Xue Yue reveal 
the importance of political considerations for military matter. As a hero of 
the resistance campaign, Xue Yue could not be held responsible for mili-
tary defeat. Such a selective application of military law, however, encour-
aged wild speculation about Chiang’s motivations and further harmed his 
prestige and authority.
The Hunan battle then moved southward to Hengyang, a key site that 
could be reached in several hours either by train or waterway from Chang-
sha. The city faced the joining of two rivers along its southeast and lay 
against the Hengshan Mountains. After the loss of Changsha, Chiang faced 
an internal debate as to whether his forces should defend Hengyang at all 
costs. His deputy chief of staff, the Guangxi General Bai Chongxi, was so 
obsessed with the defense of his home province that he urged Chiang to 
abandon Hengyang and move all the available forces to the Hunan border 
with Guangxi. His deputy chief of staff, General Liu Fei, whom military 
observers would consider as a close follower of General Bai, saw things 
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quite differently. A native of Hunan, he argued from his position as chief 
advisor that aroused public opinion could no longer tolerate the loss of 
any more Chinese land; the army had to show determination to fight to the 
last. Chiang concurred, but asked his staff officers to make a contingent 
plan for the loss of Hengyang. When he was still hurrying supply officers 
to send provisions and ammunition, the Japanese began an attack at the 
airfield outside Hengyang on June 25. The next day when the Japanese 
army attacked Hengyang, Chiang still worked very hard to expedite the 
logistic and air support. 
General Fang Xianjue’s 10th Army was understaffed and ill-equipped. 
With about 17,000 soldiers, he was now facing two Japanese divisions, 
about 30,000 strong. General Fang was fortunate enough since the Japa-
nese seriously underestimated the toughness and resilience of his soldiers, 
who effectively combined grenade attacks with excellent fortifications 
for resistance. The attacking army was initially beaten back after suffer-
ing heavy casualties, including the wounding of a division commander. 
When the news reached Guilin, General Bai Chongxi allowed the provincial 
newspapers to issue a special issue, which was then followed with celebra-
tory fireworks the whole day. One higher ranking officer asked Chiang to 
do the same in Chongqing. Chiang refused because he did not consider 
it a conclusive victory. Several days later, the Japanese army attacked 
again with bombing and shelling far fiercer than the first round (Nihon 
Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 347, 373-4; Xu, Riji 1944, July 5; 
Ge 2005, 141-5).
The Japanese failure in their initial attack at Hengyang, however, gave 
Chiang some cause for optimism. Given the Japanese performance in Hu-
nan, he saw feasibility for a successful defense of Hengyang. After the 
Japanese movement of their troops from Guangdong, he even planned to 
make a decisive war south of Hengyang, where General Fang weakened 
the Japanese force from the north and lured another Japanese force from 
the south. Instead of rushing the Canton reinforcements, he asked the 
commander of the 62nd Army, the only army with full strength nearby, to 
slow down in his attempt to reach Hengyang (Chiang, Riji 1944, July 1, 
July 5). Chiang did not know the Japanese thought similarly. They prepared 
to use a second attack wave to lure more Chinese reinforcements into 
Japanese traps. Aware of the Japanese moves outside Hengyang, he chose 
to interpret them as attempts to divert Chinese reinforcements in order 
to enable the attacking divisions to withdraw from Hengyang. Actually, by 
then the Japanese were able to use three divisions to cope with the Chinese 
reinforcements, while ordering the two divisions to make fresh attacks at 
Hengyang after supplying them with more provisions and ammunition.
During respites between the two waves of attacks, Chiang did not have 
the luxury of relaxation. Domestic and international public opinion continu-
ally questioned his ability to lead the nation, or at least to command his 
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army. Various rumors about Chiang and his family had been circulating in 
Chongqing since the spring, but then an anonymous letter in British Eng-
lish reached Madame Chiang, listing the extra-marital affairs and other 
heinous deeds of Chiang and his two sons, particularly his eldest son’s 
bastard twins. As his wife was preparing for a long absence for medical 
treatment in Brazil, Chiang found it necessary for the couple to swear their 
moral integrity in front of very high ranking officials, foreign missionaries 
and dignitaries. At the very same time, the clash between Chiang and his 
American chief-of-staff General Stilwell also reached a climax. Urged by 
General Stilwell, President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Chiang and used 
the poor performance of his Chinese troops in the middle Yangtze to justify 
his urging him to entrust the whole Chinese army to General Stilwell. The 
fact that this telegram reaching his hand on the seventh anniversary of the 
Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the beginning of the War of Resistance, pained 
Chiang to the extreme (Chiang, Riji 1944, July 3-8; Chen 2012, 2, 850). 
Strengthened with raining artillery shells and supported by domina-
tion of the skies, the Japanese army launched a second attack. Again the 
Japanese underestimated General Fang’s tenacity and resilience. Five days 
after the attack, Chiang finally realized that the Japanese had no inten-
tion of abandoning their ambition to conquer Hengyang and dispatched 
about 30,000 fresh soldiers to the front (Chiang, Riji 1944, July 15). The 
Japanese army used the attack at the 10th Army as an opportunity to lure 
the Chinese reinforcements for annihilation. The 62nd Army of Canton 
hurried to Hengyang, but only reached the outskirts, where the Japanese 
dug in and, despite heavy casualties, refused to yield the road. In spite of 
Chiang’s personal letter of encouragement, Fang’s army was indeed ex-
hausted; it could not even find a battalion of soldiers to bear arms and go 
outside the walls to welcome the reinforcements. After repeated orders, 
General Fang finally put up a ragtag battalion to do the job, but they were 
ambushed and annihilated no sooner than they had stepped outside the 
city walls (Chiang, Riji 1944, July 15-19, July 20). Chiang blamed the com-
mander of 62nd army for timidity and cowardice, but the real reason was 
Japanese adjustment of their strategy. They decided to leave Fang’s army 
aside while focusing on the assault and destruction of the reinforcements. 
As the reinforcements failed to reach Hengyang near the end of July, 
Chiang’s desperateness grew and it can be seen in his prayers. The very 
day after General Fang’s failure to link with the 62nd Army on July 20, 
Chiang prayed to God, saying that he felt “entrapped in a well, facing 
only pitch dark walls and with wounds all over his body. If not extended a 
helping hand, he feared he would be condemned to eternal shame, unable 
to fulfil his endowed mission” (Chiang, Riji 1944, July 21). Five days later 
when he realized the futility of sending reinforcements, he even promised 
God to construct a huge iron cross on the top of the nearby Hengshan 
Mountain on his 60th birthday if granted victory, and a mass conversion of 
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the whole 10th Army to Christianity was promised. As nothing came from 
the prayers, he examined himself, stating that, “I could face heaven and 
earth, as well as ghosts and gods, with clear conscience. If God wants to 
fulfil his will through me as his tool, what enemy forces can beat me?”. But 
realizing the Japanese determination to occupy Hengyang as well as the 
Wuhan-Guangdong Railroad, he admitted his inability to prevent it from 
becoming a reality, unless God intervened on China’s behalf. Gradually he 
resigned himself to the inevitable, but, quoting from The Streams in the 
Desert, he considered all sufferings the badge of being one of the elect 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, July 25-26, July 31). 
Beyond Chiang’s expectations, Fang was able to hold out due to the fact 
that the Japanese army gave higher priority to the interception of Chinese 
forces in flanks, particularly the reinforcements outside Hengyang. Dur-
ing the respite between attacks, Chiang allowed himself the comfort of 
imagination. He imagined the Japanese attacking force as an arrow now 
approaching the end of its flight (Chiang, Riji 1944, August 1, August 3). 
Actually, the superior Japanese army that spread outside Hengyang easily 
beat away the 79th Army which came from north-western Hunan to lift 
the siege of Hengyang. However, the 62nd Army, which received some 
air support, was able to inflict high casualties on the invaders. After eight 
days’ fighting, a large Japanese regiment had to use non-combat soldiers 
to stop a breakthrough of their positions (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo sen-
shishitsu 1987c, 488-91). Meanwhile, four days after Chiang made the 
first observation that the Japanese force acted as an arrow of spent force 
which he could be brought to an end by his reinforcements, the Japanese 
strengthened its Hengyang army with two additional divisions, prepar-
ing to strike a crushing blow on Fang’s decimated forces. After powerful 
artillery shelling, as well as air bombing and strafing, the attacking army 
quickly broke the backbone of the resistance force. General Fang sent in 
almost simultaneously three consecutive radio messages: First request-
ing reinforcements, then reporting urgency, and finally confessing “we 
are finished”. Fifteen minutes later Chiang found a wave of Chinese air 
bombing put a stop to the Japanese offensive. He misread the temporary 
suspension of the offensive as proof that his prayer fifteen minutes ago 
elicited God’s response (Chiang, Riji 1944, August 4).
Again, Chiang promised Fang that he would send a tank regiment from 
Guangxi to relieve the siege. He could not sleep that night, and after a 
prayer he began to rework the directive he had sent to the tank command-
er three days before, reminding him that they should reach Hengyang the 
same day and rush to the front with a company of infantry troops (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, August 5). The promised tank regiment never materialized. It 
actually made little advance due to topographical problems and Japanese 
mopping up campaigns along their planned route (Chiang, Riji 1944, Au-
gust 12). Two days after the urgent notes mentioned above, Fang found he 
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had less than 2,000 men still capable of bearing arms, and most of them 
had no combat experience. Realizing his end was approaching, Fang and 
his division commanders sent Chiang a farewell telegram, pledging to fight 
to death (Chiang, Riji 1944, August 6-8). Fang then committed suicide, but 
failed because of the timely intervention of his subordinates. Unable to die 
and unable to fight, Fang eventually chose to negotiate for something like 
an honourable surrender. He promised to lay down weapons in exchange 
for medical treatment for all the wounded soldiers. The Japanese army 
accepted the conditions but later honoured only part of the agreement. 
General Fang was incarcerated in a Catholic church on a nearby mountain, 
albeit without strict surveillance.
Having received the farewell telegram, Chiang still harboured hopes. 
He interpreted an aerial intelligence report as suggesting that the situa-
tion could be improved if reinforcements were encouraged to move fast. 
On the very night of the farewell telegram, he got up three times to say 
prayers. Pondering heavenly principles, human affairs and his devotion to 
God, he thought he deserved a miracle bestowed from above, but further 
aerial reconnaissance soon revealed without a doubt that there was no 
longer any sign of Chinese resistance. Gripped by shame, grief and deep 
sorrow, Chiang tried to seek comfort from his wife, but she was thousands 
of miles away. Unable to reveal his emotion to his sons, he chose to recite 
Mencius: “vast-flowing passion-nature (haoran zhiqi) is exceedingly great, 
and exceedingly strong. Being nourished by rectitude, and sustaining no 
injury, it fills up all between heaven and earth. It is the mate and assistant 
of righteousness and reason. Without it, man is in a state of starvation” 
(Legge 1895, 190). Someone translates “vast-flowing passion-nature” as 
noble spirit. Only by identifying with Mencius’ noble spirit or vast, flow-
ing passion nature, he was able to live through the long ordeal of military 
debacles (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 7-9).
Unable to see General Fang as a traitor, Chiang simply dismissed the 
Japanese broadcasts that claimed Fang had raised white flags, begging 
surrender like the British general in Singapore. Before the broadcasts, 
Chiang had edited a short biography of General Fang, hoping to use his 
heroic exploits to encourage the rank and file. His order to distribute the 
biography met opposition from his staff, who were concerned about a 
possible sharp turn of events. Now Chiang had even more to worry about. 
Some people cited Japanese broadcasting to question General Fang’s pat-
riotism and cursed him as a traitor. American officers buttressed such ac-
cusations with a photograph at the scene of the negotiations, which only 
showed Fang’s back without any clear signs of begging for peace. Despite 
all this contrary and embarrassing evidence, Chiang insisted on trusting 
Fang’s patriotism and spent several more days finishing the latter’s biog-
raphy together with a telegram about the enormous sacrifices the 10th 
Army had made at Hengyang. Later Japanese changes of their story about 
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General Fang gave him some relief and comfort, with subsequent broad-
casts claiming that negotiations had started after finding General Fang in 
a dugout rather than waving a white flag (Chiang, Riji 1944, August 9-12). 
These events continued to haunt China, however, especially after General 
Fang escaped from Japanese hands several months afterward. Despite 
favouring a reinstatement of Fang, however, Chiang had to confront loud 
public opinion that sang for high-pitch patriotism and demanded complete 
sacrifices for the resistance cause.
What General Stillwell’s staff officer predicted as a defence unlikely to 
last more than 7 days turned out to be actually a defence lasting 47 days 
under overwhelming Japanese shelling and bombing. Despite his failure 
to honour his promise of suicide, Fang had accomplished what no other 
Chinese officers could do – write one of the best chapters of the resistance 
war. Two days after the ravaged city of Hengyang fell, Chiang made the 
following reflection on the 47 days’ battle: 
My failure to grasp opportunities in guiding the war explains the fall of 
Hengyang. False intelligence accounts for the mistakes I have made. 
First I thought the Japanese army would withdraw out of their own ac-
cord. Next I underestimated the Japanese strength, refusing to hurry 
reinforcements. I frequently missed opportunities. Finally, the troops 
from Guangdong and Guangxi lost the will to fight and break the siege. 
I gave the tank formations three more days to prepare, but when I or-
dered immediate reinforcement they excused themselves, citing prob-
lems with rivers and topography. My agony and anger rose to extremes. 
The officers’ intellect and the troops’ command over techniques are 
so low. How our army can be called an army? How can we be spared 
insults from foreigners? The state of our army seemed to force me to 
hand training and command of the entire force to Stilwell. (Chiang, Riji 
1944, August 10)
Chiang admitted that he had made many mistakes in directing the Heng-
yang campaign, but he placed more blame on failures of military intelli-
gence and the training of his troops. Actually he had already by this time 
begun to ponder a military reform that aimed at improving the fighting 
capabilities of his army, although no concrete methods were adopted about 
improvements in military intelligence. Before the reform could have any 
effect, Chiang still had to use those resources at his disposal to continue 
the resistance. Meanwhile, as a national leader, he had to face serious 
challenges to his leadership. Internationally, the Americans criticized 
his poor leadership and pressured him to give command of his troops 
to General Stilwell. Domestically, the Chinese Communists began to win 
increasing sympathy and support from public opinion, and pressured him 
for a political reform. Chiang considered suicide, but a sense of historical 
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mission encouraged him to stand fast. He told himself, “as long as I lived, 
the country would have a future. Neither the Communist bandits nor the 
Japanese invaders would succeed if I were around. If I kill myself due to 
discouragement and pessimism, my country and people would then perish 
together” (Chiang, Riji 1944, August 11). Besides the trust of the soldiers 
and people, he emphasized that control over military and financial power 
would guarantee his ultimate success in dealing with both domestic and 
international enemies (Chiang, Riji 1944, August 11). In other words, he 
had no intention to relinquish his powers, let alone to a foreigner or a 
foreign country.
Now let me turn our attention to the third stage of the Japanese of-
fensive, which aimed at Guangxi, where Generals Li Zongren and Bai 
Chongxi had retained much control and where the political dissenters of 
the Nationalist government congregated.
3 Defeatism vs Momentum: The Battles of Guangxi
The defense of Hengyang delayed the Japanese invasion of Guangxi by at 
least one month, but subsequent mopping-up actions in the area west of 
Hengyang secured railroad transportation from Hunan to Guangxi and 
set the stage for Japanese incursions into Guangxi. Initially, Chiang Kai-
shek hoped his army in Hunan could discourage the Japanese from cross-
ing the provincial borders, and for this purpose he sent the American-
equipped 93rd Army from Chongqing to the front. Commanded by Chen 
Munong, a Hunanese general with credentials from the Whampoa Military 
Academy, the army was nicknamed as Chiang’s “Praetorian Guard” in 
Chongqing, and most of its officers had graduated from the same Wham-
poa Academy. Despite being equipped with American weapons, and in-
cluding both a tank battalion and an anti-tank artillery battalion, Chen 
and his army did not have time to reach southern Hunan for action, and 
stayed in Guangxi (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987a, 385; 
Zhang 2008, 363). 
Chiang’s initial plan was to make a determined resistance in Quanxian 
and Guilin, while withdrawing his forces from Hunan along the Hunan-
Guangxi Railroad. Quanxian, the gate to Guangxi, had been fortified sev-
eral years earlier, when the Japanese made attacks from south China. 
After General Chen gave his vow to defend the strategically important 
county for at least three months, Chiang hurried his quartermasters to 
transport all provisions and ammunition needed for promised resistance. 
About ten days later, the commander of Fourth War Zone, Zhang Fakui, 
came to inspect the military positions and concluded that these so-called 
fortifications were not up to the standard. Without walls, in his judgment, 
Chen Munong could not hold the county for more than three days. Zhang 
58 Chen. Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese Ichigo Offensive, 1944
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 37-74
Fakui thus asked Chiang to rescind the earlier order, but to defend for 
two weeks in order to evacuate the stored ten thousand bombshells, one 
million rounds of bullets, sixteen thousand grenades and sixteen thousand 
sacks of rice (Zhang 2008, 364-6). 
General Bai Chongxi accepted Chiang Kai-shek’s initial plan, but when 
Zhang proposed the evacuation he responded favourably, eager to strength-
en the defence of Guilin. Bai told Chiang he would hold Guilin for four to five 
months with the help of Karst caves and rock formations in its surround-
ings. Despite his chief-of-staff’s opposition, Chiang finally agreed with the 
change of the plan. Two days later, General Bai suddenly joined hands with 
Zhang Fakui and urged Chiang to airlift all available troops from Sichuan 
and Guizhou to Guilin. Astonished by the request, Chiang refused flatly. It 
is unclear why General Bai made the sudden request; we only know that, 
on the same day, the Japanese crossed the border without knowing the 
terrain in the area. Perhaps Bai realized that the enemy had mobilized far 
more troops than he could imagine for the offensive against Guangxi. While 
six Japanese army divisions had expanded their control over south-western 
Hunan bordering Guangxi, four additional divisions were sent from the 
southeast (Guangdong and North Vietnam) and headed towards Liuzhou, 
which lies at south of Guilin. Chiang, still conceived of the Japanese army as 
an arrow of spent force, viewed the Guangxi army and militia as sufficient 
for defensive purposes, particularly after he had agreed with the evacuation 
of Chen Munong’s 93rd Army. What he could not tell General Bai was his 
great concern for the security of Sichuan, where the residual warlords and 
the provincial elite had become restive because of his huge requisitions of 
human and grain resources (Chiang, Riji 1944, September 11). 
To Chiang’s surprise, Chen Munong made no resistance at all when the 
Japanese army launched a formal attack two days later, and his army began 
evacuation immediately. Chen’s army even burned all the provisions and 
ammunition Chiang had prepared for them. Informed of the occurrence, 
Chiang was furious and ordered the commander of the Fourth War Zone to 
execute Chen Munong, who by this time had reached Guilin for safety. If he 
had known that Chen Munong’s soldiers were staring at the Japanese cross-
ing the river shielding Quanxian, he would have had more reason to shoot 
Chen, and had he read a Japanese colonel’s assessment of the fortifications 
of Quanxian, he would have been absolutely furious. After inspecting the 
fortifications, the enemy officer came up with a conclusion completely dif-
ferent from Zhang Fakui. These fortifications were designed by the Central 
Government, consisting of concrete structures and moats five kilometres 
deep. The pillboxes were well-designed and placed. This Japanese colonel 
wondered why the Nationalist army gave up Quanxian without firing a shot 
(Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 608, 738, 748-9, 752). Gen-
eral Stilwell was very upset about the yielding of Quanxian, and soon began 
to destroy the airfield of Guilin and evacuate its personnel and airplanes. 
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General Bai planned to defend Guilin with three of his top divisions 
under Wei Yunsong. On September 14, Generals Stilwell and Zhang Fakui 
came to Guilin to inspect the topography and preparations, and concluded 
it would be nearly impossible to defend Guilin for half a year as General 
Bai had claimed. Zhang, however, understood the political considerations 
requiring the Guangxi army to defend the provincial capital for at least 
several weeks, or better yet several months. He asked General Bai to allot 
three more Guangxi divisions for the defence of Guilin and the vicinity. 
General Bai concurred with Zhang’s assessment. Contrary to what Chiang 
Kai-shek thought, the Japanese actually mobilized a force much larger than 
the Chinese generals had thought and the attack along the Hunan-Guangxi 
Railroad was coordinated with simultaneous offensives from Guangdong 
and North Vietnam at Liuzhou, the south gate of Guilin.
To orchestrate their campaigns, the Japanese army gave Guilin a respite 
of one and half months. During the period, Chiang Kai-shek was beset 
by domestic criticism of his leadership, and challenges to his legitimacy 
following the debacles in Henan and Hunan. The Communist Party also 
took advantage of the occasion to launch a skillful propaganda offensive 
against the Nationalist government, urging the end of Chiang’s alleged 
dictatorship. But the greatest challenge came from his main war partner, 
the United States. President Roosevelt decided to throw his support for 
General Stilwell’s grabbing the commandership over all troops within the 
China Theater, including the autonomous Communist forces. Viewing the 
proposal a great insult to both Chinese integrity and personal dignity, 
Chiang chose to risk an irreparable rupture of the Sino-American relation-
ship and asked for General Stilwell’s recall in late September. He eventu-
ally won the confrontation, but would pay a high price. Be that as it may, 
for one and a half months, Chiang was so preoccupied with the problem 
of General Stilwell that he made no interference in General Bai’s actual 
command of the defense of Guilin. 
As the Japanese army met little resistance along the Pearl River, Guilin 
was now exposed to a much stronger attacking force reinforced from Hu-
nan. The Japanese offensive punched open the gate to Guilin, a train sta-
tion, around 28 October, which worried Chiang enormously (Xu, Riji 1944, 
October 30; Chiang, Riji 1944, October 28, weekly reflection). Two days 
later, General Bai flew back to Chongqing and he sought to enlist aid for 
his position on the Guangxi Battle. The next day, he hurried to see Chiang’s 
chief-of-staff and told him that it was meaningless to defend Guilin unless 
he could defend Liuzhou, because the fall of Liuzhou would expose Guilin 
to Japanese attack from both south and northeast. For this reason, Bai 
moved the three top divisions to defend the airfield of Liuzhou and in its 
lieu sent some inferior units for the defence of Guilin. He then attended a 
meeting of the Department of Military Command and severely criticized 
the neighbouring Combat Zones for their failure to launch diversionary 
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attacks, highlighting the futility of the defence of Guilin. Deputy Chief-of-
Staff Liu Fei challenged this position, declaring that China no longer had 
space to exchange for time. Unless determined resistance was offered, the 
Nationalist government would be soon doomed. In Liu’s view, only sacri-
fice could buy time for the Nationalist government. He criticized General 
Bai’s transfer of three divisions of troops away from Guilin to Liuzhou (Xu, 
Riji 1944, October 31).
It was strange for Chiang to miss the important meeting. On that day, 
he opened the Bible after morning prayers and found the paragraphs 26 
and 27 from chapter 39 of Ezekiel. He deciphered as a prophesy for 
recovering lost land and a blessing for the nation (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
October 31). However, when General Bai came to see him at lunch time 
the next day, instead of bringing good news, he again pleaded for re-
inforcements. Chiang told him it was too late to send more troops to 
Guilin, and that the request contradicted the original plan. General Bai 
would have no choice but to make do with troops available in Guangxi. 
Chiang also told him Bai that the situation in Liuzhou was hopeless, so 
Bai should concentrate on the defense of Guilin. In a passionate plea, 
Bai raised his voice, reddening his face and showing defiance, but noth-
ing could swing Chiang. The conversation lasted two and half hours. 
Chiang confessed the “prating” stretched his patience to the limits, but 
congratulated himself for tolerance, magnanimity, and reasoning pow-
ers. He believed he had finally persuaded General Bai (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
November 1, November 4). 
The next day, Chiang’s minister of military command Xu Yongchang 
received a report from the general he had sent to the Guangxi front. This 
general found the topography advantageous and the fortifications excel-
lent, but military morale was extremely low. The major reason was Gen-
eral Bai’s redeployment of troops without the authorization of the higher 
command. Two of the three divisions Bai redeployed to Liuzhou were 
commanded by the nephews of Guangxi military leaders, and all the re-
deployed divisions were crack Guangxi troops. The remaining ones had 
been recently put together, were under-trained and under equipped, and 
commanded by inexperienced young generals. The report did not mention 
how much ammunition, provisions, and medical supplies were transported 
and stored in Guilin, but the quantities were deemed only enough for one 
to two months’ determined resistance. The general concluded that it would 
be lucky for the Guangxi army to hold Guilin for two months (Xu, Riji 1944, 
November 2; Zhang 2008, 367). 
It is unclear whether Chiang was informed of this report, but on 17 Oc-
tober, the Japanese started to attack Guilin after clearing out the Chinese 
defences nearby. Wei Yunsong held Guilin for only two days. Before Zhang 
Fakui conveyed his request for permission to make a breakthrough, he had 
already given his own orders for such a manoeuvre. Despite some heroic 
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resistance, Guilin fell after a battle lasting all of two days, instead of the 
expected two months.
The Japanese actually used three divisions to attack the larger Guilin 
area, but only used slightly more than one division for the attack on Guilin 
itself. The defence of Guilin’s periphery lasted about two weeks. Yet the 
city defences held for only 48 hours. The same day Guilin fell, the victori-
ous Japanese army moved swiftly southward to occupy the almost aban-
doned Liuzhou and the nearby airfield. Guilin fell before Liuzhou instead of 
the other way around as General Bai had forewarned. Despite high praise 
for their fighting capabilities and supporting militia system, General Bai’s 
Guangxi army had performed disappointingly. Chiang could not believe 
that, with such large stores of ammunition, the Guangxi army could not 
resist less than one Japanese division for more than several hours, or only 
about 200 hours including the peripheral areas. He might be wrong on 
the exact time the defenses lasted, but he was certainly right in the easi-
ness with which the Japanese army conquered Guilin. The military debacle 
greatly depressed Chiang (Chiang, Riji 1944, November 11-12). 
To prepare the defence of Guilin, Bai began the evacuation of the civilian 
and dispensable government employees in June. The fall of Quanxian also 
sparked a wave of evacuations. The Japanese victory set more than 100,000 
refugees to the roads or trails. A few lucky ones could board trains or climb 
on the roofs, but the majority had to trudge under constant Japanese bomb-
ing. Exhaustion, cold, starvation, and sickness beset them, and no help was 
in sight on the part of either the provincial army or government. Chiang 
had to order the authorities to offer charitable relief (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
November 4). 
The fall of the provincial capital opened the door for the Japanese army 
to penetrate further into another province, Guizhou. Moreover, for Na-
tionalist government, the defeat led to Sichuan students’ protests, behind 
which, Chiang believed, were the manipulating hands of underground 
Communists. The residual warlords such as Long Yun and Pan Wenhua 
began to assert their autonomy again (Chiang, Riji 1944, November 9). 
Not only did the residual warlords from the Northwest begin to rethink 
their support of Nationalist rule, but also the war zone commander Xue 
Yue began to take “free actions”, sending his brother’s troops to occupy an 
airfield in the hope of gaining direct military aid from America (Chiang, Ri-
ji 1944, November 6-7). To make the matter worse, the US President used 
the corruption and poor performance of the Chinese army as justification 
for urging Chiang to compromise with the Communist Party. Ambassador 
Hurley even flew to Yan’an and, without prior consultations with Chiang, 
accepted all the conditions the Communists hoped but never expected 
to be agreed upon (essentially they asked for sharing military and politi-
cal power with the Nationalist Party) (Chiang, Riji 1944, November 19, 
November 21, November 23). Chiang considered Hurley’s concessions 
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to the Communists as detrimental as the fall of Guilin (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
November 11). And, as if these misfortunes were not enough, Stalin began 
to take revenge for Chiang’s reassertion of the Chinese rule in Xinjiang by 
inciting a separatist movement there. 
Chiang Kai-shek asked Commander Zhang Fakui to order Guilin com-
mander Wei Yunsong to shoot Chen Munong immediately, but now Wei 
Yunsong disobeyed his orders of determined resistance and fled almost as 
fast as Chen Munong. Wei was a close follower of the Guangxi clique, and 
helped General Bai arrange his nephew’s avoidance of being ensnared in 
the hopeless cause of defending Guilin. General Bai thus joined hands with 
another leader of the Guangxi clique and the commander of the Fifth War 
Zone, Li Zongren, to come to Chongqing to help save Wei Yunsong’s life 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, November 17). An open court martial for Wei Yunsong 
was thus out of the question. Therefore, Chiang contradicted himself and, 
during a public occasion, pretended to have issued an oral permission 
for Wei Yunsong’s breakout. Solidifying his cooperation with the Guangxi 
clique, however, Chiang still had to face the two Japanese divisions that 
followed the railroad westward.
The collapse of the Chinese troops after the fall of Guilin and Liuzhou 
encouraged the Japanese pursue the collapsed Chinese army, including 
the Guangxi army, to the end of the Guangxi-Guizhou railroad (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, November 25). In desperation, Chiang turned General He Ying-
qin and General Tang Enbo, and asked them to take over the defence of 
Guizhou. A native of Guizhou, General He was the chief of the Military Af-
fairs Department and had formed a powerful military faction under Chiang 
with his Whampoa students. General Tang was also loyal, so Chiang asked 
him to lead his reorganized troops from Henan, mostly by walking for 
weeks through mountainous areas.
By this time another Whampoa general, Chen Sunong, and his rein-
forced 97th Army had reached the area. The 97th Army was considered 
another Praetorian Guard, which had spent one month forced-marching in 
straw sandals to Guangxi earlier after the loss of Quanxian. On 25 Novem-
ber, Chiang specifically ordered Chen Sunong to make a stand near the 
end of the Guangxi-Hunan railroad. Through General Tang Enbo, he asked 
Chen Sunong to fight to the last man. He also specifically instructed them 
that they should not open fire in darkness unless seeing the approaching 
enemy, and that they should quickly launch a counteroffensive from the 
flanks if the Japanese broke through their positions (Chiang, Riji 1944, No-
vember 25-26). But General Chen disappointed and disgraced him. After 
less than two days’ engagement, he was found alone in a nearby military 
camp that served as Zhang Fakui’s headquarters, where the previous day 
the American air forces mistook it for a Japanese concentration of forces 
and bombed to death more than one thousand soldiers, including one 
lieutenant general and two major generals, as well as uncounted number 
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of civilians (Chiang, Riji 1944, November 28, December, 2; Zhang 2008, 
361, 363-6, 376, 378).3 Scrambling for safety, General Chen made no ef-
fort to bring his radio equipment and accompanying code book (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, November 28-29). 
Not knowing what happened to General Chen’s defence, Chiang began 
to blame his military difficulties on the mass media. He attributed these 
disappointments to the Western press which, in his view, exaggerated the 
shortcomings of his army, painting a picture of starvation and sickness 
among the ranks and files and even striving to speculate on Chinese mili-
tary moves. Chiang accused western reporters of revealing military se-
crets and encouraging the Japanese to undertake bolder pursuits (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, November 27-28). However, such imputations could not reverse 
the course of the war, and no evidence shows the Japanese were helped 
and encouraged by the Western press. The hard reality was that the Japa-
nese army pursued relentlessly, and General Chen Sunong’s army failed 
to stop the Japanese drive. 
While constantly deriving courage from reading the Bible and 
Streams in the Desert, the distraught Chiang found additional ways 
to find comfort in his Christian faith. For no clear reason at all, he 
claimed God had promised him that the Japanese army would not enter 
Guizhou and because of His grace, so he could feel relaxed (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, November 29). Another night he dreamed about cleansing 
fecal pollution, which he persistently interpreted as a sign for turn-
ing danger into safety. He also opened the Bible after prayers to find 
signs. For example, he found in the 26 chapter of Samuel one account 
that King David got rid of Saul, and interpreted it as a portent for his 
army’s ability to get rid of the pursuing Japanese army. Similarly, after 
saying a prayer and asking God to reveal his will on the Communist 
problem, he found the third chapter of Joshua, and deciphered it as the 
heavenly father’s protection of him to endure through adversity so that 
his nation would revive (Chiang, Riji 1944, December 22). Regardless 
of what Chiang considered as good signs, the military reality remained 
bleak. When his American chief of staff, General Albert Wedemeyer, 
criticized the disheartening performance of his troops, dilatory working 
style of their supporting institutions, and General He Yingqin’s failure 
to hurry home to assume commandership, Chiang listened silently with 
shame and resolved secretly to make commensurate reforms (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, November 30). 
3 Zhang never mentioned his ever ordering Cheng Sunong to withdraw, but he sought to 
clear himself from the execution of General Chen Munong because he was considered the 
culprit for the death. He wanted to revenge the execution of Zhang Deneng. In order to clear 
himself, he even emphasized his urging Chiang to allow Chen Munong to evacuate before 
the Japanese offensive at the county.
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The hot pursuit by two Japanese divisions did not allow Chiang the luxu-
ry of relaxation. Regardless of God’s “promise”, they still entered Guizhou 
and reached the end of the Guangxi-Guizhou railroad, while General He 
remained in Chongqing. General Wedemeyer promised to airlift two divi-
sions from Burma, but the British blocked the decision. Unable to send 
timely reinforcements from Sichuan and elsewhere, Chiang was so shaken 
by this chain of events that he decided to abandon the provincial capital 
of Guizhou if the Japanese chose to pursue further. General Wedemeyer 
saw the possibility of the Japanese entering Sichuan, proposing to consider 
moving the war capital from Chongqing to Kunming. Chiang understood 
what the abandonment of Chongqing meant for his government, and flatly 
rejected this proposal. His heart was warmed by General Wedemeyer’s 
pledge to stay with him if worst came to worst, but he still lamented the 
same general’s failure to understand his readiness to die for righteousness 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, November 30, December 1-4, December 10). Logisti-
cal considerations led the Japanese vanguards to stop pursuits, despite 
their having decimated many Nationalist units. Chiang soon came to his 
senses. Commenting that “God delivered his promise to protect China”, 
he persuaded the American embassy in Chongqing to stop evacuating the 
Americans, a move widely interpreted by the local people as a sign of the 
imminent entry of Japanese soldiers and the collapse of the Chongqing 
government (Chiang, Riji 1944, December 5). Despite the improving situ-
ation, the British embassy intended to evacuate its citizens, and that night 
Chiang again dreamed of cleansing faecal pollution and even heard some 
strange sounds of “leaving credentials (liu guoshu)”, which he again in-
terpreted as a good sign for turning defeat into victory (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
December 7). When he heard of the recovery of the last terminal on the 
railroad line, he thanked God for realizing his promise (Chiang, Riji 1944, 
December 8). Despite the stabilization of the military situation, the dam-
age of the authority of the government was done. Like the strongmen in 
Henan, local “warlords” and secret society leaders of Guizhou used the 
slogan of protecting one’s home to disarm some of the disintegrated army 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, December 12).4 Increasingly more intellectuals tilted to 
the Communist side and the warlord generals Long Yun and Pan Wenhua 
began to ponder bolder challenges to Chiang’s authority. Even within the 
Nationalist Party, Chiang now faced more serious challenges than Sun 
Yatsen’s son Sun Fo’s criticism. Fortunately, he had the cooperation with 
4 Chiang never mentions Tang Enbo’s disarming of General Chen Munong’s retreating 
army around this time. The army that was most officered by his Huangpu students played 
no role in the defence of Guilin. It soon fell into disarray, extorting and plundering local 
administration and people. Their misdeeds eventually forced Chiang Kai-shek to send in 
Tang Enbo’s army to disarm them. See Zhang 1992, 34-8; Shi 1986, 188-200. General Shi 
Jue who was entrusted with the job mistook the 93rd army as Gan Lichu’s 6th army.
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the United States, which had sent Wedemeyer to serve him as his chief 
of staff; together they began to reorganize the badly mauled Nationalist 
army with American training and ammunition. 
Chiang ordered a court martial for General Chen Sunong, who had fled 
the battle without permission from his commanding officer. He pleaded 
that his unit had been undermanned, and that despite this constraint he 
had fought the Japanese for seven days and seven nights. He also pointed 
out that Chiang’s order reached him only after the decimation of his unit, 
and that it was the commander of the Fourth War Zone who urged him to 
leave the battlefield. Japanese accounts hinted at the unexpectedly strong 
resistance of his army, but do not show that such resistance actually con-
stituted an obstacle to Japanese progress, with hard fighting lasting only 
for one day. Chen Sunong’s claim about an order from the Fourth War Zone 
is doubtful. Without radio equipment, how could he receive any orders 
from Zhang Fakui? He should have seen the commander himself in order 
to get authorization for his departure from the battlefield. At any rate, his 
Whampoa instructor, Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin (nicknamed 
Grandma for his protection and indulging of his Whampoa Military Acad-
emy students) vouched for Chen’s good conduct and worked with the chief 
military judge who had a reputation for socializing to seek his release. He 
was imprisoned only because of Chiang’s adamant insistence. In the end, 
General Chen Sunong had to wait for three more years to secure a com-
plete acquittal and reinstatement of military position due to the interven-
tion of another Whampoa instructor, Gu Zhutong, who now served as the 
chief of staff of acting President Li Zongren, the Guangxi militarist who 
had forced Chiang Kai-shek to resign from the Nationalist government 
(He 1986, 560, 576, 679; Chen 1974, 65-80; Zhang 2008, 376-7; Nihon 
Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987a, 761).
4 Reform and Rectification of the Nationalist Army
No serious attempt at military reform could be detected in the military 
conference called in the Hengyang, Hunan, after the Lunar New Year 
of February 1944 (Chiang, Riji 1944, February 19). During the defence 
of Changsha, Chiang Kai-shek had ordered this conference to be recon-
vened in order to reform and rectify the army. This decision certainly had 
something to do with Roosevelt’s support for Stilwell about the Chinese 
military command. Chiang found the military performance in Henan was 
so embarrassing that he had to do something to remedy the situation. The 
agenda Chiang had in mind included the following priorities: a system for 
military conscription, grain taxation from the rural sector, the elimination 
of unaccounted military units, the training and treatment of new recruits, 
reducing the size of the army by disbanding superfluous units, raising 
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wages for soldiers and officers, eliminating army’s smuggling activities, 
minimizing and controlling army’s commercial adventures, and last, get-
ting rid of the army’s habit of “eating the ghost soldiers”, by which officers 
claimed a payment unwarranted by actual number of soldiers (Chiang, 
Riji 1944, July 8; agenda for this week). If this list can serve as an indica-
tor of Chiang’s sense of urgency, we see that he was concerned first and 
foremost with the extraction of resources from society, second the perfor-
mance of his troops, and third breaches of military discipline by engaging 
in smuggling and commercial activities. 
What he saw and heard about the military conscription gave him deep 
grief and pain. During the fighting of Lingbao, he witnessed a group of 
peasant recruits roped and herded like animals by county militiamen. He 
was so angry that he lost his temper and stopped his limousine, stepping 
down and beating two officers with a cane. He thought “If such an illegal 
matter can be seen here, we should have no difficulty in imagining what 
actually happens outside the capital” (Chiang, Riji 1944, June 7).5 During 
the interlude between the Henyang and Guilin battles, one of his sons 
informed him about abuses against recruits by transport team. The angry 
father asked the responsible ministers and concerned officials to come to 
the scene to see the maltreatment with their own eyes. Having witnessing 
the sick, starving, and beaten recruits, he suddenly lost his temper and 
used his stick to hit the responsible platoon leader and even the lieuten-
ant general in charge of the Bureau of Military Recruitment, who had 
reached the house late because the previous night his underlings gave him 
a farewell banquet, in which Beijing opera was staged followed by a game 
of mah-jong to celebrate his promotion (Shen, Lan 2003; Cheng 2012a, 
2012b, 2012b).6 Chiang did not know the cause of his being unable to ap-
pear on time at the scene, but, simply unable to bear such miserable sights 
and needing to vent his anger, he beat the two until they bled. Chiang 
instructed other higher ranking officers who were present to stay in the 
room and engage in self-reflection (Chiang, Riji 1944, August 30). 
Unfortunately, Chiang’s anger and punishment did not end these abuses, 
specifically the maltreating, scolding, beating, starving, and even killing 
of recruits, not to mention the inadequacy of clothing and medical treat-
ment, all problems that continued to haunt the Nationalist army. Chiang 
sought to improve the system by issuing detailed instructions about the 
transport of recruits from their home to the front or by ordering the gen-
darmes to immediately report all the abuses and their perpetrators, while 
5 Chiang asked for investigation into abuses of recruits in a county of the Fifth War Zone. 
The county was alleged to give recruits only a meal a day (Chiang, Riji 1944, January 24).
6 It is difficult to check the accuracy of the digital materials. According to these materials, 
Cheng was a local militarist with ties to the provincial networks of elder brother society.
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specifying minimum provisions for recruits such as bed, quilt, and clothing 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, September 1). However, a list of factors such as budget 
constraints, institutional backlogs, the low standards of recruits, and the 
intervention of local elites all prevented Chiang him from putting an end 
to the reoccurring sights of roped recruits, despite the upgrading of the 
Bureau of Military Recruitment to a ministry, which was asked to double 
its efforts to send recruits after the loss of the human resources from the 
three provinces of Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi (Lu et al. 2011).
Chiang also knew that the loss of Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi meant the 
doubling or tripling of the grain burden for the peasants in the unoccupied 
areas, particularly Sichuan. During the Japanese offensive, he had also 
noticed the increasing impact of grain requisitions. He never mentioned 
Tang Enbo’s alienating peasants by the army’s direct and relentless grain 
acquisitions from the rural areas, but he certainly noticed heavy taxation 
had already led to local uprisings in Guizhou and that the abuses of military 
men had led to a large-scale rebellion of peasants in northern Hubei in 
early November 1944, which ended in the killing of 20,000-300,000 peo-
ple (similar riots occurred in Sichuan) (Chiang, Riji 1944, November 4). 
Chiang asked landlords and rice merchants to shoulder larger burden 
by purchasing national bonds (Chiang, Riji 1944, September 2, Septem-
ber 10, September 12), but unlike his Communist foes, he never exploit-
ed the class antagonism and the redistributive mechanisms behind such 
policies as reasonable burden (actual tax burden redistribution) and rent 
and interest reduction to mobilize peasants into pressuring the wealthy 
(landlords, rich peasants and other rural elite) to shoulder larger financial 
burden. Later, nobody could miss the alienating effects Chiang’s extractive 
policies engendered, actually prompting many Sichuan local elites and 
strongmen to turn a blind eye to and to even support the Communist con-
quest in 1949. To increase peasant incomes, the Communist Party encour-
aged cooperative movements, but even though Chiang meant to duplicate 
these experiences, he could not make progress due to the failure of his 
grass-roots officials to mobilize and organize peasants.
Like their Communist counterparts, the Nationalists suffered from in-
flation fed by rapidly growing war expenses. However, the difference of 
scale was enormous because the Nationalist government had to finance 
a much larger army and bureaucracy, the latter of which had grown by 
leaps and bounds because of the urgency to control and mobilize national 
resources. Unable to cover these expenditures with tax incomes, whether 
in currency or grain, the state sought stringent methods to control the 
price of commodities, but this often prompted hoarding and therefore 
drove the inflation rate even higher. These experiences led to much more 
detrimental effects in the Nationalist than in the Communist areas. Other 
than alienating the business sector, Chiang could only seek means to lower 
the financial spending of his government, but, unlike the Communists, 
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he could not adopt a similar policy of mobilizing soldiers to engage in 
production. Needless to say, any effort to cut down the size of the bureau-
cracy also failed. Instead, Chiang began to overlook military involvement 
in smuggling and commercial activities, because he knew very well that 
the army suffered from insufficient military budgets. While such profits 
could relieve the commanding officers of their financial anxiety, ventur-
ing into the spheres of smuggling and commercial activities gave rise to 
rampant corruption. Some of the commanding officers even allowed their 
dependents to step into the forbidden fields of fortune-gathering. During 
the Henan debacle, Chiang noted that General Tang Enbo’s doing busi-
ness with the Japanese occupied areas had handicapped efforts to train his 
army (Chiang, Riji 1944, May 4), and later he also considered smuggling 
and commercial activities a key cause of his military defeat, second only 
to the appearance of many Chinese traitors. The commanding officers’ 
involvement in smuggling and commerce in the name of the insufficient 
provisions not only alienated the people but also eroded military morale 
(Chiang, Riji 1944, July 24). However, being unable to eliminate such prac-
tices, Chiang later only specifically forbade military dependents’ engaging 
in smuggling and commercial activities (Chiang, Riji 1944, October 31). 
Due to public accusations that he had amassed a private fortune, Gen-
eral Tang Enbo handed Chiang all of his ledgers for judicial investigation, 
and simultaneously promised to hand over all of his earnings. However, he 
seemed to be alone in so doing. To put things in a comparative perspective, 
the Chinese Communists in at least the Yan’an areas in 1943 also encour-
aged their military units, as well as the branches of their regime, to find 
other means of raising funds and actually acquiesced in their commercials 
activities. The difference was that the Communist authority could later 
terminate these widespread practices and urge all the military units to 
turn over their hidden “treasures”. In contrast, Chiang could not find ways 
of curbing ranking officers’ undertaking of the smuggling and commercial 
activities, particularly among the top brass.
While encouraging the self-reliance of military units, the Communists 
also resorted to the planting and trading of opium to tide over their finan-
cial difficulties (Chen 1995; Xiao 2013, 399, 457). Chiang Kai-shek could 
not imitate similar policies, even though his anti-opium policy failed to 
eliminate the opium sale and addiction in the area under his control. For 
him, Western credits and loans became the only way out, but neither the 
United States nor the British were willing to provide the needed sums, 
and both powers used corruption to justify their asking for stringent su-
pervision of these funds’ use, even though they had agreed to extend a 
helping hand. 
As a military man, Chiang placed top priority in training and equipping 
his army with weapons and expertise provided by the United States, a 
task now possible after General Wedemeyer had replaced General Stilwell 
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as his chief of staff. Other than mobilizing students to form a new army, 
Chiang sought to reform his army into one blessed with adequate pay, 
equipment, and training. Minimizing starvation and sickness, as well as 
guaranteeing minimum provisions to soldiers and adequate payment to 
his officers, became his top concerns, and he severely scolded his chief 
quartermaster for not paying soldiers on time and even dismissed him 
from the job temporarily in a fit of rage (Chiang, Riji 1944, September 6, 
September 12-13; Xu, Riji 1944, September 9).7 He also blamed Minister of 
Military Affairs He Yingqin for only knowing the need to save money with-
out any sympathy for soldiers’ starvation (Chiang, Riji 1944, August 18). 
Be that as it may, Chiang first had to reduce the discrepancy between au-
thorized strength and actual strength, and standardize all the Nationalist 
military units. Resistance from commanding officers seemed overwhelm-
ing, for they inherited a military culture that saw their forces as private 
property. While facing strong resistance to his determination to reduce 
the size of the Nationalist army, Chiang still had to do something about the 
starving, sickness, and malnutrition of his forces. He did try to increase 
payments for the officers and soldiers, but his reforms could simply not 
stand up to the eroding power of the inflation; financial constraints set 
severe limits on what he could achieve. 
Once the military crisis the Japanese offensive had engendered was over 
and US-China relations had improved, Chiang found more time to pon-
der military reforms and the concrete measures needed for implementing 
them. His top priority was to take advantage of American expertise and 
equipment to create a completely new army, including the mobilization of 
junior and senior high school students to join a new youth expeditionary 
army, a move he had already started. A more important task was to have 50 
army divisions equipped with American weapons and trained by Ameri-
can advisors. At the same time, Chiang sought to reorganize the forces 
already under his control, and sought to eliminate rampant factionalism 
and cronyism, both of which he had inherited from the warlord period and 
compounded by his mishandling of the problem of military personnel, a 
job handicapped by his seemingly favorable treatment of former Whampoa 
instructors and graduates, who usually had no training commensurate 
with their assignment. 
The Communists had initiated similar reforms by introducing a hier-
archal system of compensation, albeit starting from a very low point in a 
seemingly egalitarian world. Chiang’s bureaucracy and army had suffered 
tremendously from the war induced inflation. The purchasing power of 
their payments only amounted to 20% in 1940 and 10% in 1944. He faced 
7 Thanks to the pleading of General Feng Yuxiang, the chief quartermaster retained his 
job on probation.
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far more difficulties in improving their material lives. The Communists 
faced criticism from intellectuals who craved an egalitarian social order, 
but Chiang faced different challenge, namely finding resources to pay the 
rapidly growing military budget. Now with the help of General Wedemeyer, 
he set one US dollar a month as the goal for improving his soldiers’ treat-
ment. Furthermore, he began to see the urgency in reorganizing his cen-
tral and regional military headquarters, strengthening the troops directly 
under central control (Chiang, Riji 1944, December 10). It was difficult to 
find generals up to the challenges, but he finally prevailed upon General 
Chen Cheng to take over the difficult task of reforming the Ministry of 
Military Affairs (Chiang, Riji 1944, December 14).8 On the basis of his 
recommendations, Chiang began to reshuffle major military personnel and 
allocate them with American weapons (Chiang, Riji 1944, December 10, 
December 13, December 15, December 16, December 20, December 23, 
December 2). With American help, he also sought to establish personnel 
and logistic systems (Chiang, Riji 1944, December 19), but despite his 
numerous moral exhortations and official injunctions, these reforms were 
slow to make an impact. The way of reform and rectification was long and 
protracted, and abuses within the military forces plus their negative re-
percussions on society continued to haunt him. Late in 1944, he continued 
to face difficulties in dealing with the factionalism rampant in the military 
forces, as his officers continued to act with personal interests and senti-
ments as topmost concerns (Chiang, Riji 1944, December 27). He also still 
saw his soldiers clothed like beggars (Chiang, Riji 1944, December 28). 
After one year, he did equip about 50 divisions with American training and 
equipment, but once the civil war broke out the military expenses again 
rocketed and without a sound financial base and American’s consistent 
and sympathetic help, Chiang had to cope with the inevitable super infla-
tion, which seriously eroded military morale and fighting capabilities. In 
contrast, the Communists armies had built themselves a solid supporting 
structure in the countryside, and the peasants readily responded to the 
Communist calls for supplying soldiers and logistical support. In time, 
these factors contributed to the defeat of Chiang’s army. 
8 Chiang gave a list of people whom he planned to use, but it is unclear what he would 
do with the list. The list includes Whampoa generals Liu Zhi, Wang Maogong, Song Xilian, 
Du Yuming, Kang Ze, Liu Kan, non-Whampoa generals Xu Yongchang, He Guoguang, He 
Yaozu, Wang Zuanxu and the professionals of the political science group Wu Dingchang, 
Zhang Gongquan, Chen Yi, Xiong Shihui,and a CC clique related technocrat Zhen Yangfu.
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5 Conclusions
Based on the data presented above, I would like to offer some conclud-
ing observations about the Ichigo Offensive. Despite his determination to 
fight the invaders to death, whether for nationalist dignity, personal ambi-
tion or both, Chiang persistently underestimated the Japanese ability to 
launch attacks on a scale larger than the 1941 campaigns against either 
Changsha or Changde, which his armies had resisted until the Japanese 
were forced to withdraw. While Chiang’s intelligence people are hardly 
free from blame, his temperament and misjudgements also played a role in 
undermining Nationalist military campaigns. Once the Japanese launched 
their unprecedented scale of attacks, Chiang had no strategic alternative 
other than holding a city, weakening the attacking forces, and mobilizing 
a much larger force to hopefully inflict a crushing blow on the Japanese 
forces. Unfortunately, this strategy backfired on three accounts. First, the 
Japanese army often placed higher priority on the attacking peripheral 
forces in order to isolate the chosen city. Second, the Japanese placed 
higher priority to the interception and annihilation of the Chinese rein-
forcements than the occupation of important cities. Third, the Chinese 
defenders with the exception of the Fang Xianjue’s 10th Army barely lived 
up to Chiang Kai-shek’s expectations. Zhang Deneng’s 4th Army, Chen Mu-
nong’s 97th Army, Chen Sunong’s 93rd Army and Wei Yunsong’s Guangxi 
Army all failed to deliver on their promised performances. The Luoyang 
defenders were essentially satisfactory, but Chiang was simply unable 
to amass enough troops to take advantage of their defense. At the same 
time, Chiang was lucky merely because the Japanese army allowed seri-
ous logical constraints to dictate their strategy. Moreover, enemy forces 
were unable to think boldly in their penetration into China’s hinterlands.
In contrast, the Chinese Communists fully understood their weaknesses 
in the face of the Japanese pacification army, and chose not to meet enemy 
attacks headlong while also trying to avoid enemy attention. As a result of 
the so-called One hundred regiment offensive in 1940, the Japanese army 
wreaked large-scale retaliation against the base areas behind the Japanese 
fronts. By all accounts, Communist base areas shrank enormously, and the 
population declined almost by one half. The Communist party state barely 
survived, but still managed to consolidate rural support. No public opinion 
compared them to the Nationalist armies and blamed them for their failure 
to hold Chinese land. Eager for victory, the Japanese army instead dealt 
deadly blows on the Nationalist regular armies, which actually coexisted 
with the Communist guerrillas in the same north China areas, particularly 
the Nationalist armies in southern and eastern Shanxi. The Nationalist 
regular army was also forced to evacuate from Shandong and Chiangsu. 
The shrinkage of the Communist territory resulted in the transfer of cadres 
en mass and financial burdens to the Yan’an area. Similar effects occurred 
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in Chongqing after the loss of Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi, with the Com-
munist army taking advantage of the chaos for territorial expansion. The 
Communist base areas behind the Japanese front also expanded because 
the Japanese army had to shift its garrison forces to fight the Nationalists. 
In short, the Communists actually experienced a revival during and after 
the Ichigo Offensive. As a result, when the civil war finally broke out, the 
Communist base areas behind the Japanese front could delay and dilute 
Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive, thereby enabling the Communist army to 
compete for the control of Manchuria. The Communist forces also reversed 
their military fortunes after Chiang’s forces overextended their logical 
lines and brought about a period of unprecedented inflation.
Chiang Kai-shek’s military reforms assumed whole-hearted support of 
the United States, and the Nationalist army he reorganized with American 
help initially performed well once the civil war broke out. However, once 
the United States withdrew its military and economic support, his army 
immediately faced insurmountable difficulties. Chiang could neither build 
solid grass-roots support nor recapture the acquiescence of the upper 
strata of the society, such the intellectuals, the landlord-gentry and the 
commercial interests. These cascading series of military debacles ended 
up sealing Chiang Kai-shek’s destiny.
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In recent years, the opening of the Chen Cheng Archives at the Academia 
Historica in Taibei (officially “Vice President Chen Cheng Heritage”) and 
the publication of Chen Cheng’s memoirs, letters and other historical ma-
terials concerning him have made the study of Chen Cheng and of the 
history of the Republic of China and of contemporary Taiwan much easier.
My own research focuses on Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and during a 
visit to Taibei in September 2012, I was informed that the scanning of 
another important source, that is Chen Cheng’s personal diary, donated 
by the family to the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica, had 
been completed. Since I had never heard of the existence of Chen Cheng’s 
surviving diary before, I was very happy, and immediately applied to view 
these documents before I left Taiwan. Unfortunately, on that occasion I 
could work on them for just a day. In fact, when I had the chance to go 
Translated from Chinese by Laura De Giorgi.
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back to Taiwan and applied again to read the diary, I was told that, in ac-
cordance with the wishes of Chen’s family, it was temporarily unavailable. 
To date, I am the only scholar who has had the opportunity to read Chen 
Cheng’s diary held in those archives.1
Due to the very short time (just one day) I was able to dedicate to this 
work, I concentrated on the sections of Chen Cheng’s diary concerning 
Chiang Kai-shek. In this paper, I first introduce the diary and then inves-
tigate the relationship between Chen and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan as 
transpires from these documents. 
1 A General Introduction to Chen Cheng’s Diary
Chen Cheng’s diary represents one important part of the material donated 
by Chen Cheng’s family to the archives of the Institute of Modern History 
at Academia Sinica and it is available as digital images. Since I could read 
these documents only as computer files, and I have not been able to work 
on the originals, the documents quoted in this paper are indicated with 
their “digital image file number”.
The diary consists of 28 volumes, which cover a period of 33 years 
from 1931 to 1964. Some years are missing, and in some cases even if 
the diary for that year exists, there are actually no daily entries.
The specific situation for each year is given below: 
 – 1931: two volumes, the first covering the period from January to June, 
94 pages long; the second, 177 pages long, from July to December;
 – 1932: one volume, 12 pages; 
 – 1937: one volume, 163 pages. 
These first four journals were written in the “soldier’s diary” issued by 
the Central Executive Commission of the Guomindang. 
 – 1939: four volumes, the first one is 85 pages long; the second just 4 
pages, the “work diary for the inspections in Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Hunan and Chiangxi”; the third one is 61 pages long; and the fourth, 
137 pages long, consisting of an ordinary notebook;
 – 1940: one volume, 53 pages;
 – 1942: one volume, 140 pages, on its cover is written “The Diary of 
Shi Sou (the old man of the stone, a pseudonym of Chen Cheng’s)”. 
 – 1943: one volume,163 pages; 
 – 1944: three volumes, the first is 274 pages long; the second is just 58 
pages long, and consists of the work diary of the inspections to Shaanxi 
and Henan; the third, the “Diary of Shi Sou” has 82 pages; 
1 According to a friend in Taiwan, the publication of Chen Cheng’s Diary has already been 
planned. 
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 – 1945: two volumes, the first is 31 pages long; the second 10 pages 
long, an ordinary school exercise notebook that says “army demobi-
lization meeting”; 
 – 1946: one volume, 73 pages; 
 – 1950: one volume, 103 pages; 
 – 1954: one volume, 40 pages;
 – 1955: one volume, only 7 pages; 
 – 1956: one volume, 32 pages; 
 – 1958: one volume, 239 pages; 
 – 1959: one volume, 190 pages; 
 – 1960: one volume, 241 pages;
 – 1961: one volume, 267 pages; 
 – 1962: one volume, 266 pages; 
 – 1963: one volume, 252 pages; 
 – 1964: one volume, 27 pages. Chen Cheng’s last diary covers the period 
from 24 January 1964, to the date of his death on March 4, 1965, 13 
months overall.
Starting from 1931, Chen Cheng’s diary covers fifteen years overall, 
since the diaries for the years 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1938, 1941, 1943, 
1947, 1948, 1949, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1957, 1965 are missing; moreover, 
he did not write every day in each year. Until 1961, there are only 267 
pages, all told. Conversely, the diaries from 1958 to 1963 (six years) are 
relatively intact, and rich in content. As work diaries, they mostly did not 
concern Chen’s private life and feelings.
I do not know whether the Chen Cheng diaries held in the archives of 
the Institute of Modern History include all the diaries that Chen Cheng 
kept, or just the ones which were preserved or which his family decided to 
donate. It is my contention that it is just what survived. Since the diaries 
donated by the family also include a lot of information about the conflicts 
between Chen and Chiang, it is hardly likely something could have been 
hidden because of its sensitive nature. Nevertheless, Chen Cheng’s inter-
mittent diary and Chiang Kai-shek’s long-term, continuous diary are in 
stark contrast. From the perspective of content, Chen Cheng’s writings 
are more similar to a “work journal”, describing work and travel activities 
as “records schedules”, barely touching on his personal life and emotions.
Despite the flaws, Chen Cheng’s diaries do cover the period of the anti-
Japanese War, the Civil War and his life in Taiwan. Considering Chen’s 
status within the Guomindang, his diaries not only enrich what we know 
of his personal history, but also provide more insight into the history of 
the Guomindang, of the Republic of China, and of contemporary Taiwan. 
The author is interested in offering a parallel reading of Chen Cheng’s 
and Chiang Kai-shek’s diaries in order to compare how some events were 
recorded by each in these sources.
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2 Chen Cheng’s Questioning of Chiang’s Capacities  
After the Withdrawal to Taiwan
At the end of 1948, before Chiang Kai-shek stepped down, he hastily ap-
pointed Chen Cheng, at that time recovering from illness in Taiwan, to 
replace Wei Daoming as the Chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Govern-
ment. In the struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren, Chen 
Cheng stood firmly by Chiang’s side, and took several measures to stabilize 
the situation in order to lay the foundations for Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Guomindang regime’s retreat to Taiwan. Chiang praised Chen Cheng’s 
capacity to pacify Taiwan in 1949 highly: 
At that time, if Cixiu [the zi name of Chen Cheng] had not been in charge 
of the political power and had not actively done the clean-up work, the 
situation would have been more dangerous than the February 28th In-
cident in 1947. (Chiang, Riji 1949, “This year’s most depressing and 
difficult events”, December 31) 
Nevertheless, as it concerned the loss of the mainland, Chen Cheng initial-
ly raised doubts about Chiang’s ability and approach. These doubts were 
not rare among the Guomindang’s senior generals, an instance being Zhou 
Zhirou’s complaints about Chiang’s meddling in the military aviation’s af-
fairs (Chiang, Riji 1949, June 6).2 Chiang was very sensitive regarding his 
generals’ doubts (Chiang, Riji 1949, May 25).3
By the end of 1949, the United States were opposed to Chen Cheng’s rule of 
Taiwan, and they put Chiang under pressure to replace Chen using American 
economic assistance as bait, “they use intimidation, if I do not replace the old 
leaders, I will not get any American aid” (Chiang, Riji 1949, November 16). 
Aware he could not trust the Unites States and without any way out 
Chiang Kai-shek decided to “risk once again”, and he replaced Chen Cheng 
with Wu Guozhen, whom the Americans preferred. 
2 In Chiang Kai-shek’s diary we read “after the morning prayers, I read the letter of 
Zhou Zhirou to Jingguo, it said ‘the President still has direct control over the cadres, and 
this could potentially damage the power of the aviation’s commanders’. When I read this I 
became very upset. I think that because Zhou did not agree to go to Taiwan and has some 
resentment towards Cixiu, he is unexpectedly jealous of my power, this is really unbeliev-
able” (Chiang, Riji 1949, June 6). 
3 As Chiang wrote in his diary on May 25th “I feel that the civil and military officers are 
arrogant, their attitude towards me is not the same as before, and Guo and Chen all like 
that”. On June 6th he wrote: “This afternoon I summoned all the commanders, Liu Ruming, 
Wang Jingjiu, Shen Facao, Gui Yongqing, and Tang Enbo, to again discuss the defense of 
Taiwan with Cixiu and Xueting. The opinion of the commanders is quite strong, they com-
plain that I interfere improperly; Zhou Zhirou’s letter is quite revealing, it is really sad”. 
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At that time, as governor of Taiwan, Chen really meant to make a dif-
ference and was very reluctant to resign, but eventually he complied with 
Chiang’s decision. In his letter of resignation addressed to Chiang Kai-shek 
he wrote:
I would not accept to resign for the relationships with the Communist 
bandits; nor would I stand to resign for the relationship with Taiwan 
compatriots; I would be willing to do it just for our personal relationship 
and for these diplomatic relations there could be only resignation. You 
said that we must take the risk, and I will accept and stand humiliation. 
While serving, I encouraged myself to think that “in order to carry out an 
important mission you have no reason not to endure humiliation; if you 
want to complete it, you must necessarily accept it”, and now I console 
myself with this. (Chen, Riji 1949, 740) 
The passage from “I would not accept to resign” to “there could be only resig-
nation” shows that Chen Cheng was surprised and puzzled, and that he even 
felt wronged by Chiang’s decision. Eventually, though, he obeyed loyally.
On January 5th, 1950, while chairing a meeting of the Research Insti-
tute on Revolutionary Practice as president (congcai), Chiang Kai-shek 
acknowledged that the Guomindang’s policies on the continent “must be 
considered as a complete failure”, and that the causes of that failure were 
his own retirement and the fact that “the Guomindang had lost its center 
and was disorganized”, stressing that “in the future we must start again” 
(Chen, Riji 1950, January 5).4 
Chen Cheng spoke at the meeting, and pointed out that the withdrawal 
of a large number of troops and institutions to Taiwan had brought the 
island’s economy close to collapse, and that it was imperative to consider 
how to stabilize the economical and financial situation:
1. As concerns military expenses, we must use what we need, but we 
must abide by the principle of not weakening the whole economy and 
finance; about the sale of public properties and goods, we must know 
who the purchasers would be, and once everything is sold what can 
we do? 
2. (a) I hope that the funds regarding military expenditure will be kept 
in the Bank of Taiwan. (b) The number of personnel must be veri-
fied. (c) Smuggling must be banned. All these three points must be 
accomplished, especially the verification, and to verify the officers is 
the most important thing (Chen, Riji 1950, January 5).5 
4 Digital File Number (hereinafter DFN) 085-05-0018. 
5 DFN 085-05-0018. 
80 Chen. The Relationship Between Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng in Taiwan
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 75-102
Chen Cheng’s questions and suggestions show that he did not agree with 
Chiang Kai-shek’s initiatives. Chiang sent Wang Shijie to persuade Chen 
not to be so negative. Chen Cheng said he was not negative, “but I do not 
know how I can be positive. Now, if we are taking a self-destructive way 
(selfish and self-deceptive), should we not change this destiny? Or should 
we commit suicide?” (Chen, Riji 1950, January 7).6 Chen Cheng believed 
that Chiang Kai-shek’s priority should be to deal with the great issues, and 
he personally persuaded Chiang not to waste time on details, but “to focus 
on what was really urgent” (Chen, Riji 1950, January 8).7 
A few days later, again chairing a meeting on political work, Chiang 
Kai-shek stressed that the most important reason for the loss of the main-
land was the failure of the political work inside the army and that it was 
necessary to reconstruct.
Chiang specifically asked Chen Cheng to speak out, pushing him to 
express his opinions. Chen believed that the reason for the defeat in the 
mainland was first of all political, and only secondly military, and that “the 
political work in the army cannot bear the full responsibility for the military 
defeat” (Chen, Riji 1950, January 12).8 Holding a meeting on the political 
work was not urgent, so he said:
I do not oppose this policy, but in doing things there are some priori-
ties. According to my observation the Communist objectives regarding 
Taiwan are: first, they expect that there may well be domestic unrest; 
two, they can infiltrate and instigate rebellions; three, they can carry 
out a military attack. The area we control in Taiwan is only 3/1000, and 
the population is 1/60; as for the time, January, February and March are 
the most valuable period, during this period we must not procrastinate, 
we must not be chaotic, nor make bad mistakes. As might be considered 
from the position of the President, the most urgent matters are: since 
nowadays there is anarchy and the people’s hearts are shaken we must 
think how to improve the government and to reassure the people. The 
most urgent tasks of high functionaries and officers are: first organize 
the army, second prepare the war. Today we are not doing these things, 
it is frightening. (Chen, Riji 1950, January 12)9 
Moreover, Chen Cheng did not agree with Chiang’s proposal – raised at 
the meeting – to promote the policy of military farming units (bingnong 
6 DFN 085-05-0018. 
7 DFN 085-05-0018. 
8 DFN 085-05-0018. 
9 DFN 085-05-0018. 
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heyi) as Yan Xishan had did in Shanxi Province, “[I] simply do not agree 
with such a backward idea”. As it concerned Chiang’s proposal for hir-
ing former Japanese officers as advisers(which later became the ‘white 
group’), for “both the political and academic aspects”, Chen Cheng did 
not publicly express his opinion, but wrote in his journal, “with regard to 
this proposal, those in favour are few, only Wan Yaohuang does his best to 
support it because of his servilism” (Chen, Riji 1950, January 12).10 Obvi-
ously he disagreed. 
During that time, Chen Cheng conducted a comprehensive self-exam-
ination regarding the causes of the failure of the Guomindang on the 
mainland. He wrote: 
There are many causes for today’s defeat, but the most important factors 
have been that the leader did not distinguish the good from the evil, and 
this made the high officials self-deceptive and selfish to the point that in 
the domestic field they lost the support of the people, and in relations 
with the outer world, they refused the right help. 
The critical key to the survival of the Party and the State, to the suc-
cess or the failure of the revolution is that if the leader does not examine 
things he will be unwise, and if he does not decide he will not act with 
humanity; and if the cadres do not speak out they will not be loyal, and 
if they do not act, they will not be just. 
Without wisdom and humanity, how can it not be a general evil? 
Without loyalty and justice, how can the guilt not be deep?
In the domestic field, losing the heart of the popular masses, in the 
relations with the outer world, refusing the correct help, how can you 
expect anything other than defeat? (Chen 1950, January 12)11
Chen Cheng pointed out that the main reason for the loss of the continent 
was Chiang: “A leader that does not distinguish the good from the evil, 
makes the highest officials self-deceptive and selfish, in the domestic field 
losing the support of the people, and in the relations with the outer world 
refusing the right help!”. He expected that Chiang did not want again to 
“not control” and “not decide”.
Basically Chiang Kai-shek thought he had Chen Cheng’s support, and 
when Cheng actually unexpectedly raised a divergent opinion, Chiang 
became very angry, as he wrote in his journal:
I went to the Institute [Institute on Revolutionary Practice] for a meet-
ing; we discussed the problems of the political work. In the end Cixiu 
10 DFN 085-05-0018. 
11 DFN 085-05-0018.
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spoke, full of resentment and disgust; he considers my words and deeds 
to be tortuous, and thinks that I interfere in all affairs, delaying eve-
rything and that Taiwan’s chaotic situation has been caused by this. 
The listeners were all stunned. I politely cut it all, since I think that 
his psychological state suggests he is sick, so I forgave him. (Chiang, 
Riji 1950, January 12) 
Chiang Kai-shek was not satisfied with Chen Cheng, but in any case, Chen 
Cheng was the most trustworthy of his subordinates. Chiang sent Wang 
Shijie to persuade Chen Cheng, conveying two requests: Chen was to 
cooperate with the President of the Provincial Government, Wu Guozhen, 
and had “openly to solve his problem with Chiang Kai-shek”. Chen’s replies 
were: with regard to his non-cooperation with Wu Guozhen, “I cannot grant 
endless cooperation”; with regard to Chiang Kai-shek, “I can only obey”, 
but as concerns the issue of things that “cannot be done” or “must not be 
done”, “I think that a loyal officer must stand and talk, and he absolutely 
cannot deceive” (Chen, Riji 1950, January 17).12 Wang Shiji had raised the 
hope that he could cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, but Chen explicitly 
said: “I and the President cannot cooperate with each other, I just have to 
obey him” (Chen, Riji 1950, January 19).13 
In that period there was no direct communication channel between 
Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng. Chiang informed Chen of his wishes 
through other people. 
On January 20, Huang Shaorong visited Chen Cheng informing him that 
Chiang intended to nominate Chen as Minister of Defence. Chen Cheng 
asked Huang to transmit his wish to decline the offer: “When I made my 
report this year, I offended too many people and I have only increased the 
difficulties of the President. I would not be of any help and I cannot take 
the position. Please inform the President”. He recommended Gu Zhutong 
and Lin Wei, inviting Chiang Kai-shek “to choose the one to put in charge” 
(Chen, Riji 1950, January 20).14 
Chen Cheng supported the plan that Chiang should become reinstated 
as President as soon as possible. Chen thought that Chiang should not have 
too many scruples and himself limit his actions, “I think that a revolution-
ary action should be taken. Basically it is not possible to act according to 
the Constitution; at the very least he must first be restored to the office 
of President” (Chen, Riji 1950, February 5).15
12 DFN 085-05-0018.
13 DFN 085-05-0018.
14 DFN 085-05-0018.
15 DFN 085-05-0018.
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On February 19th, the 3rd day of the first month of the lunar year, 
Chiang Kai-shek summoned Chen Cheng, in order to discuss how to force 
Li Zongren to accept the ‘reinstatement’. Chiang proposed that if Yan 
Xishan were to resign as Premier, the position could be taken up by Chen 
Cheng. Chen declined the offer saying that “his physical condition did 
not allow him to do it”, “his personal character did not fit”, as a soldier 
he “was not so at ease as to accommodate himself in that place”, and he 
invited Chiang “to consider someone else” (Chen, Riji 1950, February 19).16 
At that moment, Chiang agreed to reflect on the issue. The following day, 
however, he unexpectedly summoned Chen Cheng again, to force him to 
accept the position. Chen recorded in the diary: 
At 7 pm the President called me for a meeting, to discuss once again 
the question of the position of Premier. I strongly recommended Wang 
Xueting [Wang Shijie], and reported that Wang was afraid that Mr. Li-
fu [Chen Lifu] would not be cooperative. In the event Wang should 
not agree, it was possible to consider Chen Lifu, Wu Tiecheng, Zhang 
Lisheng, Zhu Liuxian [Zhu Jiahua]. In the end, he intended to ask for 
Wang’ s consent, but said that if Wang did not agree, he still hoped that 
I would take up the office, urging me to prepare myself in advance. 
(Chen, Riji 1950, February 29)17
On March 1 1950, in Taibei, Chiang Kai-shek took up his post once again 
(“I again shall serve”) and was appointed President, with Chen Cheng 
appointed Premier. Chiang’s decision was opposed by the Governor of 
Taiwan Province, Wu Guozhen, who was no friend of Chen’s. When Chiang 
Kai-shek reflected on how to reconcile the two men, he blamed Chen’s 
attitude and style above all: 
Wu Guozhen is anxious because of Chen Cheng’s appointment as Pre-
mier. He demands his dismissal. Since this is his intention, I have to 
reassure him, and how can I make him serve with tranquillity? Cixiu’s 
temperament is narrow and intolerant. He is always overcritical, em-
barrassing many people. How can I deal with it? (Chiang, Riji 1950, 
February 22)
Chen Cheng reluctantly took up the office, but two months later he wrote 
a letter of resignation to Chiang Kai-shek, saying that his personality and 
skills “were not suited to a longer stay in the present position” (Chen, 
16 DFN 085-05-0018.
17 DFN 085-05-0018.
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Riji 1950, May 6).18 Chiang sent Huang Shaogu and Wang Shijie to appease 
Chen, and persuade him to stay on.
Chen Cheng was thoroughly dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek who 
would not listen to others’ views and insisted on pushing forward his own 
ideas. At the time, Chiang Kai-shek was planning the retreat of the Nation-
alist forces from Zhoushan in order to have a better control of Taiwan. On 
May 9th, morning, Chiang presided over a military meeting to discuss the 
withdrawal plan. Chen Cheng opposed the military retreat [saying] that if 
it was necessary to retreat, it should be asked the officers, “to study how 
to remedy this”. Moreover Chen warned that the recent military defeats 
were all caused by the habit of “deciding without investigating the situa-
tion and violating principles”. Nevertheless, Chiang insisted on his deci-
sion, and that night he informed Chen Cheng that the navy had been sent 
to Zhoushan to carry out the military retreat. 
Chiang pretentiously asked for Chen Cheng’s opinion, and Cheng re-
plied: “It is already decided, why quibble?”. He recorded his deep disap-
pointment in his diary: “It is very risky when the will of just one becomes 
action” (Chen, Riji 1950, May 9).19 
These examples show how, during the first period following the retreat 
to Taiwan when Chiang Kai-shek did not yet control the situation, Chen 
Cheng questioned Chiang Kai-shek’s capacity and style of action, and that 
Chiang was also aware of Chen’s dissatisfaction. 
3 The 1958 Divergence of Opinion  
Regarding Chen Cheng’s ‘Cabinet Reorganization’
In late June 1950, the Korean War broke out and the United States pro-
ceeded to help Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. After he had cleared the diffi-
culties, Chiang reshaped his autocracy and reinforced his control on the 
Party, the government, the military and Taiwan society adopting several 
measures. Chen Cheng was one of Chiang’s most important collaborators 
in this process. During the 1954 ‘elections’ Chiang chose Chen as ‘Vice 
President’. Chen Cheng did not intend to take up this new position, and 
wrote in his diary about the discussions among Guomindang high level 
cadres about the candidates for the ‘Vice Presidency’:
In the evening, at Huang Shaogu’s home we studied the President’s politi-
cal report. The Secretary-General Zhang raised the issue of the President 
18 DFN 085-05-0018.
19 DFN 085-05-0018.
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asking if a Vice President could or could not hold another position at the 
same time and said that both Zhang Yuejun [Zhang Qun] and Yu Youren 
had expressed their desire not to run for Vice President. My idea is that 
Wang Lianglao [Wang Chonghui]  is the best candidate for the position, 
and that also Zhang Yuejun could fit the profile. If Wang is elected as Vice 
President, Zhang can be the Premier. Moreover, I mentioned He Jingzhi 
[He Yingqin]. Zhang thinks that the President will not consider He. (Chen, 
Riji 1954, January 5)20
Chen Cheng considered Wang Chonghui and He Yingqin as the most 
suitable candidates. But Chiang Kai-shek preferred Chen Cheng, and he 
went on to nominate him. After Chen Cheng was elected, he resigned 
his position as Premier and became full-time Vice President. In 1957, 
during the 8th Congress of the Guomindang, Chiang Kai-shek proposed 
creating the role of Vice Chairman [of the Party], to be taken up by Chen 
Cheng. Chiang’s reasons for creating the position of Vice Chairman were 
quite complicated: “The position of Vice Chairman is necessary for the 
success and safety of the current and future political affairs of the Party, 
but also more necessary for Chen Cheng and Chiang Jinguo as well”. 
(Chiang, Riji 1957, September 27)21
After Chen Cheng became Vice Chairman of the Guomindang, his position 
as the second leader in Taiwan’s political arena was fully acknowledged. By 
the end of 1957, Taiwan’s political world was shaken by the case of the im-
peachment of the Premier Yu Hongjun by the Control Yuan, a case that was 
to cause political instability for more than six months. In the end, Chiang had 
to accept Yu Hongjun’s resignation and invited Chen Cheng to take up the 
position of Premier. Chen Cheng was unwilling to accept. In his 1958 diary, 
this was especially evident in the list of great events detailing the situation. 
February 13: the President has expressed the intention to reorganize 
the Executive Yuan after two or three months and chose me as Premier.
June 5: tonight I went to Jiaofanshan [Daxi], the President has again 
raised the issue of the reorganization of the Executive Yuan no later 
than mid-year (i.e., July 1) and asked me to take on also that position. I 
think it is not possible.
June 6: today he has mentioned again the reorganization of the Execu-
tive Yuan. I will reflect and I have not answered yet. In the afternoon 
at 2.00 he mentioned the issue again. 
20 “Table of main events”, DFN 085-05-0019. 
21 Here, Chiang makes a comparison between Chen Cheng and Jiang Jingguo, but at that time 
Jiang Jingguo’s position within the Guomindang cannot be compared to that of Chen Cheng. 
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June 26: the issue of the Executive Yuan has been raised again. 
June 30: during the meeting of the Standing Committee, the President 
has brought up my name as Premier. I have again invited him to reflect 
on it. (Chen, Riji 1958)22 
During those four months of negotiations, Chen Cheng did not agree to 
act as Vice President and Premier at the same time. He was aware that 
there was a contradiction between the two positions: “According to the 
Constitution, the Vice President and the President should not have differ-
ent opinions, but, as Premier, I have no way to avoid having different views 
from the President” (Chen, Riji 1958, July 28).23 
Chiang also recorded that Chen Cheng refused the position several 
times, including on June 26th when the two men talked of the matter, 
Chen “vowed he would not take up the position” using “quite vulgar ex-
pressions”. Chiang insisted again and in the end Chen was forced to “ac-
cept this order” (Chiang, Riji 1958, June 26). On June 30th, at the meeting 
of the Central Standing Committee of the Guomindang, Chiang officially 
nominated Chen as Premier. After the nomination, Chen Cheng “stood 
explaining”, with evasive words: 
A Party member must obey the Party and the President totally, but I am 
unsuitable for the position of Premier. I repeatedly stated my view to 
the President. I cannot be redundant, I invite all the comrades in the 
Standing Committee to consider carefully so as to choose some other 
more virtuous and capable. (Chen, Riji 1958, June 30)24
Chiang went to a lot of trouble to ensure that the appointment of Chen 
Cheng would be approved smoothly by the Legislative Yuan. The evening 
of the day of Chen’s election, during his walk, he expressly went to Chen’s 
home “to visit a sick person” (Chiang, Riji 1958, July 4). 
Originally, Chen Cheng was forced by Chiang to accept the new appoint-
ment, which he did reluctantly, but after Chen Cheng began to organize 
the Cabinet, Chiang felt less sure about him and constantly interfered with 
his work, which occasioned serious divergence between the two. 
In his selection of the members of the new Cabinet, Chen Cheng consulted 
Chiang Kai-shek several times. On July 6th, Chiang stressed to Chen that 
in future all policies were to be coordinated with regard to personnel mat-
ters, [saying that] “education is the most important”, and hoping that “the 
position of Minister of Education” would be taken by Zhang Qiyun (Chiang, 
22 “Table of main events”, DFN 085-05-0022.
23 DFN 085-05-0022.
24 DFN 085-05-0022.
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Riji 1958, July 6). Nevertheless, Chen preferred the rector of Qinghua Uni-
versity, Mei Yiqi. Because of this, Chiang thought Chen’s political stance 
was not stable, that his way of acting was weak, since, when he selects staff, 
“[he] does not examine what is good and what is bad, he listens to the nice 
words of mean people; with regard to the people he does not pay attention 
to their fundamental political profile, moral attitude and academic qualities, 
but he takes their administrative role as criterion of his choice” (Chiang, 
Riji 1958, July 7). 
Initially Chiang was ready to accept Chen Cheng’s proposal. However, 
when Chiang knew that the reason Chen did not want Zhang to remain in 
the position [of Minister of Education] was that Hu Shi and the others in 
the ‘Beijing University faction’ were jointly opposed to Zhang, his attitude 
changed drastically.
On July 10th, Chiang wrote: “Cixiu does not tell the truth and he is 
tricky, he makes the others nurture doubts, and have the feeling that he 
is not sincere. This is one of the greatest losses, and especially a worry 
for Cixiu’s future. How to make him be more impartial, and take greater 
responsibilities?” (Chiang, Riji 1958, July 10).
Chen Cheng did not notice Chiang Kai-shek’s change of attitude and, in 
the choice of Deputy Premier he continued arguing with Chiang. Chiang 
indicated Wang Yunwu as Deputy Premier, but Chen Cheng unexpectedly 
wanted Huang Shaogu to keep the position. On July 10th, Chiang asked 
Zhang Qun to inform Cheng he should “rapidly decide the issue regard-
ing the Deputy Premier and have Wang Yunwu succeed to the position” 
(Chiang, Riji 1958, July 10).
But three days later, Chen Cheng again met with Chiang Kai-shek, and 
continued to put forward the name of Huang Shaogu. Chen clearly per-
ceived Chiang’s dissatisfaction for in that day’s entry in his diary he noted 
not only Chiang’s intransigence, but also his grievances for having been 
wronged twice:
9 o’clock, Chen Xuebin came to discuss nominations-tomorrow will the 
list of nominees for the Executive Yuan be ready to be submitted to the 
Standing Committee? I shall wait to meet the President before making 
the final decision.
10 o’clock, I met with the President, and he insisted on Wang Yunwu 
as Vice Premier and Huang Shaogu as Minister of Foreign Affairs. From 
his actual words you would think that he was just giving me advice, but 
the meaning of his words… in truth I had never heard anything like it 
in my life – it was stressful. 
At noon, Yuejun, Lisheng, and Shaogu came for talks. I hoped that 
Shaogu would be encouraged to take the position of Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and I waited for each one to take the final decision. In the after-
noon, at 4 o’clock, I had a personal interview with Wang Yunwu, hoping 
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that he would accept to act as Vice Premier. He let me speak and after 
an hour and forty minutes, he only replied that he would think it over 
for a night, and would give me his answer tomorrow morning. I immedi-
ately called Yuejun by phone to inform him in order to jointly persuade 
Wang. After an hour’s talk between Yuejun and Yunwu he agreed, I did 
my best (he was not willing)  and leave the rest to fate (there is no way 
to resist orders). (Chen, Riji 1958, July 13)25
Chen Cheng eventually gave in and complied with Chiang’s will. But Chiang 
felt that Chen was not wholly persuaded, and thought that Chen “was false 
and not sincere”, a disappointment after three decades of painstakingly 
cultivating him (Chiang, Riji 1958, July 13).
Chiang and Chen’s respective status and responsibilities were different, 
so the fact that they had different views on the make-up of the Executive 
Yuan should have been unsurprising, but Chiang had a preconceived preju-
dice that Chen did not tell the truth and intended to deceive him, and this 
angered him greatly. After Chen Cheng’s Cabinet was complete, Chiang’s 
anger did not disappear and he secretly went on hindering Cheng’s poli-
cies. In early August, Chen Cheng accepted the Control Yuan’s request and 
agreed to improve the economic conditions of civil servants and Forces 
men. But Chiang Kai-shek, while chairing the meeting of the Financial and 
Economic Commission, did not mention the matter, his intention being to 
let Chen understand that Chiang was the only one who could take the final 
decision concerning political directives. 
Chiang, with some pride wrote in his diary: “The day before yesterday 
Cixiu at the Control Yuan arrogated to himself the right to announce that 
from this month on, the allowance of officers and lieutenants would be 
raised to 10 yuan, but his behaviour was not in line with the correct pro-
cess with all his eagerness to win, so I ignored him” (Chiang, Riji 1958, 
August 15).
As regards the reason why he could not follow all Chiang Kai-shek’s 
orders, an interesting conversation is reported in Chen Cheng’s diary. 
Chiang Menglin once reported to Chen the following observation made by 
Zhang Qun: of what Chiang says, Chen just listens to one half, Zhang Qun 
to just two-thirds and only Yu Hongjun to one hundred percent. Apparently 
Chen Cheng agreed with this observation, but he replied that “listening 
to one hundred percent is equal to not listening at all; first Hongjun just 
listens but does not act, secondly, when you act just obeying orders, not 
necessarily will society and officials listen too” (Chen, Riji 1958, April 12).26
25 DFN 085-05-0022.
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4 Chen Cheng’s 1960 “Trip to Jinmen”
Notwithstanding his support for Chen, Chiang Kai-shek was also increas-
ingly suspicious of him and hindered him in several ways.
When, in 1958, Chen Cheng in difficult circumstances complied with the 
order to take up the position of Premier, he had shown an exceptionally 
positive attitude, hoping that it could make a difference, and make him 
live up to Chiang’s trust and expectations. Nevertheless, Chen Cheng did 
not understand Chiang’s intentions. Chiang hoped that he would prove 
the kind of head who was a hundred per cent obedient, like Yu Hongjun, 
but Chen Cheng’s keen determination to go ahead and to maintain his 
opinions seemed to such a suspicious person as Chiang Kai-shek just like 
an inclination for disrespectful rivalry and restiveness. 
In 1960, presidential elections were to select the third President of the 
Republic in Taiwan. According to the Constitution, the President could be 
re-elected only once, so Chiang Kai-shek could not be elected again. The 
general opinion was that Chen Cheng would have no trouble being elected 
to succeed him. However, Chiang decided to run for office just the same, 
using various means to legitimate his ‘illegal’ behaviour, thus revealing 
his lust for power and the selfishness of his old age.27 Inside and outside 
Taiwan where Chen Cheng’s smooth succession was already taken for 
granted, the fact that Chiang stood for election, considering the climate 
then prevailing, seemed to convey the following message: according to 
Chiang, Chen Cheng was not yet qualified to ‘take over’. Worse still, the 
envious within the Party thought that Chen Cheng’s rise ought to be con-
sidered a joke. This was a severe blow for Chen.
There appears to be no hint in Chen Cheng’s diary of his dissatisfaction 
with Chiang’s participation in the elections. On the contrary, he always 
helped Chiang, putting pressure on opponents to persuade them to sup-
port him. On January 31st, Wang Yunwu expressed his “basic disapproval” 
of Chiang’s re-election, arguing that, even if Chiang could have kept his 
position, it was not possible to justify it by means of a modification of the 
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion. 
He said “it is not possible to re-promulgate the Temporary Provisions” and I 
absolutely oppose any change of the maximum term of office, it will create 
endless troubles”. Chen Cheng proposed: “at this point, if the President 
continues in his position, this will be quite legitimate and cannot have too 
many implications. In the current situation, fundamental reforms are ex-
cluded, for all the problems cannot be solved in a short time! In sum, the 
27 The most widely shared opinion is that Chiang Kai-shek, after his retreat to Taiwan, 
began to weigh up the opportunity of handing over power to his son, and to deliberately 
cultivate Jiang Jingguo. Chiang Kai-shek’s election in 1960 was supposed to stop Chen 
Cheng, until conditions were ripe to transmit the power to Jiang Jingguo. 
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national situation must necessarily be steered and the President cannot but 
be re-elected” (Chen, Riji 1960, January 31).28 His words helped Chiang.
The next day, Wang Shijie went to visit Chen Cheng to discuss the “issue 
of the presidency”. Wang argued that the international situation did not 
favour Chiang’s re-election and suggested “a government led by the Party” 
approach, with Hu Shi as President and Chiang holding political power as 
Premier. Chen Cheng disagreed with him, saying “we cannot ignore the 
reality that the President needs to be re-elected, and the current situation 
is unlikely to change”. Wang agreed with Chen’s judgment, but said “for 
the sake of the nation in the long term, I hope there could be the chance 
to change” (Chen, Riji 1960, February 1).29
Among the voices of those who opposed Chiang’s re-election, Hu Shi’s 
was the most influential. He expressed his opinion on every occasion, 
infuriating Chiang (Chen, Duan 2011).30 Chen Cheng and Hu Shi had a 
good relationship so Chen took the initiative to “have some consultations” 
in order to persuade Hu not to express his opposition publicly. Hu said in 
conclusion, “my opinion is still the same concerning the problem of the 
total duration of the roles published the day before in the Independent 
Evening Post (Duli wanbao), but I have decided not to express this opinion 
anymore” (Chen, Riji 1960, February 14).31
Election results returned Chiang as President, and Chen as Vice Presi-
dent. Chen Cheng immediately wrote to Chiang, resigning from his position 
as Premier. But Chiang refused Chen’s resignation, saying that “the difficul-
ties for the nation have not yet been relieved: there are still heavy respon-
sibilities to bear; there is no discussion as far as your resignation from the 
position as Premier is concerned”. Chen then resolutely stated once more 
that “I should no longer serve and can no longer serve as Premier”, urging 
Chiang’s approval. Chiang again replied that he would not give permission: 
We are personally committed to the Party and the State. We’ve been 
engaged in revolution for decades, have shared joys and sorrows, ex-
perienced dangers and difficulties. Now our country is in this critical 
situation and the people have placed their trust in us. We must expect to 
work harder, and bear the hardships. This means that it is not possible 
to resign. Your informal request has been kindly returned. Do not talk 
of resignation again. (Chiang 1960a, 795).
28 DFN 085-05-0024
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30 Chiang speculated that Hu Shi and the others’ opposition to his re-election was aimed 
at promoting his substitution by Chen Cheng, and afterwards having Chen as a ‘puppet’ 
controlling and managing political affairs. 
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Chen Cheng had often in the past submitted his resignation so his resolve 
in the matter came as no surprise and could hardly be ignored. Yet from 
this moment on, Chen assumed a clearly passive attitude. When it was 
time again to reorganize the Cabinet, Chen disagreed with Chiang only 
regarding the roles of Huang Shaogu and Chen Xuebin, but it was not such 
a dispute as it had been two years earlier.
Chiang accepted the Cabinet list submitted by Chen, and moreover 
thought he had succeeded in his scheme: “I will listen to his will... and 
observe what follows. In this way, I have not enforced anything, and this 
will make him comfortable and encourage his self-efficiency, isn’t this the 
way to employ a person?” (Chiang, Riji 1960, May 25).
This time Chiang was quite satisfied with Chen’s demonstration of com-
pliance, especially when compared with the rivalry which had beset the 
choice of the 1958 Cabinet: “In the talks with Cixiu about ministry person-
nel, everything has been quite arranged, generally, all has been decided; 
his proposals for the nominees mostly acknowledged my own intentions. 
He has demonstrated more loyalty in comparison with the previous reor-
ganization of the Cabinet” (Chiang, Riji 1960, May 23). 
What Chiang did not know was that this time Chen Cheng’s compliance 
and ‘acknowledgement’ was a demonstration of passivity due to the loss 
of any hope of ‘succeeding’ him and of resigning. Chen Cheng expressed 
his repressed feelings when he replied to the accusations raised by the 
members of the Legislative Yuan during the June session. On June 9th, 161 
members of the Legislative Yuan raised the issue to the Cabinet about the 
fact that Chen Cheng had remained Premier without authorization from 
the Legislative Yuan. On June 14th, Chen Cheng’s proposal for adjusting 
the pay and conditions of the military, the civil servants and the profes-
sors, was again criticized by the Legislative Yuan. Chen complained that 
“with their envious attitudes, comrades’ hatred has made them enemies” 
and angrily criticised the rhetoric of “cynical prejudices”. The situation 
was evolving into a crisis as “the Premier waged war on the Legislative 
Yuan”. On July 3rd,Chiang Kai-shek talked to Chen, persuading him to 
“train himself to keep calm”, and as far as possible to have a “tolerant and 
calm temperament” (Chiang, Riji 1960, July 3). On July 7th, Chiang wrote 
to Chen Cheng and, using the admonition taken from the Conversation of 
a Man Who Lives on Vegetable Roots (Cai gen tan)32 he advised Chen to 
“cautiously restrain his words”, asking him to go to Jinmen island to rest:
My younger brother, this time you should go to the outer islands and 
take a rest, for in all discussion you cannot show signs of anger, dis-
32 Cai gen tan is a  morality book written by the late Ming scholar Hong Zicheng, first 
published around 1590. 
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tress and discouragement. You should be more generous and carefree. 
If something unhappy occurs, I will deal with it properly, do not worry. 
(Chiang 1960b, 800) 
However, we do not know why Chen Cheng not only did not listen to 
Chiang’s advice, but although many years had passed since his retirement 
from the military and his entering politics, he actually went to Jinmen 
dressed in uniform and with great fanfare. On July 17th he wrote two 
letters to Chiang, one quite formal and solemn, reporting his inspection 
of Jinmen defences, the second directly addressing the harsh political 
environment in Taiwan and his personal grievances, indirectly replying 
to Chiang’s July 7th admonitions, and once again asking to resign. Chen 
Cheng half affectionately, half complainingly wrote:
In these thirty years that I have accepted your guidance, I never avoided 
difficulties, when I had to face problems, have never been negligent, com-
plaining or lazy, negative or pessimistic. Moreover, I have never searched 
for undeserved gain, nor have adopted an avaricious or selfish attitude. 
From winter 1930 when I received the order to go to Jiangxi against the 
Communist bandits until now, I have always motivated and consoled my-
self following the rule of ‘for what is right or wrong decide by yourself, for 
praise or criticisms listen to others, for gain or loss just follow destiny’, 
and ‘in order to carry a heavy burden, why hinder shame’, ‘if you desire to 
realize everything you will need to pursue tortuous paths’. Especially after 
the fall of the mainland and the Central Committee’s move to Taiwan, I 
was ordered to leave military activities and enter politics. Though I was 
not interested in politics, I knew that our country’s political environment 
was so bad, and then in these ten years, my entire attitude has ever been 
‘having a sense of guilt, working hard to expiate’. But in the end my train-
ing has not been sufficient, my knowledge and capacity lacking, and my 
contribution has been minimal, worse, I raised resentment and hostility, 
increased your burden and damaged your reputation, how can I remain in 
office with a feeling of peace and endurance? On May 21st in addition to 
the request to remove me from the role of Premier, I personally explained 
that I don’t have the mind and feelings to be able to cover the position of 
Premier. But unfortunately I have not received your approval. So, as it has 
always been that ‘to be afraid of danger is the way to ensure safety; to be 
afraid of perishing is the way to survive’ and  that  ‘people who have the 
same benevolence share the same worries’, and ‘people who are wicked 
all consort to each other’, and is this not this case? (Chen 1960a, 801)
Chiang Kai-shek was furious when he received this letter, concluding that 
Chen had “a serious psychological problem”, and that the question was 
very serious, Chen Cheng: 
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is a narrow-minded person with a low degree of tolerance, recently 
he has been criticized by the opposition faction in the Legislative Yu-
an, which has contributed to today’s situation, but actually all this has 
been caused by his inclination to speak a lot, being gullible, angry and 
doubtful, self-praising and arrogant. The excellent advantages of hav-
ing him usually in charge of managing things are now overshadowed 
by his shortcomings, and he reflects not at all on this, is unaware of it 
in fact. What a pity especially for the future of the Party-State! (Chiang, 
Riji 1960, July 19)
Since he felt that there was a risk of losing control since Chen had left, 
on July 19th he sent the General Secretary of the President Zhang Qun 
to Jinmen with a personal letter, sternly commanding Chen to return im-
mediately to Taibei: “In recent weeks, you have not been able to conceal 
your inner anger nor to control your emotions, I wish for us to solve all the 
problems of the present circumstances... this cannot come to be if you stay 
away, it is better for you to come back as soon as possible, and discuss the 
overall situation” (Chiang 1960c, 804).
As is proved in Chen Cheng’s diary, he did not want to create any prob-
lems for Zhang Qun: “I decided to take the afternoon flight together with 
Yuejun to fly back to Taibei” (Chen, Riji 1960, July 20).33 The day after, 
back in Taibei, Chen Cheng went to see Chiang. He has described this 
meeting in detail:
5.30 I had a meeting with the President. In addition to the inspection 
report and my impressions of the Jinmen situation, the President asked 
me to consider the present and the future of national issues. I said that 
from the very start I did not have any interest in politics, and since I was 
ordered to leave the army and to get into politics, I have only increased 
the President’s burden and anxiety, and I feel guilty deep in my heart, 
actually I cannot solve this problem by myself, and often feel that I would 
be happy to die before the President.
In this conversation, I felt that the President’s expectations in my 
regard were apparently great, but actually his doubts were deep. Moreo-
ver, mentioned when he travelled with Hu Shi, Wang Xueting, Jiang 
Menglin, and Mei Yiqi in past years, and for this he had decided to act 
as President for the third time, since he was the only one who could 
deal in the political world and said that I had my organization, and so 
on. (Chen, Riji 1960, July 20)34
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Chiang apparently showed he had great expectations of Chen, but actu-
ally, raising the issue of how two years earlier he had ‘beaten’ Chen, he 
said that Chen had his own faction. From what we can see from the diary, 
Chen believed that Chiang seemed to have great expectations but this was 
on the surface, while his doubts were “too real”, and this was the basic 
truth. Chen was compelled to defend himself, and in desperation, he went 
so far as to say “I often feel I would be happy to die before the President” 
something close to a curse, hoping this would dispel Chiang’s doubts. It 
is worth noticing that Chen Cheng was born in 1898, and was 11 years 
younger than Chiang Kai-shek.
Cheng’s explanations did nothing to make Chiang Kai-shek change his 
mind, on the contrary he thought that Chen had a “hypocritical and de-
liberately false attitude in words and deeds” (Chiang, Riji 1960, July 23). 
Subsequently, he required that Chen Cheng read The Biography of Von 
Moltke, so as to make him understand his responsibilities and limits as 
a subordinate and an aide. Chen understood Chiang’s intentions, and he 
specifically reported his impressions to Chiang after reading the book: 
I honestly feel that an aide, in addition to understanding the interna-
tional situation and the political environment, must especially :(a) know 
the cardinal principles, consider the overall situation, with loyal and 
fierce dedication, working unremittingly. (b) connect the higher and 
lower, transform the differences to similarities, temper losses and gains, 
and search to deal with them properly. (c) tolerate the words that people 
do not tolerate, and accept insults that people cannot accept. Other-
wise, is it so surprising that he should harm himself and the country? 
(Chen 1960b, in He 2007, 805)
Chen Cheng, who was well acquainted with Chiang’s personality, had no 
ambitions of ‘succession’. He considered himself an “aide” and, to Chiang, 
showed that he had to put into practice the three lines of “know the car-
dinal principle, consider the overall situation”. This was what Chiang had 
expected to see.
5 The 1961 “Caoshan Controversy”
In his record of great events of 1961, Chen Cheng wrote: “July 2, unforget-
table day” (He 2012, 45). What happened on that day was so memorable 
that he had to write it down. On that day, for the first time, he had a per-
sonal confrontation with Chiang Kai-shek which developed a great quarrel.
Previously, the contradictions and differences between Chiang and Chen 
Cheng were in most cases a hidden war consisting of reciprocal insinua-
tions, in 1961 they had a serious disagreement about the issue of ‘counter-
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attacking the mainland’, and since they both were impulsive and unable 
to control themselves, the conflict came out into the open. 
‘Counter-attacking the mainland’ was the basic policy and objective of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s rule in Taiwan. It was not easy for anybody to question 
it. Chen Cheng served as chairman of the Committee for the plans to re-
cover the mainland, and he had been an active supporter and promoter 
of ‘restoring sovereignty on the mainland’. But with the passing of time, 
Chen Cheng began to doubt the likelihood of success of the counter-attack 
and between the two goals of ‘counter-attacking the mainland’ and ‘Tai-
wan’s reconstruction’ he gradually began to be more inclined to pursue the 
second, since he considered that ‘Taiwan reconstruction’ was the founda-
tion of any plans to counter-attack the mainland (He 2012, 127). In 1958, 
while he served as Premier, he had raised the concern that the plans for a 
counter-attack had to take international factors into consideration. Indeed, 
by the late 1950s, Taiwan’s psychological mood at any level was that to 
counter-attack was hopeless. In early 1961, Chiang Kai-shek drafted the 
“wild dragon plan”, whose goal was to “take advantage of the opportunity 
to relieve the famine and hunger on the mainland”, in order to carry out 
air attacks and launch an airborne invasion and to promote a “full-blown 
anti-Communist revolution on the mainland” (Chiang, Riji 1961).35 By the 
end of June, Chiang received a secret report from Peng Mengji, which 
revealed that Chen Cheng had lost confidence in the ‘counter-attack and 
recovery of the mainland’.
Chiang thought that, since two months earlier Chen had agreed with his 
decision “to start the counter-attack phase” and affirmed that “we have 
already decided wartime financial measures and military expenditures”, 
now that Chen was suddenly opposed to the previous intent, not only had 
he lost faith in the enterprise, but also he did not care at all about Chi-
ang’s prestige (Chiang, Riji 1961, July 30). Chiang angrily discussed this 
with Cheng Chen. Unexpectedly, the July 2nd argument, as Chen Cheng 
persevered in his divergent opinion and the quarrel was an angry one, 
turned into the famous ‘Caoshan controversy’. Chen described the situa-
tion in detail:
The President intends to begin military operations in August. I think the 
counter-attack is right and I never thought the contrary, but we have to 
reflect if now is the appropriate time for the offensive. The President 
did not wait for me to finish talking, he was furious, thinking that I had 
doubts about the capacity of the army to fight and that I was going to 
destroy the commanders’ prestige and obstruct the counterattack. I said 
that if the President spoke in that way it meant that he had doubts about 
35 Minguowushinian dashi nianbiao (Table of the main events of 1961).
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my personality, not only about my ability to do things, but also about the 
correctness of my behaviour. When we counter-attack, though we cannot 
calculate everything, we cannot be fatuous about the war, for however 
slight, there is always a degree of risk to one’s life in war. Can we ask 
how we can make the army not afraid to risk their life? And talking about 
the transportation, if we do not give enough time to the Ministry of Com-
munication, how can it gather the naval forces? Not to talk about the 
other issues. When we began to quarrel violently, the First Lady came 
out to make peace. After the President was quite calm, he said that it 
was necessary to prepare actively (for the war). (He 2012, 45)36
In his diary Chiang Kai-shek also recorded this event in detail: 
I discussed the counter-attack with Cixiu: plan, guidelines, dates, and 
the reasons why this opportunity is difficult to take and easy to lose, 
and the fact that he should be responsible enough not to say that “the 
national army cannot fight”, and this is an attack to the fighting spirit, 
to the prestige and leading capacities of the commanders. In this way 
it would not be possible to revive the confidence in the counter-attack 
in the future and I ordered him to pay particular attention to this. I in-
formed him that I have already given the order of mobilization, and that 
I cannot cancel it myself, unless, because of his disapproval, he cancel 
it on my behalf. But since I want the counter-attack to receive domestic 
approval, the only thing to do is to sacrifice my position. 
After he heard this, conscious that his conversation with Peng [Mengji] 
two days before had contradicted the position and dates agreed with me 
two months ago, he could not say a word as a reply, but only acknowl-
edge he would proceed according to my ideas and dates. Was not this a 
great occasion to turn defeat into victory for my policy of counterattack? 
(Chiang, Riji 1961, June 2)
Perhaps because of their different positions and different feelings about 
the debate, Chiang and Chen’s accounts were quite diverse in focus: 
Chiang did not remember the quarrel and Chen’s opinions. He gives the 
impression that he was always instructing Chen. Chen Cheng not only de-
scribes the quarrel and his views, but he also mentions the detail of Song 
Meiling’s pacifying role. Both men stressed their respective positions and 
reasons, so it seems that at last the other side had made a concession, 
and each had prevailed. Chiang Kai-shek recorded, “[Chen] did not say a 
word in reply, he could only acknowledge he would proceed according to 
36 Besides his diary, Chen Cheng had also a “Work journal”, where he recorded the sched-
ule of meetings and visits; the July 2nd 1961 record is especially detailed. 
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my ideas and dates”. Chen Cheng wrote, “After the President was quite 
calm, he said it was necessary to actively pursue the preparation”. It is only 
from this point that we know that their differences were not solved, the 
knot was not untied. Actually, Song Meiling, after this event, again went 
to Chen’s residence to appease him, after which she informed Chen’s wife, 
Tan Xiang, that “the two have an irritable character, they quarrelled for 
national affairs” (He 2012, 273). The arrogance shown by Chiang during 
the discussion greatly provoked Chen Cheng, who in his notebook “The 
Caoshan Controversy” recorded in some detail Chiang’s criticisms and his 
answers and feelings:
The President met me and set out his criticisms of me. In this meeting 
his rage was very explicit, in a way that I’ve never seen in the forty years 
I’ve followed him. His criticisms can be summarized as follows:
(a) He blamed me for having destroyed his commanders’ prestige 
(referring to the armed forces personnel);
(b) He accused me of obstructing his policy of counter-attacking the 
mainland (vaguely referring to military expenditures);
(c) he expressed his disappointment about these forty years of train-
ing and said that if he is no good, he will let me do all things.
My answers and thoughts:
(a) I am aware and I understand by myself that my learning is not 
good and my training insufficient, but I am second to nobody in believing 
in the decision and preparation for the counter-attack of the mainland. 
Moreover, with our ancestors’ spirit and ethics of “knowing that it is not 
possible but doing it anyway”, I will necessarily carry out the struggle 
against the Communist bandits until the end.
(b) My shortcomings are numerous and great, but I’ve never forgotten 
my responsibility and the ethical values.
(c) If there are doubts about my character, not only am I not able to 
act as Premier again, but I shall not even be able to be a moral person. 
My choice is to behave according to ethical values, I do not want to be 
an official. 
(d) My intent is to follow the President in order to realize Sun Yat-sen’s 
Three Principles of the People, rather than being an official, especially 
a high-ranking official.
I’m more than sixty years old. For decades I have worked hard without 
any complaints and without caring about slander, but in the end why?
If I had been just a little self-interested, I would never have been 
so stupid – careless of fame and blame and of physical exhaustion. 
(He 2012, 273)
After this quarrel, Chiang received the reports and Chen Cheng changed 
his attitude, becoming willing to make active preparations for the coun-
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ter-attack (Chiang, Riji 1961, July 6). The Cabinet had already issued the 
“Provisional costs of the war”, and ordered the Ministry of Transporta-
tion to schedule the gathering of the fleet, coordinating mobilization. 
Actually, Chiang Kai-shek’s counter-attack military plans were limited 
by several factors, especially the containment of the United States. They 
were just illusions, and could not be implemented. On July 18th, Chiang 
looked for a way to sidestep: “I have decided to extend the preparation 
of the mobilization for the counter-attack by two months to conclude it 
by September. This is necessary because of the situation and moreover 
due to the common domestic psychological attitude; we must stoop to 
public opinion and relieve the financial pressure”. At the end, he added 
one sentence: “Cixiu will be happier” (Chiang, Riji 1961, July 18). This 
sentence did not contain the previous wrath towards Chen. If anything, it 
held a somewhat self-deprecating tone, something very rare. In his heart 
of hearts, also Chiang thought that in these circumstances the counter-
attack was really hopeless.
According to Chen Cheng’s records, during the quarrel Chiang had 
said in wrath that, “if you think that I am not good, then you [Chen]
should do it”. This was tantamount to frankly saying in desperation that 
Chen Cheng was ‘forcing him to abdicate’. Listening to these words Chen 
Cheng was shocked, and replied that this meant doubting his loyalty, and 
that if Chiang had this in his heart, he could be neither an official, nor 
even simply a moral person. These words really show that his profound 
worry was that Chiang should ‘misunderstand’ him, thinking that he 
aimed to replace him. 
Not longer after this controversy, something else was to make Chen un-
happy. In 1961, the UN General Assembly discussed the issue of ‘China’s 
representation’, and Taiwan and the United States argued over how to 
keep the status of Taiwan in the United Nations. US President Kennedy 
asked Chiang to send “his closest officer” to the United States to negoti-
ate. Chiang evidently knew that the United States meant Jiang Jingguo, 
but he preferred to send Chen Cheng as his personal representative to 
the United States. In the July 17 diary entry, Chen records that he was 
summoned from Taibei to Sun Moon Lake to see Chiang:
At noon I arrived at Sun Moon Lake. The president had summoned the 
minister Shen Changhuan to report on President Kennedy and Vice 
President Johnson’s letter. This letter invited our President to send a 
trustworthy representative to the United States. I met the President 
at only half past twelve. I was not really happy. We talked a little and 
then had lunch, and resumed talking at half past five p.m. when he 
called me to go together with Minister Shen to the United States. I 
said that that my ability to speak is not good enough to convey his 
intentions, and I do not understand English, and I invited him to take 
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into consideration Madame Chiang or the elder brother Jingguo, or 
the elder brother Changhuan. The President felt that I am generally 
appropriate for this. (Chen, Riji 1961, July 17)37
Since Chiang Kai-shek had treated his ‘Vice President’ Chen Cheng quite 
coldly, first directly talking alone with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Chen’s feeling of being “not very happy” is certainly understandable. Chen 
Cheng’s refusal was not entirely an act of courtesy. Two days later, when 
Chen and Jiang Jingguo had a conversation, he again expressed that “he 
was unfit” to go to the United States, “because he was not good at talking 
and feared to damage the face of the President and the Nation” (Chen, 
Riji 1961, July 19).38 Nevertheless, Chiang insisted on sending Chen Cheng 
on an official visit. Fortunately, when he was in the United States, Chen 
faithfully implemented the guidelines decided by Chiang and withstood 
American pressure, insisting on Taiwan’s ‘original position’. This made 
Chiang very satisfied and “even delighted” (Chiang, Riji 1961, August 5). 
The 1961 July quarrel was a final catharsis and Chen Cheng’s last pro-
test, after which he completely abandoned his feisty spirit, and repeatedly 
submitted his request to resign. In December 1963, Chiang approved Chen 
Cheng’s resignation as Premier for health reasons. Chen immediately sent 
a letter to Chiang to thank him: “After my reiterated requests, I am finally 
relieved from this burden. I accept your caring concern and will keep it 
always in my heart”. He further requested Chiang to permit him “to be 
exempted from the circulation of all the documents and from the partici-
pation in various meetings and ceremonies” in his various posts as Chair-
man of the Committee for projecting the recovery of the mainland, as Vice 
Chairman of the Study group of the Constitution, as Vice Chairman of the 
Guomindang, and as Vice President, in order to focus on health, recovery 
and rest (He 2012, 833). The public motive for Cheng’s retirement was 
health, but afterwards in a letter to his daughter he plainly said, “I am in 
good health”.
Chen Cheng’s last diary record was written on January 24, 1964, but 
after 1961, in his diary there is no longer anything which concerned his 
relationship with Chiang Kai-shek.
As mentioned earlier, Chen Cheng’s diary does not concern his per-
sonal life and feelings, however, as can be seen from the above examples 
of his dissatisfaction concerning Chiang Kai-shek, it does give us a new 
understanding of the relations between Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng 
in Taiwan, since besides their long close co-operation, there were also 
contradictions and conflicts between them.
37 DFN 085-05-0025.
38 DFN 085-05-0025
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Based on the personal diaries and records of Fu Bingchang, a high-ranking 
official and diplomat in General Chiang Kai-shek’s government, this paper 
explores Chinese perspectives at the 1946 London Peace Conference with 
regard to the Iran crisis; a crisis that historians have long viewed as a piv-
otal event in the Cold War (Leffler, Painter 2005). Fu Bingchang is not a 
particularly well-known figure in the diplomatic history of Modern China, 
but significantly, he was General Chiang Kai-shek’s last ambassador to 
Moscow serving in Soviet Russia from 1943-49. As such, Fu’s knowledge 
of Chinese-Soviet and Allied wartime relations made him a key contributor 
and member of the Chinese delegation (Fung 2012, 195). By the time of 
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the peace conference events in Iran had already influenced the formation 
of the major components of the Cold War: the tendency of Britain and the 
United States to ally in order to confront widening Soviet influence in stra-
tegically important regions of the Near and Middle East (Yegorova 1996, 
22). Essentially, the Iran crisis was the result of Soviet support for a minori-
ties Azeri nationalist movement in Iranian Azerbaijan, and Soviet refusal 
to withdraw their occupation forces as specified by treaty. The roots of the 
crisis, therefore, lay in great power rivalry and internal Iranian politics 
(Leffler, Painter 2005, 5). As we shall see later, China’s involvement with 
the Iran debate was also tied to her geopolitical interests. 
From Ambassador Fu’s diaries we can discover much about the role 
of diplomacy under Chiang, as well as what it was like to be a diplomat 
under his regime. Because of China’s international standing at the end of 
the second world war, there can be little doubt that Chiang’s diplomats 
felt disadvantaged when compared with their western equivalents. China, 
along with America, Soviet Russia and Britain, was officially one of the 
so-called Big Four nations. But, given her status as the weakest player by 
far of the Big Four, Chinese diplomats were by necessity accorded a lower 
status in the diplomatic arena, much like the poor relative. This meant that 
even the best of Chiang’s representatives were not on an equal footing 
with their counterpart players of the international stage. For example, the 
US ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, boasted to Fu that he had 
gone over Foreign Minister Molotov’s head on any number of occasions 
to contact Stalin direct, and in this way he had obtained good results. Am-
bassador Fu simply did not have that authority (Fu, Riji 1945, November 
11). Effectively, Chinese diplomats were constrained within the limits of 
their own country’s geopolitical circumstances. A key aspect of this paper 
therefore is to consider, through the eyes of Fu Bingchang, how Chinese 
diplomats coped within their constraints and what avenues were open to 
them when negotiating foreign policy matters. Dittmer, Fukui and Lee 
(2000) argue that Chinese diplomats were masters of behind-the-scenes 
diplomacy, achieving goals through informal channels. Informal diplomacy 
was certainly practised at the peace conference and was endorsed, even 
encouraged, by Chiang himself. Indeed, Fu’s diary illustrates very clearly 
the way that informal diplomacy was used as a key strategy at the confer-
ence–an arena where he and the Chinese team found themselves embroiled 
in a key international issue with capacity to put China’s geopolitical in-
terests at serious risk (Leffler, Painter 2005, 5). The pressure to avert the 
crisis concerning Iran, therefore, was doubly important for the Chinese 
delegates. Fortunately for them, Fu’s record shows that by the time of the 
end of the conference the Chinese team was satisfied that in January 1946 
they had made a positive contribution to world events without jeopardising 
their country’s interests. 
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1 China’s International Position
By the time of the conference Fu had been stationed in Moscow for over 
three years, and in that time he had not set one foot out of Soviet Russia. 
No wonder he was elated when it was confirmed that General Chiang 
wanted him to fly out to London and attend the peace conference as vice-
chair of the Chinese team. Not only was this his chance to escape Moscow 
and see Europe; it was a major opportunity to be involved in an event of 
historic proportions. As the US president, Harry Truman, had pronounced 
six months earlier in the plenary session in June 1945, “The Charter of 
the United Nations… is a solid structure upon which we can build a better 
world” (Truman 1955, 211). 
At the time of Truman’s declaration Ambassador Fu was satisfied that 
China’s international position was better than it had ever been. The long 
war of resistance against Japan had been won. China was a member of the 
Big Four nations, a position that gave her international recognition and a 
permanent power of veto in the new United Nations Security Council. Fu 
himself had signed the Moscow Declaration paving the way for China’s 
membership back in October, 1943 (Foo 2011, 111). Further, Fu was sat-
isfied that the Chinese-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed in 
Moscow just five months earlier, in August 1945, gave Chiang Kai-shek 
a formal guarantee from Stalin that Soviet Russia would not support his 
enemies, the Chinese Communists, and that to this end there would be a 
smooth handover by Soviet troops in China’s northeast over to Chiang’s 
central government forces (Foo 2009, 203-5). “Things look hopeful”, wrote 
Fu on New Year’s day after hearing the BBC’s welcome announcement that 
President Truman’s special envoy to China, Ambassador General George 
C. Marshall, was in Chongqing working strenuously to mediate a peace-
ful settlement between Chiang’s national party, the Guomindang (GMD), 
and the insurgent Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong. At the time 
Fu was hosting Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Jiang Jingguo. Jiang had been sent 
to Moscow by his father to hold exploratory talks with Marshal Stalin on 
the Soviet handover of China’s northeast, and he and Fu had celebrated 
the New Year together at an all-night private party in one of Moscow’s fin-
est hotels (Fu, Riji 1946, January 1). Fu knew, having been in attendance 
already at the first Jiang-Stalin talks starting 30 December, that despite 
misgivings by Stalin concerning certain “reactionary elements” in the Guo-
mindang, Stalin still supported Chiang’s government as the legitimate 
government of China and felt that cooperation between the Guomindang 
and the Chinese Communists was feasible and to be encouraged (Fu, Riji 
1946, January 4). Fu’s job had been to accompany Jiang Jingguo during 
the latter’s late night meetings in the Kremlin. 
It was at one of these meetings that Fu was able to tell Stalin about 
his forthcoming mission to London. Stalin replied that he was pleased to 
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hear of the news and that his own chief representative at the United Na-
tions’ conference was to be Andrei Vyshinsky, his vice minister of Foreign 
Affairs; a man that Fu knew and had had dealings with since June 1944. 
Andrei Gromyko was to be the Soviet Union’s permanent representative 
to the United Nations. Stalin advised Fu to keep in contact with Vyshinsky 
and suggested that if the Chinese representatives in London cooperated 
fully with the Soviets at conference, it would be of great advantage for both 
countries. Stalin’s undertone was obvious. With thousands of Soviet sol-
diers still stationed in China’s northeast and clear evidence, from circles in 
Chongqing and Moscow, that Stalin was still giving support to the Chinese 
Communists, Fu was well aware that the Soviet leader had plenty of lever-
age. He took Stalin’s advice seriously (Fu, Riji 1945, October-December). 
2 London
Fu left Moscow for London on 7 January 1946. The conference proceedings 
began on the afternoon of 10 January and were held in London’s Method-
ist Central Hall of Westminster (Fu, Riji 1945).1 China’s ambassador to 
Britain, Dr. Wellington Koo, (also known as Gu Weijun) headed the Chinese 
delegation with Ambassador Fu as his vice. The team included China’s 
ambassador to the United States, Wei Daoming, China’s representative in 
Turkey, Dr. P.C. Chang, and the diplomats, George Yeh (also known as Ye 
Gongchao) and Victor Hoo (also known as Hu Shizi). Altogether, Fu stayed 
in London for a total of five weeks (Fu, Riji 1945, December 21). 
From the start of the peace conference, the international arena was 
very much concerned about the tensions between Soviet Russia and her 
western Allies over Iran. In 1941, under a wartime agreement with Britain, 
the Soviets had deployed their troops into northern Iran. British troops 
(alongside 30 thousand US troops) were stationed in southern Iran. By 
the terms of a 1942 Tripartite Agreement signed by Britain, Soviet Rus-
sia and Iran, Allied occupation troops were to be withdrawn from Iran 
six months after the end of the war. This arrangement had been useful to 
the Allies. The foreign troops could safeguard Iran’s oil, and they could 
protect the movement of lend-lease supplies through the Persian Gulf 
from the United States to the battlefields of the Caucuses and the Ukraine 
(Scheid Raine 2005, 93). US troops evacuated Iran by 1 January 1946, 
and British troops would leave by 2 March 1946. Regarding the Soviet 
troops, their presence in northern Iran had awakened Soviet economic 
and political interests. By the end of the war, the fact that the Soviet posi-
tion in Iran had been significantly strengthened gave Stalin grounds to 
1 ‘Invitation to First United Nations Peace Conference’, in private possession of the author.
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hope that Soviet Russia would manage to enhance her geopolitical and 
economic standing and interests in the Middle East and he had no intention 
of withdrawing the Soviet presence (Yegorova 1996, 8). If he could gain 
access to Iran’s oil it would be good for the economy, and good for Soviet 
prestige (Yegorova 1996, 2; Harbutt 1981, 624). Also, an oil concession in 
northern Iran would give him an advantage over rivalry with Britain for 
political influence in Iran. Already, the Soviets had succeeded in reducing 
the influence of the Iranian army and Iranian administration and culti-
vated the establishment of the communist-led Tudeh Party (Yegorova 1996, 
28). In addition, Soviet troops were supporting and activating a national-
liberation movement for a ‘minorities’ Azeri movement in northern Iran 
(Yegorova 1996, 9). 
The Iranian government did try to bring up the ‘Iran question’ earlier 
at the mid-December Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in Moscow, 
but found themselves unable to do so because the question was not on 
the agenda. It had been deliberately omitted from the Moscow conference 
communiqué (Foreign Relations United States, hereafter FRUS 1945, 512-
3). Still deeply concerned about Russia’s territorial encroachment, the Iran 
government resolved instead that they would put forward a formal com-
plaint before the General Assembly of the newly formed United Nations 
Organization. Their grounds would be that the political independence and 
territorial integrity of Iran was impaired, in violation of the Charter, by 
Soviet-inspired developments in Azerbaijan Province (FRUS 1946, 289). 
The Iran government’s decision to bring the issue to the United Nations 
for mediation now meant that Iran’s internal affairs were international in 
character (Yegorova 1996, 15-7). Conference discussion on Iran started 15 
January and would draw to a close by the end of the month. Iran’s chief 
conference representative was Seyed Hassan Taqizadeh, Iran’s ambas-
sador to London. 
3 Iran Asks for Chinese Support
On the first day of discussions, Ambassador Fu noted simply that Ambas-
sador Taqizadeh had outlined the source of Iran’s troubles, and had asked 
delegates to consider a proposal to the Security Council for resolution of 
his country’s delicate situation with Soviet Russia. Three days later, Fu’s 
diary mentions the Iran question again. Ambassador Taqizadeh had ap-
proached Wellington Koo and wanted to know if he could rely on Chinese 
support were he to bring up the Soviet-Iran question before the General 
Assembly. Knowing that support of Iran’s request could embarrass the 
Soviets (and upset Chinese-Soviet relations) Koo advised Taqizadeh not 
to bring up the issue at this time. Later on in the day, Koo discussed the 
matter with his team. The situation had to be handled with care, he cau-
108 Foo. Chiang Kai-shek’s Diplomats Abroad 
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 103-116
tioned, because Chongqing could not afford to make enemies, even if Iran’s 
situation was a compelling one. Wei Daoming, China’s ambassador to the 
United States, disagreed. In his opinion appeasing the Soviets would not 
be helpful and Iran was entitled to protect her territorial integrity. Fu must 
have supported Koo’s stance because Wei accused him hotly for being too 
close to Moscow. Fu counter-argued by pointing out that Chinese interests 
should come first, and that Soviet appeasement was a policy matter to be 
decided by the central government alone. He said that they should make 
every effort to dispel Soviet doubts about China’s sincerity of purpose in 
this matter so as to retain Soviet support for Chiang’s government. Per-
haps the team was reminded here about Soviet troops still stationed in 
China’s northeast. Further, Fu was concerned that the Soviets might even 
walk out of the United Nations altogether. He reasoned that the Soviets 
were already suspicious that the General Assembly was being controlled by 
Britain and the United States. “This incident would only embarrass them”, 
he said, “and the United Nations could dissolve. The assembly is like a 
newborn child; if we put too much weight upon it, it could be smothered”. 
Equally, Fu knew that it was vital also to keep on side with China’s western 
allies, especially the United States. China needed US support as a coun-
terbalance to Soviet influence (Fu, Riji 1946, January 4). Unable to agree 
on a joint policy, the team decided to seek guidance from Chongqing. Fu 
drafted the report. It was approved by all the members and sent promptly 
off to Chongqing (Fu, Riji 1946, January 18). Meanwhile, Koo decided to 
pursue a diplomatic initiative. 
The following day he asked Ambassador Taqizadeh, for the second time, 
to rethink. He also talked with Britain’s foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, 
and the US secretary of state, James Byrnes, to see if they might also help 
to dissuade Taqizadeh. Bevin told Koo that Britain had not wanted Iran to 
raise the matter in the first place (Britain had her own areas of control to 
consolidate) but that he would have to approve the case if it were to be 
mooted before the Security Council. In actual fact, Britain’s ambassador 
to Washington, Lord Halifax, had in early January informed the United 
States that Britain wanted the US to join with them in urging the Iranian 
government not to bring the case before council (FRUS 1946, 293; 299-
301). Secretary Byrnes told Koo that he, also, was not keen for Taqizadeh 
to raise the issue, thus showing a degree of support for China’s position. 
At the time US policy was still to accommodate the Soviet Union (Har-
butt 1981, 623-9), although the official US State Department position was 
that it would support the Iranians to assure the preservation of the United 
Nations (Hess 1974, 131), a position that Fu understood, albeit from a dif-
ferent standpoint. Fu wrote, “The Soviet Union fears that Britain and the 
United States will take advantage of this organization and use it as a tool 
against them. Why support a tool against oneself? I am pessimistic for the 
future of the United Nations” (Fu, Riji 1946, January 19). 
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In spite of external pressure to withhold the Iran complaint, on 19 Janu-
ary, Ambassador Taqizadeh requested formally that the Acting UN Sec-
retary General, Gladwyn Jebb, bring the matter to the attention of the 
Security Council for investigation and recommendation for the appropriate 
terms of settlement (Fu, Riji 1946, January 19; FRUS 1946, 304). It was 
world news. In the US, American newspapers interpreted the Iran dispute 
as a test for the United Nations (Hess 1974, 132). On BBC radio news bul-
letins, Fu could hear that the language had changed from “Iran situation” 
to “Iran dispute”, thus escalating the matter. “It’s a pity”, he noted (Fu, 
Riji 1946, January 21). As a rebuke, the Soviets raised their own grievance 
to the Security Council contending that “the continued presence of British 
troops in Greece is fraught with grave consequences for the maintenance 
of peace and security” (Fu, Riji 1946, January 21; FRUS 1946, 306). 
4 Instructions from Chongqing 
On 22 January, the Chinese team received a cablegram from Chongqing: 
they were to mediate as best they could outside the conference. Such 
vague instructions from Chongqing meant one thing: they would have to 
work through informal channels to bring about a resolution. It would not 
be easy. As leaders of their team, Ambassadors Koo and Fu resolved to 
make every effort to put off the Iran affair in the manner they had been 
instructed. They started with a charm offensive aimed at the Soviets to 
reassure them that China was on their side. Wellington Koo would speak 
to Andrei Gromyko, Russia’s permanent representative to the United Na-
tions, and Fu would speak to Vyshinsky. Fu’s diary does not record the 
full extent of their conversations, but clearly from talks with US officials 
that occurred later, there must have been some discussion concerning a 
face-saving solution.
Fu describes Koo’s talk with Gromyko as having been amicable enough, 
but not before Gromyko was persuaded that Koo supported him. Gromyko 
said that he opposed the methods of the Security Council, and claimed that 
there was nothing to discuss, since by previous agreement Soviet troops 
had no obligation to withdraw from Iranian territory for six months. Pres-
ently this was the month of January and the agreement did not run out until 
March, therefore this was an empty case. Koo acknowledged Gromyko’s 
point, and the discussion ended with recognition from both parties that 
Chinese support was solid. Fu’s conversation with Vyshinsky was equally 
supportive. He took advantage of an evening reception at the Savoy Hotel 
to approach Vyshinsky. In warm tones, Fu explained that the friendship 
between their two countries was the policy of both Chongqing and Moscow. 
He assured Vyshinsky that Ambassador Koo was cooperating along those 
lines and that if there were any issues at all, Vyshinsky could be frank and 
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honest with him. Vyshinsky replied that he understood this policy and that 
he would cooperate fully with Ambassador Koo (Fu, Riji 1946, January 22).
Two days later on 24 January, Vyshinsky sent a long statement on the 
Iran question to the president of the Security Council, Norman Makin. In 
it, Vyshinsky categorically refuted the allegation that Soviet officials had 
interfered with the internal affairs of the northern districts of Iran – and 
denied that the Iran government had made efforts to enter into negotia-
tions with the Soviets on this question. Then the tone changed. The state-
ment pointed out that relations between the Soviet Union and Iran could, 
and should, be settled by means of bilateral negotiations. He stated that 
in view of this, the Soviet delegation regarded the appeal of the Iranian 
delegation to the Security Council as devoid of any foundation, and that 
they were opposed to the consideration of the Iranian appeal (FRUS 1946, 
24). The same day, a senior advisor to the US delegation recorded a con-
versation he had had with US secretary of state, James Byrnes. Byrnes 
had informed the advisor that when a state files a complaint, that state is 
entitled to a hearing in the Security Council; but the entitlement policy 
was not intended to preclude a recommendation by the Security Council 
that bilateral negotiations, for example, between Soviet Russia and Iran, 
be attempted first – so long as the Security Council was kept closely in-
formed (FRUS 1946, 309). 
5 Talking with the Americans
On 26 January, the Chinese saw a chance to pursue their diplomacy a 
step further. Ambassador Koo met with the new US ambassador to the 
United Nations, Edward Stettinius Jr. According to Fu’s record, Stettinius 
wanted the Iran crisis settled, and he proposed to Koo a tripartite discus-
sion between Britain, the US and the Soviet Union on the matter. Koo 
disagreed, saying it would embarrass the Soviets. Instead, Koo hoped that 
Stettinius would ask the Iran government to hold bilateral talks with the 
Soviets – something that had been mooted by the State Department two 
days earlier (FRUS 1946, 309). This would be a face-saving solution for the 
Soviet Union, and was consistent with the statement on Iran that Vyshinsky 
himself had put forward two days previously. Koo offered to smooth the 
way forward by broaching this strategy with British representatives ahead 
of time. With that, Stettinius replied that if Britain would agree, he would 
speak with the Soviets (Fu, Riji 1946, January 26).
A memorandum by Stettinius of this exact conversation is held in the 
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) record, but it differs slightly from 
Fu’s version in terms of what he had agreed with Koo. In his memo Stet-
tinius observed, correctly, that Koo was “very anxious to have the com-
plaints before the Security Council handled in a manner that would not 
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cause ruffled feelings”. Stettinius recorded that Koo had informed him 
that the Soviets were willing to negotiate bilaterally, but that they were 
firmly opposed to the Security Council’s passing of any resolution of any 
kind. Stettinius acknowledged Koo’s alternate plan to hold bilateral talks, 
with the Security Council stating in public that they were “delighted the 
two governments were willing to negotiate”. Koo suggested this could be 
followed up later with a statement to the effect that the Security Council 
would be kept informed of the progress, thus negating the need for a 
formal resolution. Stettinius then wrote that he had refused to make a 
commitment to Koo because of his confidence and respect for the Security 
Council. In fact he would only drop the matter if the Iranians themselves 
asked that it be dropped, and that they be given a chance to negotiate with 
the Soviets (FRUS 1946, 316-7). Thus Stettinius put the bilateral decision 
squarely in the hands of the Iranian delegation. As will be seen later, Am-
bassador Koo immediately took his cue from Stettinius as the opportunity 
he was looking for to seek out Iran’s cooperation for a bilateral solution 
to be followed up by a Security Council statement, as per his discussion 
with the Soviets. As Chongqing had advised, Koo was working strenuously 
behind scenes with all parties. Interestingly, the mood of the Chinese team 
was noted. At a House of Commons lunch hosted by the British foreign 
secretary, Ernest Bevin, Fu found himself sitting next to Sol Bloom, a US 
Republican senator. Bloom advised Fu not to give any concessions to the 
Soviets (Fu, Riji 1946, January 26).
As the informal diplomacy continued in London a new political develop-
ment in Iran changed everything. On 27 January a new premier, Ahmed 
Qavam, was appointed to office by the Majlis, Iran’s national assembly 
(Westad 2006, 61-4).Qavam, an astute politician with a record for politi-
cal radicalism, was well known to be a friend of the Soviet Union, and 
his timely assumption of power on this date coincided with the all-round 
agreement to hold bilateral talks between the Soviets and Iran. Naturally, 
with Qavam’s appointment, Soviet Russia had her ally and a face-saving 
solution. In a message to Wallace Murray, the US ambassador in Iran, 
Secretary of State, Bynes, wrote: “If the new government in Tehran agrees 
to enter into direct negotiation with Russians on the matter, its hand will 
be greatly strengthened by the fact that its case is pending before UNO. I 
insisted in London that Iran should have a full hearing” (FRUS 1946, 317). 
Murray’s response was that if the Soviets had really wished to settle the 
dispute by legitimate bilateral negotiations it had had ample opportunity 
before now to initiate such negotiations (FRUS 1946, 319). That day in 
London, Vyshinsky thanked Ambassadors Koo and Fu for their help in 
solving the difficult situation (Fu, Riji 1946, January 27). 
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6 Iran’s Complaint
The Security Council met twice to discuss Iran’s complaint – first on 28 
January, and then on 30 January. Newspapers around the world announced 
the onset of a major crisis as the wartime coalition, already fragile, seemed 
to be dissolving (Scheid Raine 2005, 93-5). As the first case since the 
founding of the organization Iran’s complaint excited worldwide attention, 
and as the organization members filed into the Central Hall, journalists 
and photographers spent over an hour jockeying for the best camera shots. 
When all was ready, Ambassador Taqizadeh took his place in front of the 
council and outlined the points of his case. Fu noticed that Taqizadeh’s 
tone was temperate, showing that he wanted to enhance Soviet-Iranian 
relations. Vyshinsky spoke next, sounding equally confident and with an 
equally moderate tone. He acknowledged Iran’s new Soviet-friendly gov-
ernment, and said that Moscow was in direct contact with Tehran, there-
fore, the Security Council had no reason to consider the Iran case further 
(Fu, Riji 1946, January 28). So ended the first meeting. 
After lunch, Ambassador Taqizadeh and his deputy, Mr. Kazemi, met with 
US officials. Taqizadeh told them that he had indeed received authority 
from his government to open discussions freely with Vyshinsky, but that he 
did not believe his government would negotiate directly with the Soviets 
in Tehran. Therefore although he still wanted bilateral talks, he wanted to 
keep the negotiations firmly under the jurisdiction of the Security Coun-
cil. To this effect, Mr. Kazemi told the US officials that Ambassador Koo 
had already agreed to draft a statement and raise it to council. That said, 
Kazemi felt it would be better if the United States could do it instead 
(FRUS 1946, 320-1). Clearly, Ambassador Koo had taken the opportunity 
presented to him earlier by Stettinius to negotiate with the Iran team a 
bilateral solution under Security Council’s jurisdiction. This had enabled 
the US to support a bilateral solution, and the Iranians could now use 
China’s backing to strengthen their position and get full US agreement. 
With Iran’s full backing, the US also had a face-saving solution. Later on 
in his rooms, Fu wrote, “The reason for Taqizadeh’s change in attitude 
is that the new premier, Qavam, has a history of understanding with the 
Soviets, therefore Vyshinsky thinks there is a better chance of negotiat-
ing directly with the Iran government. We Chinese, who feared most that 
this issue would have an adverse impact upon the UN itself, tried our best 
to mediate. According to their positive attitudes it is possible that our ef-
forts achieved something” (Fu, Riji 1946, January 28). As far as Fu was 
concerned, the team’s efforts through informal channels had smoothed 
relations and contributed towards a more positive environment, and he 
thought it important enough to record.
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7 The Final Meeting on Iran
On the morning of 30 January, before the final meeting on Iran, US offi-
cials met in preparation for the afternoon (Fu, Riji 1946, January 28-29). 
They had with them Koo’s draft proposal outlining a bilateral solution 
with Security Council oversight. Koo’s proposal was described as a “poor 
statement” and so a new one was drafted by an American policy advisor 
for Stettinius to use. As in the Chinese draft, the US agreed to bilateral 
negotiations between the parties so long as the Security Council was kept 
informed. A US advisor was sent out to seek Ambassador Taqizadeh’s 
approval. Taqizadeh agreed with the US statement, but asked that it be 
approved first by Ambassador Koo. In seeking China’s endorsement, the 
Iranians recognized the Chinese contribution and wanted to keep the Chi-
nese involved. Ambassador Koo was in full agreement with the American 
statement (FRUS 1946, 322-4). 
The final meeting on Iran was long and drawn out. It took four hours of 
passionate discussion by all sides to reach a unanimous resolution. Taking 
Fu’s record again, Ambassador Taqizadeh spoke first. He said he would not 
oppose direct negotiations with Soviet Russia so long as those talks were 
managed, supervised and reported to the Security Council. Vyshinsky ap-
peared unhappy. He could not agree on those conditions, he said. It would 
damage the dignity of the Soviet Union as well as the conference. Brit-
ain’s foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, intervened. He accused the Soviets, 
among other things, of violating the 1942 Tripartite Treaty. Furthermore, 
Bevin said that he wanted to keep Iran’s case on the agenda. With such 
an atmosphere, the Chinese team foresaw a deadlock. Ambassador Koo 
spoke up. “Whether or not the case remains on the agenda is irrelevant”, 
he said. “The General Assembly welcomes the agreement to negotiate; 
the General Assembly would accept and hear the case if there is no result 
and one of the parties proposes at a later date to the General Assembly. 
Therefore the Chinese commission suggests the debate of this issue is not 
necessary”. According to Fu, Ambassador Koo’s intervention seemed to 
have a calming effect. On the quiet, one of the Chinese delegates, Victor 
Hoo, crept out of his place to ask US aides if they would approach Bevin 
and Taqizadeh personally with a quiet word. The result was positive. Bevin 
agreed to drop his insistence that Iran’s complaint stay on the agenda in 
his draft statement. Fu recorded that Bevin laughed and then said, “I am 
the most conciliatory person in the room”. Vyshinsky answered, “Unless 
there is a hothead out there who wants to stop us from achieving a good 
result, I emphatically answer to Mr. Bevin, yes” (Fu, Riji 1946, January 28).
At last the resolution was adopted, and with it the United Nations met 
its first test as the world’s authority in disputes. Once again, Fu’s entry 
for the end of the day indicates the satisfaction of the Chinese team. “Our 
efforts at mediation in the Iran affair have achieved some success at this 
114 Foo. Chiang Kai-shek’s Diplomats Abroad 
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 103-116
early stage, and we can compliment ourselves” (Fu, Riji 1946, January 
28). Upon reflection, Fu had recognized in his diary that Vyshinsky would 
calculate on a successful bilateral solution based on Iran’s new Soviet-
friendly government under Qavam. Therefore although Fu put resolution 
of the issue squarely down to Iran’s change of government, he was still 
confident that Chinese efforts to mediate between the parties had yielded 
a positive outcome and fostered a better understanding between the Pow-
ers (Fu, Riji 1946, January 28-29).
To weigh up Chinese perspectives at the peace conference it would be 
fair to conclude that Ambassador Koo’s attempts, with the backing of Fu, 
his deputy, did bring about a good result for the Chinese. Their charm 
offensives ensured that there would be no misunderstanding between 
Moscow and Chongqing. Koo’s strenuous efforts as a third-party negotia-
tor alongside the US, the Soviets and the Iranians helped to mollify and 
smooth the way towards a better understanding between the parties. Iran 
made full use of the Chinese intervention, and even asked US officials 
to seek Chinese endorsement for their Security Council statement. By 
early 1946, Cold War divisions were already becoming apparent. Stettinius 
was right when he noted that Wellington Koo was concerned about causing 
ruffled feathers. Fu had had a clear warning from Stalin himself to work 
closely with Vyshinsky and to cooperate fully. It suited Chiang Kai-shek to 
have Fu keeping up good relations with the Soviets, because he needed 
Soviet as well as US support. Although China’s position as the weakest 
player of the Big Four nations placed limits on the power of Chiang’s 
diplomats, he encouraged them to use their negotiating skills behind the 
scenes. Informal diplomacy based on friendly, but persuasive, tones was 
a reasonable option. Chiang had given his diplomats exactly the same in-
structions when Fu was in Moscow months earlier at the negotiating tables 
of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty (Foo 2011, 188-208). 
In the end the Soviets did withdraw their forces by spring 1946, and 
Iran was able to assert control over Azerbaijan by the end of the year. The 
United States dropped the matter in May, and the upshot was that the 
crisis ended and the US solidified her position in Iran. Thus the United 
States achieved its first diplomatic victory of the Cold War (Hess 1974, 
117), a victory made just a little bit easier from behind the scenes by Am-
bassador Koo and his team. Ambassador Fu left London on 23 February 
in order to attend the Second National Government’s Plenary Conference 
in Chongqing, where he spoke in detail about China’s diplomatic role at 
the 1946 Peace Conference (Fu, Riji 1946, February-April).
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 103-116
Foo. Chiang Kai-shek’s Diplomats Abroad  115
Bibliography
Dittmer, Lowell; Fukui, Haruhito; Lee, Peter N.S. (eds.) (2000). Informal 
Politics in East Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Foo, Yee Wah (2009). “From Chiang Kai-shek to Mao: Fu Bingchang, Chi-
ang Kai-shek and Yalta”. Cold War History, 9(3), 389-409. 
Foo, Yee Wah (2011). Fu Bingchang’s Wartime Diaries: Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Last Ambassador to Moscow. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Foo, Yee Wah 傅錡華; Chang, Li 張力 (eds.) (2013). 傅秉常日記. 民國三十二年 
The Diary of Foo Ping-sheung, 1943. Taibei: Academia Sinica. 
Foo, Yee Wah 傅錡華; Chang, Li 張力 (eds.) (2014b). 傅秉常日記. 民國三十二年 
The Diary of Foo Ping-sheung, 1944.Taibei: Academia Sinica.
Foo, Yee Wah 傅錡華; Chang, Li 張力 (eds.) (2014c). 傅秉常日記. 民國三十二年 
The Diary of Foo Ping-sheung, 1945. Taibei: Academia Sinica. 
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Bynes to Ambassador 
in Iran Murry, 28 January”. Foreign Relations United States, vol. 7, 317.
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Calendar notes on Ira-
nian Matters”. Foreign Relations United States, vol. 7, 322-4.
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Memorandum by Mr. 
Harry N. Howard of the Division of International Organization Affairs”. 
Foreign Relations United States, vol. 7, 289.
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Memorandum by the 
Senior Advisor to the UN Delegation at the UN (Stevenson), 24 Janu-
ary 1946”. Foreign Relations United States, vol. 7, 309. 
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Memorandum by the 
Senior Advisor to the UN Delegation at the UN (Stevenson)”. Foreign 
Relations United States, vol. 7, 309.
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Memorandum by the US 
Representatives at the United Nations, (Stettinius) to the Secretary of 
State (Byrnes)”. Foreign Relations United States, vol. 76, 306. 
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Memorandum of Conver-
sation, by the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 3 January 1946”. 
Foreign Relations United States, vol. 7, 293.
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Stettinius to Secretary 
of State Bynes, 28 January 1946”. Foreign Relations United States, vol. 
7, 316-7. 
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “The Head of the Iranian 
Delegation at the UN to the Acting Secretary General of the UN (Jebb)”. 
Foreign Relations United States, vol. 7, 304.
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “United States Repre-
sentative to the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State, 
dated 29 January 1946”. Foreign Relations United States, vol. 7, 320-1. 
116 Foo. Chiang Kai-shek’s Diplomats Abroad 
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 103-116
Foreign Relations United States (FRUS) (1946). “Vyshinsky to the pres-
ident of the Security Council”. Foreign Relations United States, vol. 
7, 309-11. 
Fu, Bingchang 傅秉常. Riji 日記 (Diaries). “Cablegram Wang Shijie to Fu 
Bingchang”. Unpublished.
Fung, Edmund S.K. (2012). “Book Review of Yee-wah Foo Fu Bingchang’s 
Wartime Diaries: Chiang Kai-shek’s Last Ambassador to Moscow”. The 
China Journal, 67, 195-7.
Harbutt, Fraser (1981). “American Challenge, Soviet Response: The Be-
ginning of the Cold War, February-May, 1946”. Political Science Quar-
terly, 96(4), 623-39. 
Hess, Gary R. (1974). “The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War”. 
Political Science Quarterly, 89(1), 117-46.
Leffler, Melvyn; Painter, David (eds.) (2005). Origins of the Cold War. New 
York: Routledge.
Scheid Raine, Fernande (2005). “The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Ori-
gins of the Cold War”. Leffler, Melvyn; Painter, David (eds.), Origins of 
the Cold War. An International History. New York: Routledge, 93-111.
Truman, Harry (1955). Year of Decisions, vol. 1, The Truman Memoirs. 
Suffolk: Hodder and Stoughton.
Westad, Odd Arne (2006). The Global Cold War. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Yegorova, Natalia (1996). “The ‘Iran Crisis’ of 1945-46: A View from the 
Russian Archives”. CWIHP Working Paper no. 15. Washington DC. 
Sinica venetiana 4
DOI 10.14277/6969-126-3/SV-4-5
ISBN [ebook] 978-88-6969-126-3 | ISBN [print] 978-88-6969-127-0 | © 2017 117
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time 
New Historical and Historiographical Perspectives
edited by Laura De Giorgi and Guido Samarani
Difficult Years: Italy’s Policy  
Towards Chiang Kai-shek’s China, 1945-49
Guido Samarani
(Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy)
Abstract This article deals with Italy’s policy towards Chiang Kai-shek’s China from the end of 
the second world war to Chiang’s defeat in 1949. It will first introduce some general questions and 
aspects related to Italy’s foreign policy in the postwar years and then it will discuss some trends and 
problems about Italy’s policy towards China, taken in consideration two main periods: first, the pe-
riod from the last months of the war to the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in February 1947; second, 
the post-1947 period to Communist victory and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Summary 1 Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Early Postwar Years. – 2 Italy’s Policy Towards China: the 
First Period. – 3 Italy’s Policy Towards China: the Second Period. – 4 Conclusions.
Keywords Italy China postwar years. Italy. China. Chiang Kai-shek. Postwar years.
In the aftermath of the second world war, Italy’s international position was 
a very weak one: actually, although in summer 1943 Mussolini had been 
overthrown, the Badoglio Government with the support of King Victor 
Emmanuel III had been able to disengage the country from the alliance 
with Nazi Germany and with Japan, and Italy had achieved the status of 
a co-belligerent nation, Italy was however perceived by the major victori-
ous powers as a defeteated enemy country. During the negotiations that 
would lead to the drafting of the Italian peace treaty, a punitive approach 
had prevailed and in February 1947 (signing of the Paris treaty) the Ital-
ian Government had been compelled to accept a sort of diktat: territorial 
losses (Dalmatian territories and the Istria peninsula, African colonies, 
Dodecanese islands), heavy reparations to pay, severe limitations espe-
cially in the military field (Lorenzini 2007, 169). From the end of the war 
and for more than two years Italy was thus subject to the armistice terms 
and to foreign occupation, and foreign troops (basically American) would 
leave the country only at the end of 1947. 
Italy’s international status sharply contrasted with the aspirations nur-
tured by the Italian antifascist political class, by the diplomatic corps and 
by many Italian opinion makers: in their opinion, Italy had to recover the 
role of a middle-rank power which would exert its influence in the two 
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traditional areas of Italy’s foreign policy: the European continent and what 
was called “an enlarged Mediterranean” (possibly widened to some parts 
of Africa and the Middle East). Thus, the recognition of the nation’s inter-
national status and the revision of the most severe clauses of the peace 
treaty became the main goal of Italy’s foreign policy after the end of the 
second world war and especially after the signing of the Paris peace treaty 
in early 1947.
It must particularly be stressed – as a general question but also as an 
important aspect, as we will see, in the bilateral relations between Italy 
and China – that Italian politics and diplomacy considered Italy’s admis-
sion to the United Nations (UN) as a fundamental step in the process of the 
recognition of its international status: actually, the first application for the 
admission as a member of the UN was presented by Italy in May 1947 and 
was rejected mainly for some juridical controversies. Following applica-
tions were presented then many times starting from that of October 1947, 
but always met the veto of the Soviet Union, clear results of the growing 
contrasts between Washington and Moscow. 
Only in 1955 such a dream will became a reality and Italy was admitted 
to the UN (for the development of Italys’ foreign policy after the end of 
the war, see Monzali 2011, 47-65; Varsori 2001). 
This article deals with Italy’s policy towards Chiang Kai-shek’s China 
from the end of the second world war to Chiang’s defeat in 1949. It will 
first introduce some general questions and aspects related to Italy’s for-
eign policy in the postwar years and then it will discuss some trends and 
problems about Italy’s policy towards China, taken in consideration two 
main periods: first, the period from the last months of the war to the sign-
ing of the Paris Peace Treaty in February 1947; second, the post-1947 
period to Communist victory and the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC).
Main sources I have used in my paper are: general studies about Italy’s 
foreign policy; selected memoirs left by Italian foreign ministers and dip-
lomats; published diplomatic documents and in particular the Documenti 
diplomatici italiani collection  (DDI, Italian Diplomatic Documents), series 
X and XI, which covers the post-war years. 
1 Italy’s Foreign Policy in the Early Postwar Years
Italy’s post war foreign policy was clearly rooted in an antifascist spirit 
even if the lack of expert and talented diplomatic personnel made quite 
necessary, in the years 1946-50, to resume activities of quite a few diplo-
mats who had made their career during the fascist period. 
A leading personality in the new italian foreign policy was Carlo Sfor-
za (1872-1952), who had been Italian Minister in China during the late 
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 117-126
Samarani. Difficult Years: Italy’s Policy Towards Chiang Kai-shek’s China, 1945-49 119
Qing-early Republican period. Sforza become the Foreign Minister in ear-
ly 1947, taking the position which had been of Alcide De Gasperi (from 
July to October 1946) and, for a very short period (from October 1946 to 
February 1947), of Pietro Nenni: he will be Italy’s foreign minister and the 
main actor in the Italian diplomacy from February 1947 to July 1951, thus 
a very crucial period for Italy and a very fundamental one in the history of 
Italy-China relations during the post-war period. 
Sforza clearly indicated that the main focus of his action would be the 
international rehabilitation of Italy and its firm stand within the western 
political and economic bloc headed by the United States. Sforza made 
particular efforts to create a solid and competent team within the Ministry 
and relied for that in particular from June 1948 as his general secretary on 
Mr. Vittorio Zoppi, a recognized expert of Africa. Zoppi was asked to work 
in order to resume the former prefascist policy to consult regularly Italian 
ambassadors in the main countries and include their evaluations as part of 
the Ministry Foreign affairs decision-making process. Sforza also basically 
confirmed the decision, taken in the previous years by the former Italian 
foreign ministers, to appoint some political men representative of the dif-
ferent political parties which were supporting the government, instead 
of professional diplomats, to lead some of the most important italian em-
bassies abroad: that’s the case of Alberto Tarchiani (Washington), Manlio 
Brosio (Moscow) and also Sergio Fenoaltea in China (Giordano 1992; Di 
Nolfo 2006; Zeno 1999). 
2 Italy’s Policy Towards China: the First Period
During the first period (last months of the war to the 1947 Paris Peace 
Treaty), contacts were organized between the new democratic Italian gov-
ernment, headed by Alcide De Gasperi, and Chiang Kai-shek.
Italy was at that time represented in China from January to July 1946, by 
a low level diplomat (chargé d’affaires), Mr. Enrico Anzilotti, who resided 
for some months in Chongqing and then, from May 1946, in Nanjing. 
It was only in July 1946 that the first Italian ambassador to China in 
the postwar period settled in Nanjing: he was the above mentioned Ser-
gio Fenoaltea (1908-95), who discussed with Chinese foreign minister 
Wang Shijie and Chinese diplomats problems related to the future of 
China-Italy relations. A special meeting was organized, in particular, on 
August 14,1946 at the Chinese Embassy in Paris among the Italian Prime 
Minister (and concurrently Foreign Minister), De’ Gasperi, and the Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Wang Shijie, in order to evaluate solutions to pending 
problems within Italy-China relations and at the same time to look at pos-
sible Chinese support to Italy’s requests and demands at the Paris Peace 
conference (Mae 1994c, document 153).
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As indicated, Fenoaltea was a political personality rather than a pro-
fessional diplomat: he was a member of one of the then Italian moderate 
parties and had been Undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council 
of Ministers (Bonomi Government, 1944). He was formally appointed in 
March 1946 as the first Italian ambassador to China after the end of the 
war. Actually, the diplomatic who had been initially chosen was Francesco 
Fransoni (1886-1974), nominated as the Italian representative to China on 
November 9, 1945, but he declined due to the reasons which have never 
been clarified. Fransoni later became general secretary of the Ministry 
from November 25, 1946 to May 31, 1948: after his resigning, he was 
substituted by Vittorio Zoppi.
Fenoaltea was able to assume his functions in China only in July 1946, 
due to the serious difficulties Italy was at that time meeting in finding fi-
nancial resources and also to find a ship to transport the newly appointed 
ambassador, with his family and staff and all his belongings, to China. He 
will basically lead the Italian embassy in Nanjing for more than 3 years, 
from July 1946 to the fall of the Chiang Kai-shek government and the birth 
of the People’s Republic of China. 
In this period, two main question were at the center of Italy’s policy 
towards China and Italy-China relations. 
The first question. During the last months of the war, before Japan’s 
surrender, the problem of Italy’s possible entry into the war against Japan 
was raised: a participation which was regarded basically as symbolical by 
many countries, including the United States (which in any case seemed 
to support almost in theory such a choice), but which was regarded as 
rather important by Italy in order to demonstrate its complete break with 
its past and confirm its firm stand to the democratic and antifascist front. 
Various sources maintain that the US Department of State clearly indi-
cated to the Italian ambassador in Washington, Tarchiani, that Italy’s decla-
ration of war against Japan will surely enhance Italy’s international profile 
and facilitate Italy’s passage as a co-belligerant country to an allied country. 
It must be also said that such a choice will surely be welcomed by China, 
who obviously considered in a positive way a further strengthening of the 
anti-Japanese front (Borzoni 2004, which stresses the role of Roberto Pru-
nas, till November 25, 1946 the powerful general secretary of the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs; Mae 1992a, document 304; Mae 1992b, document 332; 
Mae 1994a, document 85; Mae 1994b, document 93: reply to 85).
As we know at the end this option did not become concrete. 
The second question. The problem of the contents of the peace treaty 
between the two countries within the larger context of the Paris peace 
treaty (Italian colonial legacy in China, repatriation of the Italians, Italian 
properties, etc.). At the end, within the above mentioned Paris Peace Trea-
ties of February 1947, a special section (Section V), articles 24, 25 and 26 
concerned “Italy’s Special Interests in China”. 
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Articles 24, indicated that “Italy renounces in favour of China all bene-
fits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed 
at Pekin on September 7, 1901 and all annexes, notes and documents sup-
plementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect of Italy of the 
said protocol, annexes, notes and documents. Italy likewise renounces any 
claim thereunder to an indemnity”. Article 25 stressed that “Italy agrees 
to the cancellation of the lease from the Chinese Government under which 
the Italian Concession at Tientsin [Tianjin] was granted, and to transfer 
to the Chinese Government of any property and archives belonging to the 
municipality of the said Concession”; and Article 26 maintained that “Italy 
renounces in favor of China the rights accorded to Italy in relation to the 
International Settlement at Shanghai and Amoy [Xiamen], and agrees to 
the reversion of the said Settlements to the administration and control 
of the Chinese Government” (text in Unts, 49, 1950, 18-19; Italian text 
in Lorenzini 2007, 169; see also Mae 1993a, document 372; Mae 1993b, 
document 610; Mae 1997, document 423; Cm 1998a, 832; Cm 1998b, 988)
3 Italy’s Policy Towards China: the Second Period 
During the second period (from the 1947 Peace Treaty to the fall of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s government), two different political and diplomatic questions 
became central in Italy’s foreign policy towards China and in Italy-China 
relations: first, Italian analysis and evaluation of China’s political and mili-
tary situation and China’s future perspectives, based largely on the reports 
send by Ambassador Fenoaltea and also by reports provided by Italian 
ambassadors in Washington and in Moscow; second, the question of a new 
treaty of friendship and cooperation to be agreed between Italy and China 
in substitution of that signed in 1928.
Considering the weak international position of Italy and especially its 
difficulties to build an autonomous foreign policy in China, Fenoaltea man-
aged to have its own vision of the Chinese Civil war and to transmit it to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was obviously looking to establish new 
positive and friendly relation with Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang 
but at the same time he seemed willing to find and to suggest in some way 
that Italy should take a kind of cautious attitude towards the Communists, 
provoking critical comments by some Italian political actors who saw in 
such an approach a kind of equidistance position between the Nationalists 
and the Communists. Fenoaltea’s views seemed also to be influenced by 
his desire to do his utmost to protect the small Italian community and the 
Italian interests – however limited – on the spot. 
In his periodical reports sent to Rome about the development of the 
political and military situation in China between 1948 and 1949, Ambas-
sador Fenoaltea tended to stress some points:
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 – The growing deterioration of the “economic, military and psychologi-
cal” situation in Nationalist China. Fenoaltea stressed that Chiang 
Kai-shek had no real chance to maintain a real control in Manchuria 
and also in Central China and that while Chiang Kai-shek’s troops 
had been able to control Communist expansion they are subject to a 
heavy military pression by the Communists especially in various area 
(Mae 2000b, document 357; Mae 2000c, document 408; Mae 2005, 
document 328);
 – United States attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek: the Italian ambas-
sador reported how Americans in China largely considered Chiang 
as a old and intransigent leader who continues to refuse to listen to 
military and political suggestions advanced by Washington; at the 
same time, however, he notes that Americans were quite aware that 
there seems to be no real alternatives to Chiang and that in China 
there were no moderate and anti-Communist forces which at the same 
time are anti-Communist and have a popular support. Fenoaltea is 
also rather critical of the American endorsement of Chiang Kai-shek 
which seems to him due mainly to the desire of President Truman to 
find a mediation with the opposition (Republican Party) and to ap-
pease Nanjing in order to get its fully support in American’s political 
and military plans and strategies regarding Japan;
 – He stresses that within the international community in China there 
is people who suspect the United States are prepared, if the military 
and economic situation for Chiang Kai-shek is going to become more 
and more critical, to assume directly the leadership of the Chinese 
troops or almost to create within China some special areas completely 
controlled by American armed forces with the idea to maintain such 
positions for a long time;
 – Fenoaltea also indicates that there are no concrete perspectives of 
a possible mediation between Chiang and Mao Zedong, especially 
considering that the Chinese Communist Party at this moment has 
no real interest to give to Nanjing any chance to reorganize its forces 
nor to give to the Americans a concrete hope that there will be in the 
future an anti-Communist china.
Fenoaltea considerations about the Guomindang regime serious difficul-
ties seem to be largely shared by Italian ambassadors in Washington and 
Moscow. For instance, Manlio Brosio, who became the Italian Ambassador 
in Moscow in late 1946-early 1947 in substitution of Quaroni, reminds 
us of a long talk in early 1948 in Moscow with the Chinese ambassador 
Fu Bingchang (Foo Pingsheung 1895-1965). Brosio stresses that Fu had 
informed him that the war on the Manchurian front had turned quite in 
favour of the GMD troops and that actually Communist agrarian reform 
is not so popular as usually depicted in the west. Brosio indicates that 
Fu’s views seem rather optimistic and that, even if the Communist troops 
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have been defeated in the area of Mukden, this does not mean at all that 
this may represent a starting point in the defeat of the People’s Liberation 
Army (Mae 2000a, document 81; see also Foo [Foo Yeh Wah, granddaugh-
ter of Ambassador Fu] 2011).
In early January 1949, Fenoaltea in another detailed report on the Chi-
nese situation indicates that the situation is becoming worser, it is quite 
probable that Chiang Kai-shek is preparing to leave his political power and 
that a peace will be signed between Nationalists and Communists. Accord-
ing to him, American diplomats here in China seems to be convinced that 
at the end the Chinese Communist Party will moderate its political condi-
tions to gain a peace agreement because they are aware that China will 
need USA’s economic assistance and support (Mae 2006a, document 2). 
However, only few weeks later, the Italian ambassador notes that the 
Chinese Communist Party seems no more interested in a negotiated peace 
with the Guomindang government: “That’s not surprising, the game is over 
even if it will take long time before the Communists will be able to take over 
all the country” (Mae 2006b, document 206; Mae 2006c, document 213). 
In the following weeks Fenoaltea send a series of despatches further 
stressing the extraordinary advance of the Communist troops (see for in-
stance: Mae 2006d, document 557; Mae 2006e, document 663; Mae 2006f, 
document 750; Mae 2006g, document 1097). 
However, in April 1949 the Italian Government decided to sign a new 
Treaty of Friendship with Chiang Kai-shek Government. 
4 Conclusions
In the aftermath of the second world war and the first post-war years 
was rather weak: from the end of the war and for more than two years 
Italy was subject to the armistice terms and to foreign occupation, and 
foreign troops (basically American) would leave the country only at the 
end of 1947. Italy’s international status sharply contrasted with the aspi-
rations nurtured by the Italian antifascist political class, which thought 
that Italy had to recover the role of a middle-rank power which would 
exert its influence in the two traditional areas of Italy’s foreign policy: the 
European continent and the Mediterranean. Thus, the recognition of the 
nation’s international status and the revision of the most severe clauses 
of the peace treaty became the main goal of Italy’s foreign policy after the 
end of the second world war and especially after the signing of the Paris 
peace treaty in early 1947.
Within such a general context, Italy’s relations with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
China were marked during those years by some fundamental questions 
and aspects: the problem of Italy’s possible entry into the war against Ja-
pan, a participation which was regarded basically as symbolical by many 
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countries but was considered fundamental in Italy in order to demonstrate 
its complete break with its past; the problem of the contents of the peace 
treaty between the two countries within the larger context of the Paris 
peace treaty (Italian colonial legacy in China, repatriation of the Italians, 
Italian properties, etc.); after the signign of the Paris Treaty in 1947: Ital-
ian evaluation of China’s political and military situation and China’s future 
perspectives, based largely on the reports send by Ambassador Fenoaltea; 
second, the question of a new treaty of friendship and cooperation to be 
agreed between Italy and China in substitution of that signed in 1928, 
which was obviously linked to the above mentioned evaluation. As already 
indicated, few months before Chinese Communists’ victory in the civil war 
against the Nationalists (April 1949), the Italian Government decided to 
sign a new Treaty of Friendship with Chiang Kai-shek’s Government for 
some main and important reasons: 
 – The need to obtain China’s support to the Italian request to be admit-
ted to the United Nations, considering that Chiang Kai-shek’s Govern-
ment was one of those which had signed in 1945 the Charter of the 
newly established United Nations; 
 – The need not to weaken Italy’s relations with the United States, which 
were considered fundamental for the future of Italy. 
Between late 1949 and the first half of 1950, after the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China, the break of the Korean War and China’s parte-
cipation into the Korean conflict, an intense political debate was developed 
in Italy about the problems if continue to support Chiang Kai-shek or 
open the path to a dialogue with Mao’s China. The final decision, largely 
criticized especially by the Italian Communist Party but also by various 
associations and personalities of different political and cultural areas, was 
to continue to support the Republic of China in Taiwan, before in late 1970 
the process of normalization of the formal relations bewteen Rome and 
Beijing was made possible (on these questions, see Meneguzzi Rostagni, 
Samarani 2014; Pini 2011; Samarani, De Giorgi 2011; Cm 1998c, 760).
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Abstract The Northern Expedition (1926-28) was a turning-point in the rise to power of the Nation-
alist Party in China, and instrumental in Chiang Kai-shek’s own meteoric rise from the position of 
military commander to top political leader. Scholars have examined the international consequences 
of this turning-point in Republican history from many angles. Most studies, however, have focussed 
on inter-state relations at the institutional level, leaving public opinion rather on the sidelines. In 
an attempt to fill this gap, this paper discusses Japanese press coverage of the Expedition, with a 
particular focus on the changing perception of Chiang’s role in the Nationalist Party. The analysis 
brings to light the articulate response of the press and of other national figures to the events in China. 
If on the one hand the Expedition gave cause for anxiety because of the threat it posed to Japanese 
interests, on the other it raised the hope that a stable government would emerge after years of civil 
war. While some commentators expressed cautious optimism, however, other observers held strong 
reservations about Nationalist leadership. Furthermore, coverage of the Jinan Incident shows that 
even the advocates of a policy of conciliation could assume a hardline stance when the Japanese 
military took the initiative on the ground. These findings suggest that further research into the early 
years of the Nanjing government could help explain why public opinion shifted rapidly in favour of 
an aggressive policy in China after the Manchurian Incident in 1931.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 The Spectre of Communism Looms Over National Revolution. – 3 
Towards Rupture Point: the Path from Nanchang to Shanghai. – 4 Revolution Stumbles as Factional 
Strife in the Nationalist Party Produces Warlords. – 5 Japan’s Interests in China and the Northern 
Expedition. – 6 From Jinan to Beijing: an Uncertain Scenario. – 7 Conclusion. 
Keywords Nationalist Party. Sino-Japanese Relations. Jinan Incident. Public opinion.
1 Introduction
The Northern Expedition of 1926-28, the military campaign which led to 
the formal reunification of China under the Nationalist Party, has been con-
The author thanks Shimada Daisuke for his insightful comments. Funding for research in 
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sidered in a number of studies as a turning-point in the Republican period 
(in English, recent publications are Van de Ven 2003, 94-130; Zarrow 2005, 
230-47; Taylor 2009, 52-85; the most detailed account is in Wilbur 1983). 
Debate has concentrated on the significance of the Expedition in terms of 
revolutionary movement, seen from the two opposite perspectives of the Na-
tionalist (GMD) and Communist (CCP) Parties. For the latter, the breakup of 
the United Front in 1927 was a grave setback in the fight against the forces 
of reaction. For the former, on the other hand, it represented a ‘purifica-
tion’ from deviant radicalism. From these mutually exclusive viewpoints, 
scholars have explored a wide range of Chinese and foreign sources in an 
attempt to reach a balanced assessment of the political process.
Research on Japanese documents has largely been confined to the institu-
tional sphere (for instance, see Iriye [1965] 1990, 125-59; Satō 2009, 21-71, 
224-82; diplomatic correspondence has been collected in Gaimushō 1989-
90, vols. 1-2). Only a few scholars have examined those crucial years through 
the lens of Japanese public opinion. Gotō (1987, 248-97) has analysed edi-
torials from the Ōsaka Asahi shinbun as part of an extensive study on how 
this leading newspaper closely observed the Chinese Revolution from its 
beginnings, in 1911. Eguchi (1972, 355-60) has praised the liberal magazine 
Tōyō keizai shinpō for its strong criticism of Japan’s military intervention in 
China. The official histories of the two largest newspaper companies also 
consider their coverage of the Shandong Expeditions in 1927 and 1928 (Asa-
hi shinbun 1995, vol. Taishō–Shōwa senzen hen, 299-301, 310-2; Mainichi 
shinbun 1972, 155-7; Mainichi shinbun 2002, vol. 1, 674-82). Underlying 
each of these works is an effort to present the relevant editorial line in a 
positive light, with the emphasis on the intention to establish a constructive 
Sino-Japanese dialogue. Eguchi, however, has stressed that the Tōyō keizai 
shinpō was the only voice that stood uncompromisingly against imperialism 
and militarism, while major newspapers held on to the notion of preserving 
Japan’s “special interests” in Northern China.
More recently, other researchers have dealt specifically with the issue 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. Yamada (2005, 643-53) has analysed the 
writings of journalist Tachibana Shiraki, who spent most of his professional 
life in China. Tachibana, who supported the Northern Expedition as a 
popular struggle against the warlords, criticised both the excesses of Com-
munism and the reactionary character of the Nanjing government. Soon 
disillusioned with Chiang, he dismissed him simply as a military dictator 
who had betrayed the revolutionary cause. Matsushige (2013) focuses 
on the main Japanese newspaper in Manchuria, the Manshū Nichinichi 
shinbun, showing how expatriates responded with growing apprehension 
to the Expedition. Finally, Iechika (2013) has compared press coverage 
of Chiang’s trip to Japan in the autumn of 1927 with the account left by 
Chiang himself in his diary, pointing out the difference there was between 
the public reception actually awarded him and Chiang’s expectations.
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Research based on Japanese press sources has a double merit. On the 
one hand, it presents additional viewpoints which contribute to balanc-
ing our understanding of the facts. On the other, it provides essential 
information on Sino-Japanese relations beyond government level. This 
paper, which presents a survey of major newspapers and magazines, aims 
to contribute in both ways to the literature on the Northern Expedition. 
The period examined covers July 1926 to June 1928, from the start of the 
military campaign to its completion after the capture of Beijing. The two 
newspapers considered are the Ōsaka Mainichi shinbun (OM) and the 
Tōkyō Asahi shinbun (TA or simply Asahi), which were among the most 
widely read in Japan. According to police reports, at the end of Novem-
ber 1927 the Mainichi had a daily circulation of 1,166,432 copies, while 
the Asahi was selling about 400,000 copies; neither purportedly had a 
political bias (Keiho kyoku [1927] 1979, 7, 29).1 Both Mainichi and Asahi 
had a partner in the same group: the Tōkyō Nichinichi shinbun and the 
Ōsaka Asahi shinbun respectively (about 450,000 and 1,260,596 copies; 
Keiho kyoku 1979, 7, 29). It is important to point out, however, that Ni-
chinichi editorials tended to coincide with those of the Mainichi, while the 
two Asahi acted more independently. Therefore, a review of the Tokyo-
based Asahi can highlight the differences with its Osaka counterpart. The 
other sources selected are Chūō kōron and Kaizō, which were among the 
most popular general-interest magazines of that period (about 20,000 
and 100,000 copies, respectively; Keiho kyoku 1979, 21). Being special-
ised publication, Gaikō jihō is not considered here. As the main forum on 
foreign affairs, however, it will be discussed in another paper.
When dealing with press sources, the question of the extent to which ar-
ticles may be representative of public opinion in the broadest sense arises 
inevitably. Japan was at the time a nation of 61 million people, 77%  of whom 
resided in rural districts (Naikaku tōkei kyoku 1940, 5). The editorial market, 
on the other hand, catered chiefly to the urban middle class. The publica-
tions cited here, then, could hardly be said to be the ‘voice of the people’. 
Nonetheless, they do shed light on the political leanings of an important sec-
tion of Japanese society, which debated foreign affairs with a critical spirit.
The following paragraphs track press coverage of the Northern Expe-
dition in its various stages, with a focus on the changing perception of 
Chiang Kai-shek and his role in the Nationalist Party. The first section 
addresses the question of GMD-CCP cooperation in the initial phase of 
the campaign. The next traces the widening of the Left-Right split in the 
GMD in the first months of 1927, up to the start of the ‘red purge’. The 
central part then discusses later developments from the standpoint of 
1 Higher figures (1,304,262 and 575,838 copies) appear in company figures, which refer to sales 
on New Year’s Day. Mainichi shinbun 2002, Bekkan, 97; Asahi shinbun 1995, Shiryō hen, 320.
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GMD factionalism. The final section re-examines the Expedition compre-
hensively in relation to Japan’s interests in China. The conclusion ties up 
the results of the research comparatively with those of previous studies.
2 The Spectre of Communism Looms Over National Revolution
Japanese press coverage of the Northern Expedition started in a rather 
low key. Attention was still focussed on Beijing, where control of the 
nominal government of China had recently shifted to the Fengtian clique 
as a result of the latest clash of arms between the regional factions. Po-
litical instability brought with it concern over a range of international 
issues, such as the stalemate in negotiations for the revision of Chinese 
tariffs (TA 6 July). When the GMD officially launched the Expedition in 
Canton, reporters summed up the news in a few lines (TA 7, 10 July; 
OM 11 July). Only one of these articles commented on the appointment of 
Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief of the Nationalist forces. Because 
of the extensive powers which accompanied the post, the article stated, 
“the position of Mr Chiang as dictator (dokusaikan) of Canton has been 
publicly acknowledged” (TA 7 July; a similar remark in TA 3 August).
Further explanation regarding Chiang’s standing in the GMD and the 
Expedition in general, however, would soon follow as the Nationalists 
scored their first victories in Hunan. The Asahi (21 July) noted that the 
campaign against the Zhili-Fengtian coalition
is not a mere struggle for power between North and South, or military 
cliques; it is a fight between a nationalist, conservative military clique 
and a Communist Party that uses foreign power. It has to be looked at as 
a grave development in a struggle that will condition the fate of China.
Regarding the GMD leadership, in the same article the opinion was that
the Canton government has now become completely the realm of the 
Communist Party. Former chairmen of the central executive committee 
as Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei have lost their position one after the 
other; the last Right-wing leader, [...] Wu Tiecheng, has suddenly been 
removed, arrested and imprisoned [...]. In this way the central executive 
committee has lost half of its members and actual power in the Canton 
government has shifted to the despotic arbitrariness of Mr Chiang Kai-
shek and the supreme political advisor, Mr Borodin.2
2 For a portrait of Mikhail Borodin, see Furushō 1927.
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This editorial introduced three key themes that would later crop up again 
in discussions on the Northern Expedition, namely: the role of the Soviet 
Union as foreign power behind the GMD; factional strife within the GMD; 
and Chiang’s relationship with the Communists.
Concerning the first point, the Mainichi agreed that the Expedition was 
a Soviet-sponsored venture, which aimed to extend Communist influence 
over a vast territory. Russia, “after the failure of its Far East policy in 
Northern China [...] is injecting tremendous strength into Canton as its 
only foothold in Southern China” (10 August). This explained why, “tak-
ing the opportunity of disturbances in Hunan” (that is, Tang Shengzhi’s 
rebellion against the local warlord), Russia “has supplied large amounts 
of weapons and ammunitions and has had [...] Mr Chiang Kai-shek carry 
out the Northern Expedition, in the attempt to stretch its arm over the 
Chang Jiang region” (10 August; a more detailed discussion of Russia’s 
China policy is in TA 4 January 1927). According to this view, Moscow was 
manipulating the GMD:
It is no exaggeration to say that at present all foreign and domestic 
policies of the Canton government are based on Russia’s guidelines. 
Mr Chiang Kai-shek and others embellish this truth by claiming that 
they have allied with Russia from an international standpoint as a first 
step towards the achievement of a world revolution, and internally for 
the grand ideal of accomplishing national revolution”. (OM 10 August)
The same article concluded that, since the ultimate Russian goal was to 
“expel the powers’ influence from South China and replace it with a red 
kingdom”, the issue of GMD’s relations with the foreign powers was de-
serving of careful consideration.
Such an emphasis on Soviet dominance was toned down somewhat else-
where, by recalling that the Expedition had been a plan cherished by the 
GMD since the time of Sun Wen’s leadership (OM 12 August, 21 Novem-
ber; TA 17 August). It was the Russian advisors, in fact, who in early 1926 
had rejected as premature Chiang’s appeal to launch the Expedition. This 
had also been the mainstream position of the CCP, until Chiang staged a 
coup in Canton – the so-called 20 March Incident – that forced the Commu-
nists to re-negotiate the terms for cooperation with the GMD. Chiang had 
acted pre-emptively, spurred by the suspicion that a conspiracy was about 
to strike him. It seems, however, that these fears were only the product of a 
climate of mutual distrust (Wilbur 1983, 573-5; Van de Ven 2003, 98-104). 
At the time, the Japanese press gave credit to the story of the aborted Com-
munist coup (TA 28 March, 4 April; OM 1, 12 April; also OM 21 November, 
quoting from the GMD Right journal, the Guomindang zhoukan). Allegedly, 
the Communists wanted to get rid of Chiang because “while on the surface 
he takes the attitude of joining hands with Russia, on the other side he has 
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an anti-Communist colour” (OM 1 April). At the same time, Chiang seemed 
to behave independently from the Right-wing leaders of the GMD, whom 
he had already ousted from Canton (OM 1 April).
Gotō (1987, 247) notes that the Incident received little attention in the 
Ōsaka Asahi. This newspaper, indeed, only conjectured that the expul-
sion of “many Russians” from Canton would induce the Soviet Union to 
moderate its China policy (8 April). The Tōkyō Asahi took a closer look 
at the consequences of the coup in the GMD. Initially, it seemed that the 
purge of the radical Left had placed the “moderate faction” in a dominant 
position (3 April). Shortly after, though, it was reported that Communists 
within the party were still strong; as long as factional strife continued, a 
Northern Expedition stood no chance (19 April). Rather, there was a risk 
that Canton would fall into “a state of anarchy” (21 April). Finally, there 
came news that Chiang had managed to negotiate an agreement between 
the pro- and anti-Communist factions in the army, which would voluntarily 
dissolve their organisations (24 April).
In conclusion, at this stage, Chiang’s political leaning certainly appeared 
ambiguous. Because of his role in the repression of Right-wing leaders 
back in 1925 (as remembered in Ikeda 1927, 52; Yamamura 1927a, 42) 
and again after the renewed agreement with the CCP, journalists at times 
would portray him as a Leftist (as in OM 12 August 1926; TA 5 Janu-
ary 1927). Still, the economist Negishi Tadashi remarked that Chiang’s 
pro-Russian stand was only opportunism: he “has not turned red from his 
heart; rather, he is said to be an anti-Communist, but there is no way he 
could denounce Communism” (TA 5 January).
The tendency to associate Chiang with the Communists was in part the 
standard reaction to his appointment as commander of a Soviet-backed cam-
paign. The Mainichi, however, also pointed to some incipient reasons for fric-
tion, which would become increasingly evident in the following months. In 
the first place, the Communist Party and labour unions were not necessarily 
ready to comply with the instructions of the GMD government, as proven by 
the authorities’ recourse to an order labelling strikes as “counter-revolution-
ary” activity to stop them (OM 12 August). Although the Nationalist Army 
claimed not to be responsible for violence committed by the labour union 
corps, this sounded like a lame excuse that would hardly win the trust of 
either foreigners or the Chinese people themselves, “aside from the violent 
and the lower classes” (16 December). Hence, no matter how hard Chiang 
tried to present himself as Sun Wen’s heir, “this will be useless [...] so long 
as he does not reject Communism and break up with Communists and Rus-
sian advisors” (4 October).3 At the same time, it appeared that Chiang could 
3 As an instance of these attempts to distance themselves from the Communists, see an 
interview with Chiang in Jiujiang (TA 19 November evening). GMD member Yin Rugeng, who 
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not easily free himself of these bonds. Behind the successful advance of the 
GMD, the editor observed, there were “the young students and labourers” 
in China, and Russian support from abroad (3 September).
Whether initiative for the Expedition had come from Russia or the GMD, 
or whether Chiang was a Communist pawn or not, in the eyes of Japanese 
commentators the military campaign remained related to the threat of 
“reddening” (sekka). Quotations from the Nationalist Party Weekly in-
cluded the following passage:
the Communist Party propagandises its ideology and in the end, wherev-
er the Northern Expedition armies arrive, there arrives the influence of 
the Communist Party. Although originally it was the Nationalist Party’s 
Northern Expedition, the Communist Party has used it to gain power, 
wreaking havoc on the Nationalist Party. (OM 21 November)4
The Asahi, too, shared the view that the Expedition’s steady advance into 
the Yangzi region meant, without doubt, that “the reddening forces have 
come to control almost half of China” (30 November). The editor then 
pondered the disquieting consequences of such a situation:
The time when all of China turns red may not be far off. The reddening of 
all China is the emergence of a second Russia. Both the Canton govern-
ment and the leaders of the Northern Expedition pledge that they will 
not carry out Communism, and that they uphold the Three Principles 
of the People of Mr Sun Wen. We also do not believe that today, after 
the failure of idealistic Communism in Russia, they will try to carry out 
in China this kind of Communism. However, if we look at the political 
structure of the Canton government, in the cell organisation based on 
the proletarian masses there is no difference from the Soviet organisa-
tion of workers/peasants. [...] Should they control all of China, the point 
is whether they will keep their reiterated hard line on the abrogation of 
established treaties. [...] Although the reddening of China is China’s own 
problem, if the effects of reddening involve indiscriminate repeal of the 
established treaties, that is a vital problem for Japan. For the sake of a 
vital problem, regardless of whether the counterpart turns red or not, 
one has to assert those rights that must be asserted. 
had taken refuge in Japan during the previous war, spoke in defence of Chiang in an inter-
view to the Asahi (10 September evening). Evening editions bear the following day’s date.
4 In another article, Negishi explained how the organisation of the Revolutionary Army fol-
lowed the Soviet model and how its political sections, in charge of propaganda, were under 
Deng Yanda, “red among the reds” (TA 3 January 1927). He also wrote about the ties between 
the GMD and Leftist mass organisations of peasants and workers (TA 6, 7 January 1927).
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This view contrasts with the more positive attitude of the Ōsaka Asahi, 
which sympathised with the GMD as the only possible agent of China’s 
reunification supported by popular legitimacy (Gotō 1987, 249-52), and 
considered likely a substantial reduction of Soviet influence over the party 
in the future (Gotō 1987, 249-53).
Undeniably, the GMD had an explicit anti-imperialist goal, that is to say: 
abrogation of the unfair treaties that set limits on China’s sovereignty to the 
advantage of the foreign powers (TA 14 September). Even admitting that 
now the GMD targeted only British interests, it might soon turn its attention 
to Japan as well if the Expedition clashed with the Fengtian clique in the 
North (OM 18 September). The practical consequences of anti-imperialism 
in the context of the Expedition became clear at the start of 1927, with the 
takeover of British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang. These events came 
as shocking news to the Japanese public. The Mainichi (7 January) called 
the occupation “a grave problem that [...] requires also the attention of our 
country”. The Asahi (12 January) stated emphatically: “As a world problem, 
at present and in the future, there is no problem as great as this”. Quite 
naturally, as discussed further below, anti-British incidents fuelled the de-
bate on how Japan should protect its own interests in China.
On these developments, Chiang took an ambiguous stand. When ad-
dressing a large Chinese audience at a welcome rally in Nanchang, he 
stressed the need to fight imperialism so as to achieve the abolition of 
extraterritoriality and the restitution of concessions (OM 15 January even-
ing). On the other hand, on a different occasion he allegedly stated that the 
Hankou concession should be given back to Britain, as occupation was the 
wrong means to that end (OM 16 January evening). As one journalist put 
it, “Chiang Kai-shek, having in mind the people’s inclinations, has tried to 
cater to their will with ingenious propaganda, by professing aloud what the 
public wants him to say” (Ikeda 1927, 50). In this respect, Chiang’s behav-
iour was similar to that of foreign minister Eugene Chen and other GMD 
officials, whose tones swung between the threatening and the reassuring. 
After interviewing the ‘top five’ men in government (Chen, Xu Qian, Song 
Ziwen, Deng Yanda and Sun Ke, in OM 4-6 January), the Mainichi reporter 
concluded (6 January) that they shared some common ideas regarding 
Japan. These were: the absolute necessity of Sino-Japanese friendship, 
based on an equal footing; the acknowledgment of Japan’s special position 
in Manchuria; and, in the long-term, an agreement for the restitution of 
Japanese concessions. Commentators, however, remained wary of concilia-
tory statements. Negishi recalled that Chiang, after the capture of Wuhan, 
had declared that “the National Government will stifle British imperialism 
in the South; the National Army will stifle Japanese imperialism in the 
North” (TA 8 January 1927). Moreover, the spread of radical movements 
in the territories occupied by the GMD reinforced doubts about the ability 
of its officials to restrain the Communists and labour unions (OM 17, 22 
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March). For these reasons, the press kept a close eye on the mounting 
factional strife within the GMD.
3 Towards Rupture Point: the Path from Nanchang to Shanghai
From the start of the Expedition, it was clear that the political situation 
in Canton was unstable (TA 17 August). Internal divisions became rife 
at the end of 1926 when Chiang, in response to the establishment of a 
Provisional Joint Council in Wuhan by Leftist leaders, summoned from 
Canton the remaining group of party officials to form a rival political cen-
tre in Nanchang. Tension between the two factions soon escalated. At the 
Third plenum of the central executive committee (CEC), held in Hankou 
on 11 March, the Left majority stripped Chiang of his key posts (the most 
detailed account is in OM 13 April). Chiang, however, simply refused to 
recognise the legitimacy of those decisions. He and his allies started to 
use armed force against the Communists, repressing demonstrations and 
coups in several cities. The violent suppression of thousands of Commu-
nists in Shanghai on 12 April marked a point of no return in the break 
from the United Front. A few days later, a new government was formed in 
Nanjing in open opposition to Wuhan.
Thus, in the first months of 1927, Japanese newspapers had a growing 
body of evidence which set Chiang apart from the GMD’s Left wing. Shortly 
before the Third plenum, the Mainichi (7 March) noted that both sides had 
their reasons to resent each other. On the one hand, the concentration of 
military and political power in Chiang’s hands was in total disregard of 
the committee system that had so far been the norm in party governance 
(on the Soviet origins of this feature, see TA 5 January 1927). On the other, 
those in Wuhan were “more radical than Chiang and others”; their abil-
ity to instigate workers and take advantage of anti-foreign incidents was 
a cause of serious concern to the Nanchang group (the former aspect is 
emphasised in TA 1 March evening). Yet, since the CCP and the GMD had 
some powerful common enemies, the editor’s prediction was that Chiang 
would not resort to a coup, as he had in March of the previous year, and 
that the GMD would not split unless Chiang struck a compromise with 
the Northern coalition. The Asahi (6 March) agreed that a formal split 
of the party was unlikely, offering a different reason: the senior officials 
had moved to Nanchang because there Chiang would protect them from 
the radical Left; as long as Chiang held military power, the Wuhan fac-
tion would not dare to act. However, in the wake of the party summit – in 
which Chiang did not even participate – the break appeared serious. Left-
ist propaganda accused the commander-in-chief of despotic behaviour, of 
conspiring in view of an agreement with the North, and of having turned 
pro-Japanese. This was nothing but an attempt “to beat down and reduce to 
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impotence Mr Chiang Kai-shek, who is a thorn in the side for the Commu-
nist faction of Wuhan”, so as to “carry out the reddening campaign as they 
wish” (OM 16 March evening). According to an anonymous GMD official, 
however, such high-handed behaviour would only hasten the explosion of 
internecine conflict (TA 16 March).
What had so emboldened the radical Left? The Mainichi (16 March 
evening) listed three causes: (Russian) financial support through Borodin; 
anti-Chiang popular sentiment in Wuhan, resulting from effective propa-
ganda; and the elimination of Chiang’s military influence in Wuhan thanks 
to the cooptation of Tang Shengzhi. One other fact (already pointed out in 
OM 16 January evening, 14 March) signalled a process that would receive 
much attention in the press: the emergence of competing military factions 
within the GMD. Tang had been one of the first local leaders to join the 
party at the start of the Expedition; several others followed, defecting 
from the enemy. Moreover, the GMD had already coopted some powerful 
warlords, such as Li Zongren from Guanxi. There were also rising party 
members who took the Expedition as an opportunity to acquire a territo-
rial base, as did Li Jishen in Guandong. Chiang himself, by advancing into 
the Lower Yangzi region, secured direct control of Chiangxi, Fujian and 
his home province of Zhejiang. Earlier, the Mainichi had already started 
to see Chiang as the leader of a “new military clique” (shingunbatsu) 
based in Nanchang (2 February). This was ironic, for one of the declared 
goals of the Expedition was precisely that of sweeping away warlordism. 
Instead, political conflict within the GMD created a fertile ground for the 
rise of military factions, old and new (24 September). Hence the comment: 
“Whenever they open their mouth, the Southerners attack the military 
cliques, but in this way they criticise the others’ defects without noticing 
their own, and rather deserve ridicule” (19 December).
The Mainichi observed that the allegiance of generals to either the 
Wuhan faction or to Nanchang/Nanjing depended more on personal con-
venience than on ideology (16 May, 16 December). In the case of Tang, 
for example, the opinion was that in the future he would abandon the 
Communists to “join with the new Beiyang faction that will emerge” (18 
March evening). Shortly after, when he appeared to switch sides, this was 
seen as a predictable reaction to Communist violence in Shanghai (TA 24 
March). Tang continued to support the Wuhan government, but in July he 
approved the occupation of the city by his subordinate commander He Jian. 
The coup led to the flight of Borodin and also of leaders of the extreme Left, 
resulting in a shift of power to the Wang Jingwei faction (OM 19 July; TA 20 
July evening). Thus, by turning to the “pink party” (that is, the moderate 
Left), Tang tried to “fulfill his year-long ambitions” (OM 21 July). In the 
following months, Tang concentrated on strengthening his hold on Hunan 
and Hubei. When the main GMD factions reached a compromise for a new 
government in Nanjing (TA 20 September), Tang took a defiant attitude 
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(TA 21 September evening; OM 22, 24 September). Accused of plotting an 
alliance with the Fengtian clique, he had to deal with a punitive expedition 
and was forced to take refuge in Japan in November.
Chiang did not target Wuhan immediately after the Third plenum, ap-
parently because his forces were still engaged in the offensive against 
Nanjing warlord Sun Chuanfang and his ally Zhang Zongchang. However, 
the Mainichi foresaw that after the capture of Nanjing and Shanghai the 
next target would be Wuhan; in the end, Chiang would prevail over the 
Left because of his superior military power (OM 16 March evening). The 
circumstances under which the Revolutionary Army took Shanghai and 
Nanjing, on 22-24 March, contributed to an escalation in the confronta-
tion between factions. In Shanghai, troops led by Bai Chongxi repressed a 
Communist-sponsored uprising; in Nanjing, Nationalist units looted and as-
saulted foreign residents, provoking a retaliatory bombardment by British 
and US warships. Reporters sent horrified accounts of violence in Nanjing, 
especially the attack on the Japanese consulate (TA 25, 26 March; OM 30 
March). Chiang protested that the looters must have been retreating en-
emy soldiers disguised as Nationalists, and gave assurance that he would 
look into the incident (TA 26 March; OM 27 March). However, the version 
prevailing overseas (see consul Morioka, in TA 29 March) was that the 
perpetrators were Communists in the GMD ranks. It was thought that the 
CCP had planned the incident with the purpose of causing Chiang trouble 
in two ways: on the one hand, they would thwart his efforts to win foreign 
support; on the other, by provoking the powers’ retaliation, they would 
rouse xenophobic feelings among the Chinese people who would turn also 
against the moderate commander (Negishi 1927, 74; Maida 1927, 78-80; 
Yoshino 1927a, 108-9).5 While the Ōsaka Asahi stressed the need to avoid 
a hardline reaction (Gotō 1987, 258-9), the Tōkyō Asahi (27 March) added 
that Chiang should promptly reform the army and punish the ringleaders. 
The Mainichi (27 March) commented that the GMD was at least morally re-
sponsible for what had happened, because it had instigated hatred against 
the foreigners; although its government officially rejected such violent 
measures, there were many Communists and other radical agitators in 
the party. The conflict, therefore, between Wuhan and Chiang’s “moderate 
faction” could not but have serious international consequences (1 April). 
In other words, dissociating himself from the Left had become for Chiang 
ever more crucial to win international recognition.
Chiang attempted a rapprochement with Wang Jingwei (TA 5 April even-
ing; OM 5 April; Yamamura 1927b, who also traces the story of their rela-
5 The thesis of a Communist conspiracy was then extended to the anti-Japanese incident 
that occurred in Hankou on 3 April (OA 5 April, in Gotō 1987, 259; OM 5 April). The Asahi 
(5 April) stressed the responsibility of the Japanese government, which had not taken ad-
equate pre-emptive measures.
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tionship in the GMD), whom the Third plenum had summoned back from 
Europe to resume the chairmanship, but failed to dissuade him from going 
to Wuhan. There, the Mainichi expected, the Communists would use Wang’s 
prestige for their own ends (17 March, 5 April). Although the Ōsaka Asahi 
still hoped that Wang might mediate so as to bring unity back to the party 
(7 April, quoted in Gotō 1987, 260-1), the following weeks saw an escalation 
of factional violence that led to Chiang’s final break with the CCP and the 
formalisation of the GMD split. Chiang’s motives seemed clear. There were 
rumours of imminent attempts on his life and on that of other members of 
his faction by the Communists in Shanghai (OM 2 April); he was concerned 
about internal order and foreign relations which he saw as “priority prob-
lems” (OM 4 April); his “moderate faction” was enraged about the effects 
of the “wild policies” of the Communist-dominated Wuhan government, 
such as relentless strikes and peasant violence (OM 10 April); and it was 
rumoured that Right-wing leaders, dissatisfied with Chiang’s tolerance of 
Communists, were planning to establish an independent regime in Guanxi 
and Guandong provinces (TA 13 April evening). Hence, the red purge in 
Shanghai came as no surprise to the press (TA 13 April). It was, rather, 
the logical result of a combination of domestic and international factors.
4 Revolution Stumbles as Factional Strife  
in the Nationalist Party Produces Warlords
Although Chiang’s coup had stopped the tide of Communism, journalists 
did not become any more optimistic about the situation in China. An edito-
rial in the Asahi (30 April), entitled “The suicide of national revolution”, 
remarked that the GMD-CCP alliance had been decisive for the success of 
the Northern Expedition (as explained also in Ikeda 1927, 51-4; Yamamu-
ra 1927a, 40-1). The premature end of the United Front, therefore, made 
the prospects of reunification of the country more difficult. Moreover, the 
Mainichi (16 May) pointed out that there were factional divisions in both 
the Wuhan and the Nanjing camps. In the former, apart from “three or 
four people” such as Xu and Deng, there were no members of the “true 
Communist faction” in top government posts; most of the higher military 
officers in the armies of Tang and Zhang Fakui were, if anything, anti-
Communist and perhaps plotting a coup. In Nanjing, on the other hand, 
there were “surprisingly many members of the Communist Party” among 
the lower officers in Chiang’s forces. In addition, both governments were 
under external threat. Wuhan faced its enemies on three sides: the Feng-
tian clique in the north, Nanjing in the east, and Canton (controlled by 
Li Jishen) in the south. Chiang, instead, had to confront both Wuhan and 
the Northern coalition. Neither branch of the GMD, then, seemed to have 
strength enough to break the stalemate.
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In Wuhan, as recalled above, the balance of forces gradually swung 
against the Communists. There had been signs of this from the onset of 
the split (OM 22, 23 May; TA 22, 24 May). Yoshino Sakuzō, the well-known 
political scientist and columnist, noted that the Communist Party was in 
China “an extremely small group” and its recent rise to power was but 
“a temporary aberration” (1927a, 110). According to the Mainichi (25 
May), the Wuhan government had lost popular support and was isolated 
because of its radical policies, which had wrecked the economy and so-
cial order. Even Moscow had no longer any interest in supporting such 
a failure.6 As he had already done with Chiang, the editor pointed out 
that the expulsion of Communists from Wuhan, besides stemming from 
personal rivalries, had become necessary from the standpoint of external 
relations (25 July). This observation referred not only to other factions 
in the GMD (29 June), but also to the international sphere. Britain had 
severed all diplomatic ties with the Wuhan government, claiming that it 
lacked the ability to enforce any agreement. This had boosted the image 
of the Nanjing faction, which was promoting itself as a reliable negotiating 
partner for the foreign powers (see, for example, Wu Chaoshu in OM 17 
May). The Mainichi, however, remained sceptical about how trustworthy 
Nanjing was (21 May). For Chūō kōron (editorial 1927c), the red purge 
in Wuhan marked the end of CCP influence: “In China the Communist 
Party is like something that flies away when it blows. We don’t know if 
one should rejoice or grieve for China; in sum, however, their power today 
does not pose a problem anymore”.
The Ōsaka Asahi (Gotō 1987, 269-71) greeted the ousting of Commu-
nists from Wuhan as the fruit of Japan’s moderate policy. The latter had 
convinced Chiang that Russia was not acting in China’s interests and 
consequently made the Wuhan faction realise that radicalism would only 
bring isolation. However, relations between the two Nationalist centres 
remained tense. Differently from the spring, Wuhan seemed now in a 
stronger position than its rival. As explained in the Asahi (26 July), financial 
recovery had been steady, and the advantage of troop numbers over Nan-
jing was clear. Chiang, instead, could trust only the armies of He Yingqin, 
Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi; the other commanders were former enemies 
on whom he could not rely. Moreover, after negotiations for a truce failed, 
Nanjing was losing ground under the counter-offensive of the Northern 
forces. As a condition for mending the split, Wuhan (especially Tang, as 
later pointed out in OM 14 August) demanded that Chiang be removed 
from power. It was hardly likely, however, that such a request could be 
accepted by the Nanjing faction (TA 26 July).
6 On this point, however, the Asahi (2 August) commented that Russia would learn from 
its mistake of supporting only one faction. Its ties with China would continue, because there 
were still many Communists both inside and outside the GMD.
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The persistence of GMD divisions caused strong concern in the Japanese 
press. According to the Mainichi (4 August), it was possible that Wuhan’s 
break with the CCP might open the path to the peaceful unification of 
China, since “for both North and South there is no need to continue fur-
ther a useless war”. This seemed to be flouting the GMD’s ambition for 
national reconstruction through eradication of the Northern warlords. In 
fact, the editor’s belief was that “the South’s national revolution belongs 
already to the past” (13 August). On this issue, the Asahi (10 August) was 
more sympathetic to the GMD:
Revolution consists in putting first the destruction of the status quo, and 
building something new over destruction. [...] The value of revolution 
lies in whether arduous construction succeeds or not. [...] Having sev-
ered its relation with the Communist Party, will the Nationalist Party be 
able to proceed straight and forward on the path of national revolution 
in accordance with the Three Principles of the People? [...] The more 
the Nationalist Party splits and struggles, the more it will disappoint the 
Chinese people, and the Communist Party might ride on that chance.
At last, on 13 August Chiang’s decision to step down for the sake of party 
unity ended the impasse. The Asahi (16 August evening) found several 
reasons to explain his ‘retirement’. Besides having suffered heavy losses 
on the Northern front, Chiang had lost key allies. The top posts in Nanjing 
had been assigned to people originally from Zhejiang, causing resentment 
among the other regional factions. In particular, it was said that Li Zongren 
and Bai had persuaded He Yingqin to side with them in pressing Chiang to 
resign. Another article (TA 17 August a), which traced Chiang’s rise and 
fall from the start of the Expedition, also indicated the concentration of 
power in the Zhejiang group as a cause of hostility against Chiang. Among 
the military, Chiang had lost most of his loyal officers from the Whampoa 
academy in battle; in the fragile coalition of commanders, it was now Li 
Zongren who held “the casting vote”. During the Expedition, Li had al-
ways been sent to the front, hence missing the opportunity to strengthen 
his own territorial base. Until recently, he had hesitated to respond to 
overtures from Wuhan, but once the latter had carried out its own red 
purge, the main obstacle to an agreement had vanished. In conclusion, 
“superficially, the split between Wuhan and Nanjing factions is a split be-
tween Communism and anti-Communism, but that is not all. Rather, it is 
not an exaggeration to say that it is chiefly a split based on feelings and 
interests” (TA 17 August).
Further considerations on both the military and the political causes of 
Chiang’s defeat led to a grim prediction about the GMD (TA 17 August 
b). Although Chiang’s exit from the scene could pave the way to formal 
reunification of the party, the revolutionary spirit had grown thin. Chiang 
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had revived the party’s Right wing (the so-called Western Hills faction) and 
made room for “bureaucratic” elements. His fall meant that the “new mili-
tary clique” would give way to the “old military cliques” that had joined the 
GMD, such as those of Tang and Li, for whom national revolution was just 
a struggle for power, and so, “until the birth of a new revolutionary force, 
aimless disorder may continue”. These concerns over the breakup of the 
GMD into military factions appeared again in the editorial of 30 August. 
The Mainichi (16 August) offered a similar, though less detailed, analysis 
of the causes of Chiang’s retreat. The overall evaluation of his character 
was that “personally, he has a passion and spirit that are unlikely in a 
Chinese, and also frankness; nevertheless, his lack of political experience 
and ability to exert control [...] have been standing out more and more”. 
Recalling that an American journalist had called Chiang “the strong man 
that China had been waiting for”, the editor could not but point at the gap 
between this kind of prediction and reality.
It is true that, compared to just the year before, Chiang had acquired 
immense visibility on the international scene. The Asahi (TA 17 August 
a) noted that all the world now knew him as China’s Kemal Pasha or Na-
poleon.7 Analogy with great leaders, past and present, became popular 
from the spring of 1927, with the completion of the campaign in the lower 
Yangzi region. Journalist Furushō Kunio (1927b, 79) wrote that “looking 
at the history of China, his rapid success has no comparison”; at the 
same time (81-2), he wondered whether Chiang would become a second 
Kemal, or instead fall into disgrace like Lev Trotsky (the same question 
is put in TA 6 March). Furushō (1927c) also sketched one of the first 
‘private’ portraits of the commander, touching on his habits and relating 
anecdotes that illustrated his virtues and defects. As noted by Matsushige 
(2013, 48-9), this interest for Chiang’s private life developed in the wake 
of his resignation as commander-in-chief, which allowed for a separation 
of the public and private spheres in the ‘massification’ of Chiang’s me-
diatic image. Representative of the new approach is a long report about 
a visit to Chiang in his home village (OM 8 September), in which the 
reporter’s stated aim was to leave aside politics and other “hard talk” to 
capture instead some “enjoyable talk” (omoshiroi hanashi). This trend 
peaked during Chiang’s trip to Japan (29 September-9 November), when 
especially the local newspapers gave the visit to Song Meiling’s mother a 
clear romantic slant – with no apparent interest in the political implica-
tions of Chiang’s imminent marriage into one of Shanghai’s prominent 
families (Iechika 2013, 75-6; see also OM 26 September). There was no 
coverage of Chiang’s private interview with premier Tanaka Giichi (for 
7 For example, in the wake of Chiang’s entrance into Shanghai, Time (4 April 1927) fea-
tured his portrait on the cover and an article entitled “Conqueror”.
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the official record, see Satō 2009, 225-7); this, however, is perfectly un-
derstandable in the light of the confidential nature of the visit.
The November issue of Chūō kōron featured a collection of short es-
says on Chiang, which together formed a kaleidoscope view of both his 
public role and moral qualities. At one extreme, was a laudatory piece by 
Yin Rugeng and at the other, a scathing critique by the Marxist economist 
Inomata Tsunao, who was a former member of the clandestine Commu-
nist Party of Japan. Inomata accused Chiang of first trying to reduce the 
GMD to a tool in the hands of the “semi-feudal bourgeois reaction” and 
then, having failed in this, of turning his back on the people to join forces 
with the military cliques and the imperialists. From a similar standpoint, 
the Marxist intellectual Yamakawa Hitoshi (1927) predicted that Chiang 
would return to power not “as the leader of national revolution”, but just 
as “one element of the old forces of warlordism”. Also on a negative note 
was the article by Socialist thinker Takabatake Motoyuki, who portrayed 
Chiang as an opportunist politician – like every other revolutionary leader 
in China. Protestant educator Shimizu Yasuzō, who had recently met Chi-
ang in Nara, criticised his authoritarian ways but also praised his effort to 
avoid in China the excesses of the Russian revolution; he judged Chiang 
superior to all the other Chinese leaders he had met. Finally, former army 
captain and ruralist thinker, Nagano Akira, traced, in a more detached 
way, Chiang’s gradual re-positioning in the GMD through the years, from 
cooperation to conflict with the Communists. As causes of his recent fall 
from office, he cited Chinese intolerance of the concentration of power 
and Chiang’s excessive favoritism for his regional fellows – another typi-
cal Chinese trait. It seemed to Nagano that the GMD was growing weak 
in revolutionary punch and becoming more like a military clique. In such 
circumstances, Chiang had taken a wise decision to temporarily leave the 
country. He still stood a chance of running for leadership, but would be 
wise to take care not to become just another warlord.
Indeed, during Chiang’s ‘vacation’ in Japan, the struggle for power in the 
GMD had continued – to the advantage of the Northern coalition (OM 28 
October). Both the Asahi (20 September, 10 October, 26 October) and the 
Mainichi (4 October) painted a pessimistic picture of the situation. Al-
though negotiations among party factions had led in mid-September to 
the formation of a new government in Nanjing, the agreement did not 
work immediately. In defiance of Nanjing, where Li Zongren had the upper 
hand, Wang reasserted the independence of Wuhan with Tang’s military 
support. Rather than face the punitive expedition, however, on 12 Novem-
ber Tang fled to Japan. The Asahi (15 November) feared that the practical 
consequence for the GMD would be just a partitioning of Tang’s territorial 
base among his opponents. In the meantime, Wang had moved to Canton 
under the protection of Zhang Fakui, who was struggling with Li Jishen 
for control of Guandong.
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It was amidst such disorder that the conditions matured for the return 
of Chiang to the political arena as a mediator. On the eve of Chiang’s ar-
rival in Shanghai (10 November), the Japanese public received news of 
his rapprochement with Wang. Chiang had supposedly written to his old 
rival that he could “not bear to stand by and watch the disarray of the 
Nationalist Party”, and that he wanted “to stand up again to rescue it”. 
In reply, Wang had agreed to start talks in Shanghai in preparation for a 
Fourth CEC plenum (OM 10 November evening; TA 10 November). Thus, 
another round of complex negotiations was set in motion (for a summary, 
see Wilbur 1983, 686-9). This time, Chiang led the field over Wang. Over 
the next weeks, Wang’s position was badly damaged by his suspected in-
volvement in two incidents: first, the coup that Zhang Fakui staged against 
Li’s forces in Canton (17 November); then, the Communist uprising that 
devastated the same city on 11-13 December, until Zhang suppressed it 
ruthlessly. On 17th of that month, Wang left for exile in France. The very 
day before the insurrection, the preparatory conference in Shanghai had 
asked Chiang to resume his post as commander-in-chief, and entrusted 
him to call the Fourth plenum, scheduled for January.
While reporting on these facts, the Asahi (29 November) noted that the 
GMD was splintering further. After Tang’s defeat, generals of the Hunan 
and Guanxi cliques were competing for control of the territories under 
the former Wuhan faction; moreover, Zhang’s coup (discussed on 22 No-
vember) had led to the establishment of a separate regime in Canton. As 
a result of intricate factional balancing, the main leaders did not oppose 
Chiang’s reinstatement as supreme commander. In practice, however, he 
could count neither on their support nor on the loyalty of their soldiers (12 
December). At first, it seemed that the shock of the Communist capture 
of Canton might help the GMD to pull together (13 December; on a more 
optimistic tone, OA 15 December, in Gotō 1987, 279). Because of Wang’s 
alleged role behind the coup, though, it would be more difficult for Chi-
ang to cooperate with his faction (14 December). In the wake of Wang’s 
departure, China’s domestic situation showed no sign of improvement: 
both the Northern military cliques and the GMD seemed “neither dead nor 
alive” (21 December). This stark view contrasts, again, with the appraisal 
of the Nationalists’ achievements that year by the Ōsaka Asahi. According 
to the editorial of 29 December (quoted in Gotō 1987, 280-1), criticism 
that the GMD had lost its revolutionary spirit was leaning towards the 
Communist interpretation of the facts. By expelling the radical elements, 
the party seemed to have found its way back to “bourgeois democracy”. 
The Mainichi, too, kept a close eye on the interplay between Chiang and 
Wang. It appeared that both wanted to force the Western Hills faction into 
the background (7 December); this could explain why Wang sponsored 
Chiang’s reappointment (12 December). However, it was expected that 
their cooperation would not last long (14 December). Chiang, it seemed, 
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“had tried to ride on two horses at the same time”, that is, Wang and the 
Western Hills group. Now, he was severing ties with the compromised 
Wang so as to re-establish his own faction (16 December).
With Tang, Wang, and soon also Zhang out of his way (Li Jishen retook 
Canton at the end of the year), Chiang moved on to regain leadership 
in the GMD. Despite the title of commander-in-chief, which he officially 
took again on 9 January, Chiang had only limited military power to back 
his authority. Hence, it was reported that Chiang and his associates were 
using their hold on fiscal resources and personal connections to buy – lit-
erally – the support of different military cliques (TA 6 January evening). 
However, as powerful generals from Guanxi, Hubei and other provinces 
formed a “new Wuhan faction”, Chiang’s position remained precarious 
(TA 6 January evening). It seemed that the near future, far from unifying 
them, would see the GMD fragmenting even further around the three main 
poles of Nanjing, Wuhan and Canton (TA 17 January). Nevertheless, the 
long-postponed Fourth plenum (13 January-3 February 1928) was a suc-
cess for Chiang, whose proposals for conservative reorganisation of the 
party won the full approval of the participants (Wilbur 1983, 697-9). Still, 
the Asahi (15 February) objected that Chiang had managed to dispel the 
influence of the Western Hills faction, but not that of either the Wuhan 
or Canton military cliques. Therefore, as long as the South was divided, 
conditions for resuming the drive on Beijing would not be right. This pre-
diction, however, proved wrong. Even without support from the Guanxi 
generals – Bai would lead reinforcements as late as May – in February, 
Chiang started preparations for a joint offensive with the armies of Feng 
Yuxiang and Yan Xishan in the North. By early June, the Nationalist flag 
was waving in Beijing.
5 Japan’s Interests in China and the Northern Expedition
Since the early battles in the summer of 1926, the Japanese press had fol-
lowed the advance of GMD forces in Southern China with some apprehen-
sion. As noted above, the campaign was perceived as a threat to Japanese 
interests because of strong Communist influence in the GMD and the 
anti-imperialist goals that were integral to the Nationalist ideology itself. 
While the red purges to some extent dispelled the fears of a radical takeo-
ver, the Northern Expedition remained a source of deep concern. It was 
towards the end of the campaign that heavy fighting broke out between 
Nationalist and Japanese troops in Jinan, the capital city of Shandong Prov-
ince. The Jinan Incident (3-11 May 1928) has been analysed in a number 
of studies (for example, Iriye [1965] 1990, 193-205; Wilbur 1983, 702-6; 
Satō 2009, 234-45; Taylor 2009, 79-83) for it left a scar on Sino-Japanese 
relations. On the one hand, it inflamed anti-Japanese sentiment in China 
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and convinced Chiang that Japan posed the greatest threat to the future of 
his country. On the other, it set a precedent for those in Japan who believed 
in military force as a means of asserting national interests on the continent. 
How did Japanese public opinion, however, react to such dramatic news? 
To put things into perspective, let us first review how the perception of 
risk evolved over the successive stages of the Northern Expedition, along 
with changes in Japan’s China policy.
At the start of the Expedition, the foreign minister in a cabinet led by the 
liberal Kenseikai party was a seasoned diplomat, Shidehara Kijurō. Since 
his appointment in 1924, Shidehara had pursued a policy of international 
détente. An important achievement in this sense had been, in 1925, the 
normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. Japan had made overtures 
to China for the recovery of customs tariff autonomy and professed a line 
of non-intervention in domestic affairs. When Shidehara declared that 
Japan would not take sides in the dispute over tariffs between Britain and 
Canton, the Mainichi (18 September 1926) commented that this decision 
was in line with the minister’s established policy, which so far had not been 
detrimental to Japan. Nevertheless, the newspaper accused Shidehara of 
short-sightedness. Nationalist expansion would harass mainly the Brit-
ish in the Yangzi region; if war moved northward, however, Japan would 
be forced to abandon its policy of strict non-intervention. Although “the 
Fengtian Army does not have any special relation with Japan, nor does it 
receive any remarkable support”, the Canton government and Feng Yuxi-
ang would use the pretext of stopping Japanese expansionism in order to 
attack the North. These considerations logically raised the question of how 
Japan should pre-empt this menace.
For the Asahi (15 December), cooperation with Great Britain was prob-
lematic because the latter’s position in either South or North China was 
very different from that of Japan.8 Therefore, in order to defend its “vital 
interests”, Japan should “prepare autonomous measures” so as to “face 
any situation” that may arise in China. For “the near future”, it seemed 
that only the Nationalists had the potential for establishing a strong gov-
ernment. In this perspective, it would be “disadvantageous to stick to 
the anachronistic old treaties”. What was required on Japan’s side, in-
stead, was a “resolute attitude” to “solve neatly the unequal treaties”. The 
Mainichi (23 October) agreed that at present there could be no effective 
cooperation among the foreign powers and that Japan, as the country with 
the closest ties with China, should work out a new basis for bilateral rela-
tions with its neighbour. In this way, Japan would play the leading role in 
the redefinition of China’s international status, as Britain had done before 
8 On this issue, the Mainichi (7 January 1927) quoted from the New York Times the opin-
ion that Britain’s foremost goal in Asia was rather that of restraining Japanese influence.
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with Japan itself. For this strategy to succeed, however, an “absolutely 
necessary pre-condition” was that China drop its “useless and harmful 
foreign policy measures” (that is, economic boycotts and other anti-foreign 
activities). Of course, the lack of a unified government in China posed a 
major obstacle to negotiations. Should Japan deal directly with the Nation-
alists? For the Mainichi (30 November), the territorial advance of the GMD 
naturally raised the problem of diplomatic recognition. Japan, after all, 
had been the first country to acknowledge the Republic of China in 1913. 
However, there was a crucial difference: at that time the new regime had 
agreed to fulfil all previous international obligations. Although it would be 
sensible, “and maybe necessary”, to recognise a de facto regional govern-
ment, Japan would have to proceed with caution.
In the wake of the Hankou and Jiujiang Incidents in the British conces-
sions, the Mainichi (8, 10 January, 25 February, 26-28 February) collected 
the opinions of several representatives of big business regarding the situ-
ation in China. A few stressed optimistically – or cynically – that, since 
Britain was now the target of Nationalist attacks, Japanese firms would 
even benefit from this trend. The prevailing view, however, was that the 
anti-foreign tide could easily turn against Japan as well. The Asahi (19 
January) summarised in general terms two sets of opposing viewpoints: 
on the one hand, that the GMD had fallen under Communist control and 
should be stopped somehow before it invaded the rest of China; on the 
other, that “reddening” was just a passing phase and that it should not 
be too difficult to settle bilateral disputes, in light of the strong recipro-
cal interests between the two countries. The latter position substantially 
corresponded to that of the government. Minister Shidehara, in his policy 
speech at the 52nd Imperial Diet (18 January, transcribed in both OM 
and TA), reaffirmed the four tenets of Japanese diplomacy towards China, 
namely: non-interference; economic cooperation in the spirit of “coexist-
ence and co-prosperity”; sympathy and support for the just aspirations of 
the Chinese people; and the “defence with rational means” of Japan’s “le-
gitimate and important rights and interests”. While the Ōsaka Asahi fully 
agreed with this policy (Gotō 1987, 255), there were also more tepid re-
sponses in the press. The Mainichi (19 January) observed that the problem 
did not lie in policy guidelines, but in the actual management of specific 
issues and incidents. The Tōkyō Asahi (20 January), too, wondered how 
the government would turn its abstract principles into practice.
Negotiations between British and Nationalist authorities offered further 
cause for reflection. The Asahi (12 January), looking at the meek response 
of London to rampant violations of international law, read it as a sign of the 
changing times. It seemed that Britain had no choice but to follow a line 
of non-resistance, as an aggressive reaction would only worsen the situa-
tion. The Asahi, then, was concerned about the rising voice of hard-liners 
among public opinion in Britain. In order to prevent an escalation of the 
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conflict which would further destabilise China to the disadvantage of all 
parties involved, Tokyo would have to persuade London to abandon all idea 
of armed resistance in Shanghai; at the same time, it would have to urge 
the GMD to give up its “fanatic” activism for the recovery of China’s in-
ternational status. Going a step further, the Ōsaka Asahi (Gotō 1987, 254) 
also spoke in favour of gradual restitution to China of foreign concessions. 
The Mainichi (31 January) expressed similar views against the anachronis-
tic recourse to military means, stressing (28 January) that Japan had no 
reason to get entangled in hazardous British initiatives. In the following 
weeks, while Anglo-Chinese relations remained strained, the Nationalists 
seemed to respond favourably to Shidehara’s policy of appeasement. The 
press reported with cautious optimism on the quasi-official mission to 
Japan of GMD representative Dai Jitao, who strove to present his party as 
a responsible partner for international dialogue (OM 4, 13, 17 February; 
TA 18 February a, b, 26 February evening, 27 February). The April issue 
of Chūō kōron (1927a) expressed sympathy for the revolutionary cause. 
The same magazine also featured two articles by China expert Komura 
Shunsaburō, formerly an interpreter in the diplomatic service. Komura 
(1927a) urged Japan not to antagonise the GMD, especially by backing 
the Fengtian clique, because this would only push China into the arms of 
Communist Russia, thus endangering the whole world (for a similar warn-
ing by an Ōsaka Asahi journalist, see Kamio 1927, 118). Later (1927b), he 
considered several arguments in favour of either direct or indirect interfer-
ence, again in order to prove that neither, if not actually counterproduc-
tive, would serve to safeguard Japan’s interests.
However, the ever-widening fracture between Nationalist factions cast 
a shadow on the prospects for amicable relations. The Nanjing Incident, 
in addition, was a terrible blow to the image of the Revolutionary Army. As 
noted above, it also revived doubts about Chiang’s ability to enforce disci-
pline. To further complicate matters, in April 1927 a financial crisis trig-
gered a change of government in Tokyo. The new cabinet, in which retired 
army general Tanaka Giichi served at the same time as premier and foreign 
minister, was an expression of the Rikken Seiyūkai conservative party. 
Under its former president Takahashi Korekiyo (1921-25), the Seiyūkai 
had backed a policy of international cooperation and arms limitation, most 
notably at the Washington Conference held from November 1921 to Feb-
ruary 1922. Since Tanaka had taken over the presidency, however, the 
party had started to adopt more assertive policies. While in opposition, 
the Seiyūkai had voiced strong criticism of Shidehara’s weak diplomacy 
(see, for instance, OM 26 January, 5 April evening; TA 1 April a, 2 April; 
Uehara 1927). This position appealed especially to those industries and 
trading companies that had direct interests in China (TA 1 April b, 12, 20 
April). Hence, the Asahi (20 April) did not need to provide specific evidence 
to claim that the return to power of the Seiyūkai had aroused uneasiness 
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among the Chinese people. The Mainichi (24 April) worried that the cabi-
net’s “positive policy”, or “hard policy”, might lead to another disaster 
such as the Siberian expedition (the anti-Bolshevik intervention launched 
in 1918, which Tanaka had supervised as war minister in 1918-21). The ed-
itor conceded that “even if premier Tanaka cannot read the trend of times, 
he will not fail to understand that such a reckless policy cannot receive 
the support of the majority of our nation”. The editorial continued with an 
implicit warning not to defy “the strength of public opinion”, since it was 
thanks to the latter’s support for parliamentary practice that the Seiyūkai 
had been reinstated smoothly to government.9 In conclusion, Japan was 
to intervene in the Chinese crisis only by providing “moral support”, and 
diplomatic leadership for all the countries involved.
The events, however, would soon confirm that a shift in Japan’s foreign 
policy was under way. Journalist Murofuse Kōshin (1927, 113) defined this 
change as a passage from “petty bourgeois opportunism” to “armed impe-
rialism”. On 27 May, the Tanaka cabinet decided to send a small expedi-
tionary force to Shandong in order to protect the local Japanese residents. 
Although ostensibly the purpose was to prevent the re-occurence of violent 
incidents, the operation did constitute an interference in the ongoing civil 
war, as the presence of Japanese troops might deter the Nationalists from 
moving northward. Moreover, differently from the stationing of troops in 
Tianjin and Beijing, this deployment was not contemplated in any interna-
tional agreement. Although the cabinet tried to reassure the belligerent 
parties that the expedition was purely defensive and would end as soon 
as security conditions in the province allowed (the official statement was 
published in OM and TA 27 May), both the Nanjing and Beijing govern-
ments protested against this infringement of China’s sovereignty.
The Shandong Expedition proved a controversial matter for Japan. The 
main opposition party, the Rikken Minseitō (formed at the start of June 
with the merger of the Kenseikai with a party seceded from the Seiyūkai) 
expressed reservations on what it judged a premature decision, and later 
demanded the withdrawal of the troops (OM and TA 17 June, 18 July). 
For the majority of the House of Peers, too, the cabinet’s initiative was 
unnecessary and risky (TA 28 May a). The harshest criticism came from 
the so-called “proletarian parties” linked to the labour and tenant move-
ments, which formed after the enactment of universal suffrage for men 
in 1925. The Nihon Rōnōtō (Japan’s Labour-Farmer Party) denounced the 
expedition as an attempt to repeat in China the infamous Siberian inter-
vention, and exhorted the people to resist “to make Japan’s imperialists 
capitulate” (TA 28 May b). The Shakai Minshūtō (Social People’s Party), 
which called premier Tanaka “the boss of the military clique for many 
9 Komura (1927c, 77) later expressed the same concept in a more straightforward way.
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years”, claimed that the real objective of the expedition was to interfere 
with the belligerents’ strategy (TA 31 May). Both parties organised public 
rallies in protest. The reaction of the most radical party, the Rōdō Nōmintō 
(Labour-Farmer Party, which the government disbanded in March 1928 as 
part of a crackdown on Communists) is not documented in these articles. 
Chairman Ōyama Ikuo, however, referred to similar protest activities in a 
strongly-worded essay in Chūō kōron, where he called Chiang “the puppet 
of the rising urban bourgeoisie” (1927, 107). The Asahi, besides reporting 
on the reaction of political groups, interviewed some well-known person-
alities (29 May a). Apart from those aligned with the official stance of 
their party, there was independent Lower House member Ozaki Yukio. The 
veteran politician, a famous advocate of anti-militarism, voiced his alarm 
about the risk of undue interference: the army had always been partial 
to the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, and “the boss of the military 
clique” was now leading the cabinet. In contrast, cotton magnate Miya-
jima Kiyojirō stressed that the expedition was inevitable because previous 
incidents proved that the Revolutionary Army could not be trusted; those 
Peers who objected “should go and see China once”. In addition, the same 
newspaper (29 May b) asked the opinion of those whom the expedition 
would affect most directly, that is, the Japanese residents in Northern 
China. According to this survey, the prevailing view was that such a grave 
initiative should be avoided; in case of actual danger, it would be more 
appropriate to evacuate the expatriates from Jinan to Qingdao.
On their part, both Asahi and Mainichi were critical of the Shandong 
expedition. They raised the same objections (OM 26 May; TA 28, 29 May 
c, 1 June). First, that sending troops might produce the opposite effect 
and therefore should be considered only as a last resort in the event that 
all other means failed. The Ōsaka Asahi (Gotō 1978, 265-7) expressed the 
same opinion. Secondly, they argued that the Communists had been re-
sponsible for previous incidents, but Chiang Kai-shek had now suppressed 
them. Moreover, the Mainichi (29 May) pointed out that the risk of clashing 
with Japanese forces along the Jinan railway could prevent the Southern 
army from advancing in that direction; this would clearly represent an 
interference.10 It seemed that the military had dragged the cabinet into 
action, exposing the inconsistency of the latter’s China policy. The same 
article noted that war minister Shirakawa had already earned the hostil-
ity of the GMD while serving as commander of the Japanese forces in the 
leased territory in Manchuria. Afterwards, the Asahi repeatedly called for 
the withdrawal of troops (12 June, 28 June, 7 July, 26 August). Besides re-
iterating its arguments, the newspaper remarked that the expedition had 
10 Chūō kōron editorials (1927c, 1927d) and Yoshino (1927b, 119; 1927c, 92) put forward 
the same argument. 
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spurred widespread boycotts in China, seriously damaging Japanese busi-
ness interests. The Mainichi (27 June, 7 July), also, reported this negative 
outcome. However, at least part of the enterprises involved still supported 
the cabinet’s policy: a group of Kansai-based industries even lobbied for 
the sending of troops to Shanghai (TA 20 August), as Britain had done. The 
Asahi (26 August) commented that if the cabinet was to listen to this kind 
of request, the time for withdrawal would never come. The expedition had 
already cost four million yen: how could the Japanese people bear such a 
burden indefinitely for reasons that defied common sense? Yoshino, too, 
denounced the cabinet for its disregard of public opinion (1927c, 91-2).
In the end, it was the failure of Chiang’s summer offensive to Northern 
China that solved the problem. Since there was no more imminent dan-
ger that Shandong would become a theatre of war, on 30 August Japan 
withdrew its expeditionary force. The press observed these developments 
with relief and criticised the government for pretending that the operation 
had been a success (TA 1 September; OM 1 October). On the other hand, 
the Asahi (1 September) urged the Chinese authorities to reflect on their 
inability to guarantee security, as it was this failure which had justified 
the expedition. The Mainichi (30 August), noting that trade in Northern 
China had declined remarkably less than in regions affected by the Na-
tionalist revolution, concluded that the expedition had “not necessarily 
been a failure”.
6 From Jinan to Beijing: an Uncertain Scenario
The situation, however, turned critical when Chiang resumed the northern 
advance in the spring of 1928. As the Asahi had foreseen (19 April), at 
the end of April the Tanaka cabinet again sent troops to Qingdao. From 
there the field commander, general Fukuda, decided to proceed to Jinan, 
home to about 2000 Japanese nationals. On 2 May, in response to Chiang’s 
pledge to maintain order, Fukuda consented to clear part of the occupied 
area. The next day, however, a minor incident between the Japanese and 
the newly-arrived Nationalist troops escalated into intense fighting.11 The 
version of the facts reported by various sources since the evening, which 
the War Ministry soon confirmed (OM, TA 5 May evening), was that some 
Chinese soldiers had shot at a Japanese patrol when it had tried to stop 
them from looting in the protected area. The skirmish had attracted more 
and more Southern forces, resulting in a general attack against the Japa-
nese. The War Ministry suspected that it was a planned offensive (OM and 
11 For further discussion of press coverage of the Jinan Incident, see Tamai Kiyoshi 
kenkyūkai 2015, which was published while this volume was in preparation.
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TA 5 May evening, 5 May). Undisclosed sources from Tianjin and Beijing 
reported that “over one hundred” or “280” expatriates had been massa-
cred by the Southern army in Jinan, and sent gruesome accounts of these 
atrocities (OM and TA, 4-5 May). The news, however, was not confirmed 
by sufficiently reliable evidence. Eventually, the consular police reported 
about 14 dead and over 20 missing (OM 15 May evening), that is about as 
many as already confirmed by the War Ministry (OM 8 May).
The balance of forces in Jinan was about 5,500 men to the National-
ist’s 35,000, but Chiang had no intention of being bogged down in a con-
flict that would only jeopardise his advance northward. He reached an 
agreement for a cease-fire and left the city, soon to be followed by most 
of his troops. However, the Japanese command was not conciliatory. After 
obtaining reinforcements, Fukuda sent the Nationalists an ultimatum with 
humiliating conditions. Notwithstanding a partial acceptance of these re-
quests, the imperial army attacked. By 11 May it had driven the Chinese 
garrison out of Jinan and inflicted heavy losses; many civilians, too, died 
in the bombardment of the walled city. The expeditionary corps did not 
leave Shandong until a year later, after long diplomatic negotiations which 
on 28 March led the Chinese and Japanese governments to sign a state-
ment in which they expressed deep regret for the incident. The task of 
discussing compensation for both sides was deferred to a joint committee 
(Gaimushō 1993, vol. 3, 501-7).
The official histories of the Asahi and Mainichi (Asahi shinbun 1995, 
vol. Taishō–Shōwa senzen hen, 301-11; Mainichi shinbun 1972, 155-7; 
Mainichi shinbun 2002, vol. 1, 674-80) stress that, though they printed 
exaggerated news for some days of a massacre, these newspapers from the 
very beginning condemned the dangerous conduct of the Tanaka cabinet. 
On the other hand, however, they overlook other problematic aspects of 
the press coverage.
In the first place, both newspapers seemed to ignore the fact that on 3 
May the Nationalist official in charge of negotiating the truce and his 
staff had been brutally killed at the hands of Japanese soldiers. When the 
Nanjing government publicly denounced the fact, the Mainichi (9 May) 
only reported that in the United States this statement had been afforded 
great attention, while the Asahi (9 May evening) dismissed it as “risible” 
propaganda. Later on, the Mainichi (12 May b) deplored the Chinese habit 
of slandering Japan abroad in more general terms.
Secondly, although both Asahi (5 May) and Mainichi (5 May a, 12 May a) 
held the Tanaka cabinet politically responsible for the incident, they also 
laid the blame for the military confrontation squarely on Chinese shoulders. 
According to the former newspaper (5 May), the Southern army lacked 
discipline and a unified command. Soldiers involved in the clash, led by 
He Yaouzu, had already been the perpetrators of the Nanjing Incident. It 
could not be ruled out that behind their actions there was again “a plot of 
152 Revelant. Revolution Deconstructed: Chiang Kai-shek and the Northern Expedition
Chiang Kai-shek and His Time, 127-170
Communist-linked military corps to overthrow Mr Chiang Kai-shek”. There 
were, moreover, “many banditesque elements” in the forces under Feng 
Yuxiang. In any case, this time there was plenty of evidence that the South-
ern army had acted “in an organised and planned manner”, as proven by 
the deliberate damage to the railway and the telegraph lines. Therefore, 
as noted by Gotō (1987, 290-1) with respect to the Ōsaka Asahi, the editor 
completely absolved the Japanese army of taking any undue initiative. Ini-
tially, the Mainichi (5 May a) gave no credit to the claim that the Chinese 
had planned the attack. Nevertheless, it did observe that the Nationalist 
commanders had failed to prevent the recurrence of anti-Japanese agitation 
among the lower officers; this proved, if not their bad faith, at least their lack 
of authority. Therefore, “the responsibility of Mr Chiang Kai-shek and others 
is more grave than in the Nanjing Incident”. The editor, however, changed 
his mind after receiving news that on the eve of the incident, officers had 
distributed hand grenades to the soldiers: this proved that, from the begin-
ning, the Southern army had a treacherous plan to attack the expeditionary 
force (other evidence was reported from Beijing, in OM 5 May evening and 
OM 6 May evening). Although Chiang was certainly not involved in this 
scheme, he remained guilty of lack of control over his subordinates (6 May). 
The Japanese command, too, deserved censure, as they had been so naive 
as to trust the Nationalists (5 May b; the same opinion in TA 13 May). In a 
long article in the same newspaper (11-14 May), Kyoto University profes-
sor Yano Jin’ichi repeated similar arguments. Furthermore, he defended 
the expedition as a legitimate means to protect Japan’s residents, and even 
called for the sending of more troops to Tianjin and Beijing.
Finally, over the course of the incident there was a considerable change 
in the attitude of the Mainichi towards the deployment of military force. 
At first the newspaper opposed the sending of reinforcements, as this 
would only cause further tension; although it was Japan’s right to demand 
apology and reparation, these should be obtained by diplomatic means (6 
May). Later on, however, false reports that the Nationalists had broken 
the truce sparked an outraged reaction:
At this point, the circumstances are clearly a provocation from the Chi-
nese side; there is no reason for excuse. For the honour of our army, 
this wild Southern army must be crushed with determination. [...] Until 
today, for the sake of Sino-Japanese relations we have called repeatedly 
for the adoption of peaceful means; but against the extreme affront of 
this provocation by the Chinese troops, there are no means to be taken 
other than thorough retribution. Therefore from now on whatever grave 
situation may arise, and into whatever difficult position it may lead both 
countries, the responsibility is theirs; we must not endure any more. [...] 
The violent affront done to our army must be swept away, no matter at 
what sacrifice. (9 May)
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Therefore, the claim that “our newspaper since the start opposed [the 
Shandong expedition], and tried to put a brake on the lone run of the mili-
tary” (Mainichi shinbun 2002, 1, 682) is not entirely accurate.
The Asahi, instead, maintained a cautious tone. Although the sending of 
reinforcements had become inevitable for self-defence, it was now neces-
sary to prevent an escalation; the risk was that it would trigger a chain 
of events as happened in the Siberian intervention, with far worse con-
sequences (10 May). In this perspective, the Tanaka cabinet had already 
made a grave miscalculation:
From the start we opposed the imprudent expedition; we were extremely 
dissatisfied with the ignorant, inconsistent, reckless attitude [of the 
cabinet], as if there were no diplomacy other than the expedition. [...] 
The only reason for the expedition was the protection of our residents 
on the spot, but if we consider that both residents and Imperial Army 
got into a scrape and many have been brutally killed and wounded, what 
was the purpose of the expedition? (5 May)
The editor also expressed concern that prolonging the expedition would 
not only damage Sino-Japanese relations, but also arouse the suspicion of 
foreign powers. Although public opinion abroad had been sympathetic to 
Japan during the incident, there were signs that the mood was changing 
(13 May).
In this regard, the press survey that Japanese newspapers presented 
appears inconclusive. Some of the articles cited supported the Japanese 
position (the British Morning Post and Daily News, in TA 8 May; Daily Tel-
egraph, Daily Mail and Morning Post, in OM 9 May; Daily Telegraph and 
Philadelphia Public Ledger, in OM 10 May; Herald Tribune, in TA 13 May 
evening). Others, however, were either neutral or critical of Japan (Man-
chester Guardian in TA 8 May; New York Times and New York World, in 
TA 10 May; the British magazines New Statesman, Outlook and Saturday 
Review, and the Berliner Tageblatt in TA 13 May evening; Allgemeine Zei-
tung, in OM 10 May). The Russian Pravda (in TA 13 May evening) of course 
denounced Japan’s imperialism. According to the Mainichi (15 May), on 
the whole, Chinese propaganda had failed to persuade foreign public opin-
ion because the facts were too evident. Although the American press was 
wary that Japan might use the incident as a pretext to occupy Shandong 
permanently, Washington would avoid becoming embroiled in the matter, 
since bilateral relations with Tokyo were too important. As for the British 
press, doubts about Japan’s intentions were more a reflection of the view of 
Japan as a trade rival rather than a sympathy for China. Therefore, as long 
as Japan upheld its legitimate rights, other countries would not interfere.
In Japan, though, opinions were mixed (Uchida et al. 1990, vol. 3, 30-3). 
The Mainichi hosted a round table of big business representatives, who 
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voiced support for a hard-line policy (10 May). The Chambers of Com-
merce and other business organisations also issued a joint resolution, 
which urged the cabinet to take effective measures for the protection of na-
tional interests in China (OM and TA 19 May; quoted in Eguchi 1973, 358). 
The Minseitō kept a low profile during the incident, and only on 21 June 
censured the cabinet’s incompetency with a formal resolution. The Asahi 
(22 June) found this response disappointing, as the main opposition party 
seemed unable to do much more than criticise instead of formulating a 
valid policy alternative (as already criticised in OM 27 February). As be-
fore, it was the “proletarian parties” who took the strongest stance against 
the Shandong expedition, claiming that its real aim was only to protect the 
northern military cliques and Japan’s capitalists (TA 10 May). In his column 
in Chūō kōron, Yoshino (1928a) expressed sympathy for the brave Japanese 
soldiers, but questioned the political responsibility of the cabinet, who had 
underestimated the risks involved in the expedition. He urged caution, 
stressing that no gain could come from treating China as an enemy.
In the following weeks, attention for the issues left over from the Jinan 
Incident waned as the Northern Expedition reached its final stage. Fearing 
that the Nationalist armies might penetrate Manchuria, the Tanaka cabinet 
pressed Zhang Zuolin to retreat behind the Great Wall; Chiang had already 
been warned not to cross that line (Wilbur 1983, 706-10). In this way, the 
Nationalists would win Beijing but remain outside Japan’s special sphere 
of interest. However, events took an unexpected turn. Japanese officers 
dissatisfied with Zhang had plotted his assassination; they carried out 
their plan on 4 June, by blowing up the train that was taking the Fengtian 
leader back home. Zhang Xueliang, who eventually emerged as his father’s 
successor, would soon prove unwilling to accept Japan’s tutelage.
The spectacular bombing of Zhang’s train warranted big headlines in 
the Japanese press, but the plot behind it remained long undisclosed to 
the public. Although in China there were immediate suspicions of Japanese 
involvement, the main newspapers supported the thesis that the authors 
were Nationalist agents (OM and TA 5 June evening, 5 June), as claimed by 
the War Ministry after investigation (TA 12 June evening; OM 12 June; for 
an extensive survey of Japanese press coverage of the incident and the con-
sequences for Japan’s domestic politics until the spring of 1929, see Tamai 
Kiyoshi kenkyūkai 2010). Journalists were more interested in the broader 
consequences of Zhang’s demise, which was confirmed only on 19 June, 
and in the prospects for the reunification of China under the Nationalist 
Party. It was a shared opinion that the capture of Beijing, though a major 
development, did not mean that “national revolution” had been achieved, 
even in its military stage; it was still to be seen whether the fragile coali-
tions around Chiang, Feng and Yan would stabilise or break up (TA 5, 14 
June; OM 9, 12 June). Moreover, beyond the Great Wall there was the very 
real risk of a fragmentation of power, which might lead to disorder, with 
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grave consequences for Japan’s security (TA 8 June). The Asahi, neverthe-
less, reached an overall conclusion that left room for optimism. Although 
the new government in Nanjing was the product of compromise between 
different factions, this alliance had more solid foundations than those of 
past regimes in Beijing; it was unlikely that in the near future internal 
strife would put it at risk. Without doubt, “The reason for the existence 
of the Nanjing government and its significance are that it represents the 
popular will, and receives the people’s support” (26 June). 
Therefore, willingly or otherwise, it was time to rethink Japan’s for-
eign policy, which so far had been “conceived in a dualistic way between 
Manchuria-Mongolia and the Chinese mainland”. Despite their geogra-
phy, sooner or later the Three Eastern Provinces would be assimilated 
by the mainland, politically and economically. Manchuria was “an impor-
tant ‘part’, not the ‘whole’”, in Japan’s China policy. Hence, there was 
no reason to sacrifice the whole for the sake of one part. Japan should 
strive to solve its problems in China, including Manchuria, by working 
with Nanjing as its only legitimate counterpart (26 June; see also TA 19 
June, which complained about the Tanaka cabinet’s poor diplomatic skills). 
These remarks, for once, were more outspoken than those in the Ōsaka 
Asahi (Gotō 1987, 296-301) in favour of concessions to the new regime. 
On a more tentative note, Yoshino (1928b) observed that the question of 
the future unification of Manchuria with the rest of China would depend 
on the solidity of the Nationalist government, which was still to be tested. 
He also agreed, however, that Japan needed to “revise from the founda-
tions its general approach” towards China. It was time to abandon the 
established framework, even if it meant giving up some rights, and build 
anew relationship based on “coexistence and co-prosperity”.
7 Conclusion
The press survey presented in this paper suggests that in Japan the pre-
vailing public perception of the Northern Expedition evolved over three 
phases. In the first, the rapid advance of the Nationalist armies across 
the Yangzi region was associated with the threat of Communist expan-
sion across China, as observed in the spread of radical movements and 
anti-foreign incidents. There were mixed judgements concerning Chiang 
Kai-shek and other GMD leaders, depending on how close to the Commu-
nists they seemed to stand. The breakup of the United Front in the spring 
of 1927, which marked the start of the second phase, led to a positive re-
evaluation of Chiang’s leadership. Opinions regarding the GMD, neverthe-
less, remained charged with criticism for its factional divisions, which were 
dragging the party into a process of ‘warlordisation’. In the last phase, 
the campaign that led to the capture of Beijing stirred ambivalent feelings 
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towards the Nationalist government. On the one hand, there was hope for 
a return of stability in China after many years of civil war. On the other, 
besides persisting scepticism regarding the GMD’s potential to achieve 
this goal, there was concern for the future of Sino-Japanese relations un-
der the new regime. While the Jinan Incident again sparked doubts about 
Chiang’s ability to exert control over his troops and eradicate Communist 
infiltration, the Nationalist advance to the borders of Manchuria brought 
to the forefront the issue of Japan’s “special interests” in China, which 
remained an open question.
Although this progression of the debate basically matches the findings 
of Matsushige (2013), sources examined here show that responses to the 
Northern Expedition were more articulate. Matsushige (54) focuses on the 
sense of threat to national interests that prevailed after the Jinan Incident, 
and claims that expectations for government protection paved the way for 
popular endorsement of the occupation of Manchuria. The mainstream 
press, however, was still far from supporting a military solution to inter-
national problems; even its judgement of Tanaka’s “positive policy” was 
severe. There was a significant difference, nevertheless, between the at-
titude of the two Asahi and the Mainichi. The former, while acknowledging 
the many shortcomings of the Nationalist Party, saw no viable alternative 
for the stabilisation of China, and stressed the need for sound dialogue 
between Nanjing and Tokyo in the interests of both countries. Although 
the Ōsaka Asahi was usually more forward-looking than its Tokyo partner, 
in the end the two reached similar conclusions.
The Mainichi, on the other hand, developed a pessimistic view of Na-
tionalist leadership, which seemed bound to become just another incar-
nation of warlordism. Moreover, if only briefly, it shifted from a moderate 
to a hard-line stance during the fighting in Jinan. That the same incident 
exposed the weakness of both Asahi and Mainichi in reacting to the ma-
nipulation of news by the Japanese military – as again after the killing of 
Zhang Zuolin, should not, however, be underestimated. Still, this does not 
mean that an insufficient screening of sources would necessarily lead to 
unconditional support for the invasion of Manchuria a few years later. It 
is also important to note that in the 1920s censorship in Japan was leni-
ent enough to give holders of opinions that were marginal on the political 
scene a hearing, for instance those who sympathised with the GMD Left 
and even with the CCP. Although little represented in the leading news-
papers, these views found considerable space in progressive magazines, 
such as Chūō kōron and Kaizō.
In conclusion, press coverage of the Northern Expedition testifies to 
the diversity of Japanese public opinion in that period. While reasons for 
conflict with China were already looming, there was no widespread belief 
that a violent confrontation was either imminent or inevitable. Therefore, 
further research should ascertain whether the shift of public opinion to-
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wards support for an aggressive policy, as seen following the outbreak of 
the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, was grounded in a changing 
perception of China in the early years of Nationalist rule.
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Newspapers
For brevity, only editorials (Ed.) and other opinion pieces are listed here.
Ōsaka Mainichi shinbun 大阪毎日新聞
1926
12 April. “Kita to minami no kū-detā: saikin no Shina no keisei” 北と南のク
・ーデター　最近の支那の形勢 (Coups d’État in the North and South: China’s 
Recent Situation).
11 August evening. “Kanton o fumidai toshite minami Shina ni sekka 
ōkoku o juritsu sen to suru Roshia” 広東を踏台として南支那に赤化王国を樹立
せんとするロシア (Using Canton as Base, Russia Attempts to Establish a 
Red Kingdom in Southern China).
12 August. Ed. “Shina gunbatsu no naikan: hokubatsugun no naiyō” 支那
軍閥の内患　北伐軍の内容 (The Internal Troubles of the Chinese Military 
Cliques: The Substance of the Northern Expedition Army).
3 September. Ed. “Bushō kanraku: eikyō wa dai naran” 武昌陥落　影響は大
ならん (The Fall of Wuchang: Consequences May Be Big).
18 September. Ed. “TaiShi fukanshōshugi no kongo” 対支不干渉主義の今後 
(The Future of Non-Intervention Policy in China).
4 October. Ed. “Kanton gun no tachiba: shōhai tomo ni tanan” 広東軍の立
場　勝敗共に多難 (The Stance of the Canton Army: Many Difficulties in 
Either Victory or Defeat).
23 October. Ed. “Shina no taido: jōyaku kaitei ni atari” 支那の態度　条約改
訂に当り (China’s Attitude: On Treaty Revision).
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21 November. Ed. “Kanton ha no hōnichishi: iu tokoro wa nani ka” 広東
派の訪日使　いふ所は何 か(The Canton Faction’s Envoys to Japan: What 
Will They Say?).
30 November. Ed. “Kanton seifu shōnin subeki ya: taigaiteki shingi ikan” 
広東政府承認すべきや　対外的信義如何 (Should the Canton Government Be 
Recognised? Is It Reliable in Foreign Relations?).
16 December. Ed. “Chō shi no nyūkyō: waga kokumin no yōkyū” 張氏
の入京　我国民の要求 (Mr Zhang’s Arrival in the Capital: Our People’s 
Demands).
1927
7 January. Ed. “Kanton gun no haigai: giwadan jiken o omou” 広東軍の排外
　義和団事件を想う (Xenophobia in the Canton Army: Remembering the 
Boxer Incident).
16 January evening. “Kanton seifu no uchiarasoi: hidari, migi ryōha no 
niramiai” 広東政府の内輪争ひ　左、右両派のにらみ合い (Internecine Conflict 
in the Canton Government: Left and Right Factions Stare at Each Oth-
er).
18 January. Ed. “Dōdō taru waga taiShi hōshin: gaishō enzetsu hyō” 堂々 た
る我が対支方針　外相演説評 (Our Grand Policy Towards China: A Comment 
on the Foreign Minister’s Speech).
28 January. Ed. “Eikoku no kyōdō shuppei teigi: kyozetsu wa tōzen” 英
国の共同出兵提議　拒絶は当然 (Britain’s Proposal for a Joint Expedition: 
Refusal Is Obvious).
31 January. Ed. “Eikoku taiShi gaikō no ranchōshi: rekkoku kyōdō no 
hakai” 英国対支外交の乱調子　列国共同の破壊 (Britain’s China Policy in Dis-
array: The Collapse of Coordination Among the Powers).
2 February. “Ankoku gun to Kantongun: ichibu de dakyō undō” 安国軍と広東
軍　一部で妥協運動 (National Security Army and Canton Army: A Partial 
Movement for Compromise).
4 February. Ed. “Eikoku no shippai to rekkoku no tachiba” 英国の失敗と列
国の立場 (Britain’s Failure and the Powers’ Stance).
7 March. Ed. “Kokumintō no naikō: bunretsu kuru ka” 国民党の内訌　分裂
来るか (Discord within the Nationalist Party: Is a Split Coming?).
16 March evening. “Ima no tokoro kyōsanha ga zettaitekini yūsei: te 
mo ashi mo denu Shō ha” 今の所共産派が絶対的に優勢　手も足も出ぬ蒋派 (At 
the Moment the Communist Faction Has an Overwhelming Advantage: 
Chiang’s Faction Is Powerless).
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17 March. Ed. “Shina jikyoku to taiShi kigyō: mukeikai ni sugiru na” 支那
時局と対支企業　無警戒に過ぎるな (The Situation in China and China-based 
Companies: Don’t Be Too Guardless).
18 March evening. “Shō Kaiseki shi no kenryoku hakudatsu” 蒋介石氏の権
力剥奪 (Mr Chiang Kai-shek Stripped of Power).
22 March. Ed. “Kokumingun no Shanhai senryō: kongo no taigai kankei” 
国民軍の上海占領　今後の対外関係 (The Occupation of Shanghai by the Na-
tionalist Army: Foreign Relations Hereafter).
27 March Ed. “Nankin jiken: waga kuni no tachiba” 南京事件　我国の立場 
(The Nanjing Incident: Our Country’s Stance).
1 April. Ed. “Kokumingun no naikō ni tsuite: rekkoku to waga kuni” 国民
軍の内訌に就いて　列国と我国 (About Discord in the Nationalist Army: The 
Powers and Our Country).
5 April. Ed. “Kankō bōkō jiken: Nintai dekinai” 漢口暴行事件　忍耐出来ない 
(The Hankou Assault Incident: It Cannot Be Endured).
9 April. Matsumoto Sōkichi 松本鎗吉. “Kakumei Shina no chūshin e (3): 
Nanpō no nairin kenka” 革命支那の中心へ　南方の内輪喧嘩 (To the Core of 
Revolutionary China: Internecine Struggle in the South).
10 April. Matsumoto Sōkichi. “Kakumei Shina no chūshin e (4): Bukan 
kyōsanha no gyōjō” 武漢共産派の行状 (The Demeanor of the Wuhan Com-
munist Faction).
14 April. Matsumoto Sōkichi. “Kakumei Shina no chūshin e (7): Shō shi 
no seiryoku shittsui” 蒋氏の勢力失墜 (Mr Chiang’s Loss of Power).
24 April. Ed. “Shin naikaku no taiShi seisaku: shuppatsu o ayamaru na” 
新内閣の対支政策　出発を誤るな (The New Cabinet’s China Policy: Don’t 
Get the Start Wrong).
16 May. Ed. “Shina no kyokumen sarani konton: ‘kyōsan’ to ‘hikyōsan’” 
支那の局面さらに混沌　「共産」と「非共産」 (The Situation in China Gets Fur-
ther Confused: ‘Communists’ and ‘Anti-Communists’).
21 May. Ed. “Eikoku no Bukan seifu zetsuen” 英国の武漢政府絶縁 (Britain’s 
Break with the Wuhan Government).
25 May. Ed. “Bukan ha no unmei: RoShi kankei ichidanraku ka” 武漢派の運
命　露支関係一段落か (The Fate of the Wuhan Government: A Settlement 
in Russia-China Relations?).
26 May. Ed. “Waga kuni iyoiyo shuppei ka: nao kōryo no yochi ari” 我国
愈出兵か　尚考慮の余地あり (Our Country on the Verge of an Expedition? 
There Is Still Room for Reflection).
29 May. Ed. “Futatabi Shina shuppei ni tsuite” 再び支那出兵について (Again 
on the China Expedition).
27 June. Ed. “Waga shuppei no daika: Shanhai no boikotto” 我出兵の代価 
上海のボイコット (The Price of Our Expedition: Boycotts in Shanghai).
29 June. “Bukan seifu: akairo wa usureta ga nao sakan” 武漢政府　赤色は
薄れたがなほ盛ん (The Wuhan Government: Red Colour Has Grown Thin 
But It’s Still Thriving).
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7 July. Ed. “Sainan hahei” 済南派兵 (The Dispatch of Troops to Jinan).
19 July. “Bukan de kūdetā: Ka Ken shi jūyō chiten senryō” 武漢でクーデター
　何鍵氏重要地点を占領 (Coup d’état in Wuhan: Mr He Jian Occupies Key 
Points).
21 July. “Bukan seifu tsuini bunretsu” 武漢政府遂に分裂 (The Wuhan Gov-
ernment Finally Splits).
25 July. Ed. “Shina no bunkai sayō: Bukan ha no bunretsu” 支那の分解作用
　武漢派の分裂 (The Dissolution of China: The Wuhan Faction’s Split).
4 August. Ed. “Shina no heisō: heiwa wa koranu” 支那の兵争　平和は来らぬ 
(Military Conflict in China: Peace Is Not Coming).
13 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no shūen: Borojin shi no haiin” 国民革
命の終焉　ボロヂン氏の敗因 (The End of National Revolution: The Causes 
of Mr Borodin’s Defeat).
16 August. Ed. “Shōshi no intai: Bukan Nankin ha dakyō no gisei” 蒋氏の
引退　武漢南京派妥協の犠牲 (Mr Chiang’s Retirement: A Victim of Com-
promise between Wuhan and Nanjing Factions).
30 August. Ed. “Santō teppei no gi: kore mata tōzen” 山東撤兵の議　これ亦当
然 (The Opinion for the Withdrawal of Troops: It Is with Good Reason).
22 September. “Nankin seifu no nayami: Tō Seichi shi Bukan ni tachiko-
moru” 南京政府の悩み　唐生智氏武漢に立籠る (The Worries of the Nanjing 
Government: Mr Tang Shengzhi Shuts Himself in Wuhan).
24 September. Ed. “Shin Nankin seifu: sono shōrai ikan” 新南京政府　その
将来如何 (The New Nanjing Government: What Future?).
1 October. Ed. “Handō jidai rai: gen naikaku gaikō” 反動時代来　現内閣の
外交 (Coming of the Reactionary Age: The Present Cabinet’s Foreign 
Policy).
4 October. Ed. “Mata ugokidaseru Shina no keisei” 又動き出せる支那の形勢 
(China’s Situation Can Move On Again).
28 October. Ed. “Kateru Hōten gun: Chō shi no chii” 勝てる奉天軍　張氏の
地位 (The Fengtian Army May Win: Mr Zhang’s Position).
7 December. “Kokumintō zentai kaigi wa jijitsujō ketsuretsu shita” 国民
党全体会議は事実上決裂した (The Nationalist Party General Congress Has 
Actually Fallen Apart).
12 December. “Shō shi no deyō hitotsu” 蒋氏の出様一つ (Mr Chiang’s At-
titude Is One).
14 December. Ed. “Kanton no bōdō to kyōsantō” 広東の暴動と共産党 (The 
Canton Insurrection and the Communist Party).
16 December. Ed. “NanShi tōitsu nan: jijō iyoiyo fukuzatsu” 南支統一難　
事情愈複雑 (Unification of South China Is Difficult: The Situation Gets 
Complicated).
19 December. Ed. “Nanboku bunritsu no dairiyū shōmetsu: tōitsu no 
shinkikai” 南北分立の大理由消滅　統一の新機械 (The Big Reason for the 
North-South Split Has Disappeared: A New Chance for Unification).
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29 December. Ed. “Shina wa doko e iku: naisō ni toshi kureru” 支那は何処へ
行く　内争に年暮る (Where Is China Going? The Year Closes on Civil War).
1928
27 February. Ed. “TaiShi seisaku no teiton: mui no tōkyokusha musaku 
no hantaitō” 対支政策の停頓　無為の当局者　無策の反対党 (China Policy at 
a Standstill: Idle Government, Clueless Opposition).
5 May a. Ed. “Nisshi hei no shōtotsu: Shina gawa no sekinin jūdai” 日支兵
の衝突　支那側の責任重大 (Clash of Japanese and Chinese Soldiers: Grave 
Responsibility on China’s Side). 
5 May b. Ed. “Shuppei mokuteki no bōkyaku” 出兵目的の忘却 (Expedition’s 
Purpose in Oblivion).
6 May. Ed. “Sainan jiken zengo: saizen no doryoku o yō su” 済南事件善
後　最善の努力を要す (Settlement of the Jinan Incident: Utmost Effort 
Required).
9 May. Ed. “Waga gun ni taisuru chōsen: tetteiteki yōchō o kise” 我軍に
対する挑戦　徹底的膺懲を期せ (A Challenge to Our Army: Go for Thorough 
Punishment).
11-14 May. Yano Jin’ichi 矢野仁一. “Sainan jiken no ikkōsatsu” 済南事件の一
考察 (Considerations on the Jinan Incident).
12 May a. Ed. “Soku ni sennin gaishō o oke” 即に専任外相を置 (Appoint Im-
mediately a Full-Time Foreign Minister!).
12 May b. Ed. “Shina no gyaku senden: keikai o yō su” 支那の逆宣伝　警戒
を要す (China’s Counter-Propaganda: Caution Required).
15 May. Ed. “Sainan jiken no taigai hankyō” 済南事件の対外反響 (Foreign 
Responses to the Jinan Incident).
9 June. Ed. “Shina kakumei undō no zento” 支那革命運動の前途 (The Outlook 
for China’s Revolutionary Movement).
12 June. Ed. “Shō Kaisekishi no shintai: ken ni nite obietaru mono ka”蒋
介石氏の進退　賢に似て怯たるものか (Mr Chiang Kai-shek’s Course of Action: 
Looks Smart But Is He Scared?).
Tōkyō Asahi shinbun 東京朝日新聞
1926
3 April. “Kanton wa shibaraku onkenha no tenka” 広東派暫く穏健派の天下 
(For the Time Being Canton Is the Realm of the Moderate Faction).
19 April. “Kanton wa izen sakeiha yūsei” 広東は依然左傾派優勢 (In Canton 
the Leftist Faction Still Prevails).
21 April. “Kanton no ryōha antō o tsuzuku” 広東の両派暗闘を続く (Secret 
Feud between Factions in Canton Continues).
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6 July. Ed. “Kanzei kaigi no chūzetsu” 関税会議の中絶 (Interruption of the 
Tariff Conference).
21 July. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no jūdaisei” 支那時局の重大性 (The Gravity of 
the Situation in China).
17 August. Ed. “Shina gunbatsu no sansukumi” 支那軍閥の三すくみ (A Three-
Way Deadlock for China’s Military Cliques).
14 September. Ed. “Kakumei seiryoku no shinten” 革命勢力の進展 (The 
Advance of the Revolutionary Forces).
30 November. Ed. “Shina sekka no taisei” 支那赤化の大勢 (The Trend for 
China’s Reddening).
15 December. Ed. “Shina jikyoku to Nihon” 支那時局と日本 (China’s Situa-
tion and Japan).
1927
3-8 January. Negishi Tadashi 根岸佶. “Hokubatsugun to sekka” 北伐軍と赤
化 (The Northern Expedition Army and Reddening).
12 January. Ed. “Kyōkōna Shina no taigai taido” 強硬な支那の対外態度 (The 
Foreign Policy Attitude of Hard-Line China).
19 January. “Kokumin seifu to wa nanzo ya: kōsubeki ka haisubeki ka” 国民
政府とは何ぞや　興すべきか排すべきか (What Is the Nationalist Government? 
Should It Be Supported, or Should It Be Rejected?).
20 January. Ed. “Shina mondai no kongo” 支那問題の今後 (The China Ques-
tion Hereafter).
27 February. Ed. “Nanpō Shina no shisetsu: Tai shi kitaru” 南方支那の使節
　戴氏来たる (Southern China’s Envoy: Mr Dai Has Come).
1 March evening. “Yōyaku rokotsu to natta kokumin seifu no nairin ken-
ka” 漸く露骨となった国民政府の内輪喧嘩 (Internecine Struggle in the Nation-
alist Government Has Finally Become Plain).
6 March. Ed. “Nanpō chūshin seiryoku no dōyō” 南方中心勢力の動揺 (Trem-
bling at the Core of Southern Power).
16 March. “Shō Kaiseki shi wa mattaku koritsu” 蒋介石氏は全く孤立 (Mr 
Chiang Kai-shek Completely Isolated).
24 March. “Tō shi Nanshō ha ni kishite:Kankō no keisei kyūten su” 唐氏
南昌派に帰して　漢口の形勢急転す (Mr Tang Returning to the Nanchang 
Faction: Reversal of Forces in Hankou).
27 March. Ed. “Nankin jiken no kaiketsu” 南京事件の解決 (Solution of the 
Nanjing Incident).
5 April. Ed. “Kankō no bōdō: Nihon seifu no sekinin” 漢口の暴動　日本政府
の責任 (Violence in Hankou: The Responsibility of Japan’s Government).
13 April. Ed. “Shō shi no kūdetā” 蒋氏のクーデター (Mr Chiang’s Coup d’État).
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30 April. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no jisatsu: kongo no kōsei ikan” 国民革
命の自殺　今後の更生如何 (The Suicide of Nationalist Revolution: Shall 
There Be a Rebirth?).
24 May. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no henka: kyōsan ha to Hōten ha” 支那時局の変
化　共産派と奉天派 (Changes in China’s Situation: The Communist Faction 
and the Fengtian Faction).
28 May. Ed. “Tai Shi shuppei mondai” 対支出兵問題 (The Issue of the Ex-
pedition to China).
29 May a. “Santō shuppei o hyō su” 山東出兵を評す (A Comment on the 
Shandong Expedition).
29 May b. “Santō shuppei wa igi jūdai” 山東出兵は意義重大 (The Shandong 
Expedition Has Grave Meaning).
29 May c. Ed. “Santō shuppei kettei” 山東出兵決定 (Shandong Expedition 
Decided).
1 June. Ed. “Naisei fukanshō no gensoku” 内政不干渉の原則 (The Principle 
of Non-Intervention).
12 June. Ed. “Shuppei tachiōjō” 出兵立往生 (The Expedition Is Stranding).
28 June. Ed. “Tōhō kaigi ni nozomu” 東方会議に望む (We Have Expectations 
from the Eastern Conference).
7 July. Ed. “Santō shuppei mondai: iyoiyo fukami ni hairu” 山東出兵問題　い
よいよ深味に入る (The Shandong Expedition Problem: It’s Getting Deep).
26 July. Ed. “Nankin ha to Bukan ha: chōteisetsu no kakuhi” 南京派と武漢
派　調停説の確否 (Nanjing Faction and Wuhan Faction: Reliability of the 
Conciliation Theory).
2 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei to Roshia” 国民革命とロシア (Nationalist 
Revolution and Russia).
10 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no nanten” 国民革命の難点 (The Difficult 
Point of Nationalist Revolution).
16 August evening. “Shō shi shikkyaku no shin’in” 蒋氏失脚の真因 (The True 
Causes of Mr Chiang’s Disgrace).
17 August a. “Shō shi no botsuraku” 蒋氏の没落 (The Downfall of Mr Chi-
ang).
17 August b. Ed. “Kakumei seikyoku no gyakuten: Shō shi no geya” 革命政
局の逆転　蒋氏の下野 (A Reversal in Revolutionary Politics: Mr Chiang’s 
Retirement).
26 August. Ed. “Teppei wa hatashite itsu ka” 撤兵は果たして何時か (When 
Shall Withdrawal Come?).
30 August. Ed. “Shina jikyoku to Nanpō ha” 支那時局と南方派 (China’s Situ-
ation and the Southern Faction).
1 September. Ed. “Santō teppei o yorokobu” 山東撤兵を喜ぶ (We Rejoice at 
the Withdrawal from Shandong).
20 September. Ed. “Kokumintō no danketsu” 国民党の団結 (Union in the 
Nationalist Party).
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10 October. Ed. “Nanboku no jikyoku: Kokumintō no kiki” 南北の時局　
国民党の危機 (The North-South Situation: The Crisis of the Nationalist 
Party).
26 October. Ed. “Nanpō ha no tōsō” 南方派の闘争 (Struggle in the Southern 
Faction).
15 November. Ed. “Tō Seichi shi no botsuraku” 唐生智氏の没 落(The Down-
fall of Mr Tang Shengzhi).
22 November. Ed. “Kanton no kūdetā: Kokumintō gōdōnan” 広東のクーデタ
ー　国民党合同難 (Coup d’État in Canton: Union of the Nationalist Party 
Difficult).
29 November. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no chūshin” 支那の時局の中心 (The Core 
of the Situation in China).
12 December. “Shō shi no fukushoku wa kaette zento o sugiru” 蒋氏の復
職はかへつて前途を過る (Mr Chiang’s Restoration in Office Exceeds the 
Prospects).
13 December. Ed. “Kanton no saiseihen” 広東の再政変 (Another Political 
Crisis in Canton).
14 December. “Shō, Ō ryōkyotō bunri no keisei” 蒋、汪両巨頭分離の形勢(Sep-
aration of the two Leaders, Chiang and Wang).
21 December. “RoShi no kankei danzetsu: fukasoku no jikyoku” 露支の関係
断絶　不可測の時局 (Severance of Russia-China Relations: An Unpredict-
able Situation).
1928
6 January evening. “Shin Bukan ha nari: taisei Shō shi ni furi” 新武漢派な
り　大勢蒋氏に不理 (The New Wuhan Faction Is There: Trend Unfavour-
able to Mr Chiang).
17 January. Ed. “Shō shi saiki no kōka” 蒋氏再起の効果 (The Effects of Mr 
Chiang’s Return).
15 February. Ed. “Shina nanboku no keisei” 支那南北の形勢 (The Prospects 
in South and North China).
19 April. Ed. “Santō keisei no kikyū: saishuppei fuka” 山東形勢の危急　再
出兵は不可 (Shandong’s Dire Situation: Another Expedition Impossible).
5 May. Ed. “Nisshi ryōgun no shōtotsu” 日支両軍の衝突 (The Clash between 
the Japanese and Chinese Armies).
10 May. Ed. “Jitai no jūdaika” 事態の重大化 (Worsening of the Situation).
13 May. Ed. “Kokugai shoron ni kangamiyo” 国外の所論に鑑みよ (Bear in 
Mind the Foreign Opinion).
5 June. Ed. “Shinseimen no dakai ikan: Chō shi sōnan to Tōsanshō” 新生
面の打開如何　張氏遭難と東三省 (How to Break the Deadlock? Mr Zhang’s 
Disaster and the Three Eastern Provinces).
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8 June. Ed. “Bakudan jiken no eikyō: jitai kyokudo ni jūtaika” 爆弾事件の
影響　事態極度に重体化 (The Consequences of the Bomb Incident: The 
Situation Has Become Extremely Grave).
14 June. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no tenbō” 支那時局の展望 (The Outlook for 
China’s Situation).
19 June. Ed. “TaiShi gaikō no kekkan: Sainan jiken o kaiketsu seyo” 対支
外交の欠陥　済南事件を解決せよ (The Shortcomings of Diplomacy towards 
China: Do Solve the Jinan Incident).
22 June. Ed. “Minseitō no taiShi ketsugi” 民政党の対支決議 (Minseitō’s Reso-
lution on China).
26 June. Ed. “Nankin seifu no shōnin mondai” 南京政府の承認問題 (The Issue 
of Recognition of the Nanjing Government).
Ōsaka Asahi shinbun 大阪朝日新聞
1926
8 April. Ed. “Roshiya no taiShi seisaku: hatashite itten ka” ロシヤの対支政
策　果たして一転か (Russia’s China Policy: A Turnabout?).
1927
7 April. Ed. “Jūdai jiki: Shina sarani midaren” 重大危機　支那更に乱れん (A 
Grave Crisis: China Plunges into Further Disorder).
21 July. Ed. “Innin gaikō no shōri: Kyōsantō taijō su” 隠忍外交の勝利　共産党
退場す (Victory for the Diplomacy of Endurance: The Communist Party 
Leaves the Stage).
15 December. Ed. “Kanton no kyōsan bōdō: Kokumintō bunretsu no sho-
san” 広東の共産暴動国民党分裂の所産 (The Communist Uprising in Canton: 
A Product of the Nationalist Party’s Split).
29 December. Ed. “Kotoshi no Shina” 今年の支那 (This Year’s China).
Magazines
Editorial (1927a). “Musan seitō ni kawarite Shina nanpō seifu daihyōsha 
ni tsugu” 無産政党に代りて支那南方政府代表者に告ぐ (We Speak in Place of 
the Proletarian Parties to the Representative of China’s Southern Gov-
ernment). Chūō kōron 中央公論 42, 4 (April), 2-3.
Editorial (1927b). “Nisshi ryōgoku taishū no seishinteki renkei” 日支両国大
衆の精神的連携 (The Spiritual Connection Between the Masses of Japan 
and China). Chūō kōron 42, 5 (May), 2-3.
Editorial (1927c). “Shina jikyoku no seishi” 支な時局の正視 (A Straight View 
of China’s Situation). Chūō kōron 42, 7 (July), 2-3.
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Editorial (1927d). “Seiyūkai naikaku no tai ManMō seisaiku” 政友会内閣
の対満蒙政策 (The Seiyūkai Cabinet’s Policy towards Manchuria and 
Mongolia). Chūō kōron 42, 9 (September), 2-3.
Furushō Kunio 古荘国雄 (1927a). “NanShi o ugokasu Borōjin no kaiwan” 
南支を動かすボローヂンの怪腕 (Borodin’s Amazing Ability to Move South 
China). Kaizō 改造 9, 3 (March), 1-10
Furushō Kunio 古荘国雄 (1927b). “Shō Kaiseki wa doko e iku (Kokumin 
kakumei no shōrai)” 蒋介石は何処へ行く（国民革命の将来）(Where Is Chiang 
Kai-shek Going? (The Future of Nationalist Revolution). Kaizō 9, 4 
(April), 76-83.
Furushō Kunio 古荘国雄 (1927c). “Hadaka ni shita Shō Kaiseki” 裸にした蒋
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In an article entitled “Foreign views on Chiang Kai-shek” and published in 
the Shanghai English language magazine The China Critic just before the 
war, in 1936, Randall Gould, editor of the Shanghai Evening Mercury Post, 
wrote that “in foreign eyes, General Chiang Kai-shek at the time of his fifti-
eth birthday is one of the few truly great men of the world” (Gould 1936). 
In spite of the fact that, as has been noted, Chiang was also destined to 
become one of the major targets of criticism, political satire and irony in 
China and abroad (Taylor 2015), Gould’s opinion would be echoed by sev-
eral publications in the following years. Between the 1930s and the 1940s 
Chiang Kai-shek was increasingly presented to public opinion as one of 
the celebrities of world politics. China’s participation in the world war 
brought Chiang international prominence that no Chinese leader had ever 
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enjoyed before. Besides Western biographies of the Generalissimo (Berkov 
1938; Hedin 1939), Chiang’s profile could be read in books dedicated to 
Moulders of National Destinies (Soward 1939), to Great Soldiers of World 
War II (De Weerd 1944), to Giants of China (Kuo 1944), and Four Mod-
ern Statesmen (Renyold 1944). He was compared not only to Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Stalin, but also to great general-emperors of the past such 
as Napoleon and Qin Shi Huangdi, or, as did the German writer author 
Schaub, catalogued among the Kämpfer für ihr Volk alongside Mussolini 
and Kemal Ataturk (Schaub 1938). Most of these writings celebrated his 
stature as a leader, and as a symbol of a new China ready to take its place 
in the circle of modern, progressive nations. 
Raising a positive perception of Chiang in foreign public opinion was 
certainly one of the goals of the Guomindang’s propaganda machine, which 
was also engaged in building up the personality cult surrounding Chiang 
in China during the Nanjing decade (Taylor 2006). Nevertheless, it was 
during the War of Resistance against Japan and the second world war that 
the plan to project Chiang’s international image as that of the predestined, 
capable leader of a resurgent China assumed a global dimension. Actually, 
and especially in the West, the war propaganda battlefront was quite com-
plicated. Besides fighting the Japanese propaganda and gaining Western 
public opinion’s support, since the early 1940s Nationalist propaganda’s 
efforts had to face the challenge represented by some negative opinions 
about Chiang and the Nationalist government offered by Western writers 
and journalists more sympathetic with the Communist Party. In spite of 
their efforts, they were not able to control the flow of images, opinions and 
news about China’s war situation in Western newspapers and magazines. 
Nevertheless, the Guomindang poured great energies in creating a system 
for international propaganda (Tsang 1980; Tong 2005; Wei 2014; Zhu 2012). 
Westernized Chinese intellectuals engaged in diplomatic and cultural 
work in China and in the West were mobilized to this end. One outcome 
of their efforts was the publication of some biographies of the Chiang 
Kai-shek in foreign languages, with the aim of improving the knowledge 
and understanding of the Chinese leader’s personality and historical role. 
This article puts these works in the context of Chinese Nationalist war 
propaganda, but also investigates how, while presenting the Generalissimo 
as the personification of the new modern, national identity of the Chinese 
Republic, they also reflected a wider cultural agenda of the Guomindang, 
willing to shape Western discourse on China’s civilization and place in 
world history and culture. 
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1 Chiang Kai-shek’s Official Image in the West: Dong Xianguang 
and His Biography of Chiang 
The propaganda efforts aimed at building Chiang’s legitimacy as the na-
tional leader of China in foreign eyes pre-dated the war. It was actually con-
nected to the creation of Chiang’s public persona through written, visual 
and aural media. This was a gradual, complex process which started in 
the 1920s, by the desire of the leader himself (Taylor 2006, 2015). Chiang 
was well aware of the importance of his public image. He actually pro-
moted the collection and the editing of records concerning his deeds and 
words, to produce the Shilüe gaoben (Huang 2010) for future historians. 
Collections of Chiang’s speeches and political writings, autobiographical 
accounts, written by ghost-writers, Chiang’s personal secretary Chen Bulei 
for instance, were also produced. The whole process of building up his 
public image tapped several cultural resources deeply rooted in Chinese 
Confucian and popular culture but nonetheless relevant to the emerging 
modern nationalist imaginary in twentieth-century China, such as the tra-
ditional moral concept of “enduring humiliation” (chiku), the stoic ability 
to face difficulties in preparation for future victory (Huang 2011). 
Narratives of Chiang’s life also played an important role in Chiang’s 
legitimization as a leader, making him an inspirational model for modern 
Chinese identity. Biographical accounts of Chiang served to publicly ac-
knowledge him as a leader of pure revolutionary pedigree, the true heir of 
Sun Yat-sen, and to promote him as an object of veneration for the Chinese 
people for his moral, military and political qualities. 
The pattern of this narrative was set in the first biography of Chiang in 
Chinese, published as early as 1927. Written by Qin Shou’ou, a playwright 
belonging to the school of Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies, it celebrated 
Chiang’s military and moral qualities (Qin 1927). The tale of Chiang’s 
life, from infancy to the end of the Northern Expedition, is actually con-
structed following the model type of the “rebel-reformer”, also important 
in the traditional historiography but that acquired a new prominence in 
the revolutionary era (Wang 1990). As with Sun Yat-sen, the rise of na-
tionalism gave new meaning to this traditional type of hero, a personality 
who breaks the rules in order to guide a positive change for his people. 
Offering a portrait of Chiang’s life as that of a revolutionary hero but also 
a reformer, this narrative aimed to enhance Chiang’s legitimization as a 
leader China along the path established by Sun. 
This pattern was destined to become the model for the narratives of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s life in foreign languages produced by the Guomindang’s 
intellectuals to the benefit of foreign public opinion. In fact, just before the 
war, the effort targeted at foreign public opinion to strengthen Chiang’s 
fame abroad became more systematic and the first official biography of 
Chiang in English was produced by a well-known Nationalist propaganda 
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intellectual, Dong Xianguang. His work, titled Chiang Kai-shek. Soldier 
and Statesman appeared in Shanghai in 1937, and later revised and re-
published in Taiwan (Tong 1937). 
Dong Xianguang, who was known in the West as Hollington K. Tong, 
played a key role in creating first an informal network and later a prop-
aganda structure. He came from a Christian family and graduated in 
journalism from the University of Missouri and Columbia University. In 
the early twentieth-century he taught English to Chiang Kai-shek at the 
Longjing High School of Fenghua. Dong had been the editor of the Eng-
lish language newspaper the China Press (MacKinnon 2008) and later, 
in 1935, he was chosen to work in the supervision of foreign cable news 
in Shanghai. In 1937 he was appointed a Vice-Minister of Information, 
in charge of the Department of International Propaganda (Tong 2005; 
Wei 2014). 
Thanks to his professional training abroad and his experience as an 
editor of an English language newspaper, Dong was well acquainted with 
the milieu of foreign correspondents in China and consequently able to 
gain the support and cooperation of Western journalists to address foreign 
public opinion during the war. 
Dong’s knowledge of the Western media culture was certainly useful 
to his work as Chiang Kai-shek’s chief English language propagandist. 
He presented himself as someone who had access to a great lot of infor-
mation, but, though his biography of Chiang was evidently a laudatory 
work, he pretended that it respected Western norms of objectivity. In the 
preface, Dong is lavish with eulogistic adjectives and expressions such as 
“the greatest soldier-statesman of our time on the continent of Asia”, the 
“Builder of New China, who has successfully evolved order out of chaos” 
(Tong 1953, xiii). But, for it addressed a Western audience, it also aimed 
to reflect the author’s adherence to professional criteria of objectivity and 
scientific approach to his subject that he thought would strongly increase 
the credibility of his biography in Western eyes. 
In spite of his official role and personal connection to Chiang, Dong 
pretended that his work on Chiang was the outcome of his spontaneous 
admiration for the leader. He affirms that he first had the idea to write 
such a biography when he was spending some time with Chiang in Xikou 
in early 1930. There he began to better understand the greatness of the 
man. During this trip, he decided that someday he would write a biography 
of the Nationalist leader, since: 
Even in those days it had already become clear that no Chinese in this 
generation would rise to such heights of greatness as the Generalissimo. 
Specially during the following six years his life was so full of movement 
that it would be a national loss if it were not accurately recorded and 
properly interpreted. Hence the author’s present undertaking. 
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Aware of the value of self-revelation, the author has, wherever possi-
ble, let the Generalissimo reveal himself in his speeches and writings and 
in his actions. Realizing that, in many instances, by summarizing, much of 
the essence of the original would be lost, many of the speeches and writ-
ten appeals to the nation have been given in full. In brief the author has 
humbly followed in the steps of Boswell instead of attempting to emulate 
the brilliant biographers who are the present – perhaps passing – vogue. 
Though only a pedestrian performance, this biography claims to be truth-
ful – some may think unnecessarily truthful. (Tong 1953, xvi-xvii)
As an official biography Dong chose to reproduce verbatim, as much as 
possible, the words of the Generalissimo. According to him, this proved 
necessary in order to dispel the rumours and gossip which surrounded the 
leader’s personal history. The true nature of the man was simply buried in 
his own deeds and his words. But, in order to be more persuasive he chose 
to dedicate more space to the impressions and ideas of Chiang offered by 
foreigners themselves, making use of these sources to build an image of 
a national leader which could be convincing in Western eyes. 
In many cases stress has been laid upon the reaction to the Generalissi-
mo’s policy and personality by foreign correspondents in China and other 
foreigners. This was deliberate. In the nature of things articulate Chinese 
are either pro- or anti-Chiang. The foreigner is able to take a detached 
and objective view of matters which are of vital personal concern to the 
Chinese, and regarding which the Chinese could hardly be expected to 
be entirely free from partiality or prejudices. (Tong 1953, xvii) 
Dong’s biography concentrates mainly on Chiang’s career as a military 
and political leader. Being an authorized and official source as regards 
the leader’s life and thoughts, consistently with Chiang’s aspiration to act 
and to be considered as a “Confucian scholar-soldier” (Taylor 2009, 38), 
Dong’s main concern was to persuade the Western reader that Chiang 
was the product of the best of China’s tradition, but also that as a leader 
he was different from the stereotypical Asian despot. Dong Xianguang’s 
Chiang was physically and psychologically strong, never ambiguous in 
his speech and thought, never opportunistic and completely trustworthy. 
He embodied a new kind of Chinaman, who could meet the expectations 
of Westerners. But his personality was, at any rate, deeply rooted in the 
great moral and spiritual tradition of Chinese civilization. Chiang’s main 
features were actually his strong will, self-discipline and perseverance. 
His leadership was that of “a man fitted by nature and training success-
fully to guide the Chinese people to a happier and fuller life” (Tong 1953, 
xx), but Chiang’s life was that of a ‘self-made’ leader, who had acquired 
that position for his merits and capacities in politics and war: 
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Chiang devoted a score of years to training himself for the role of leader-
ship. He had hardened his body, and had schooled himself to endurance. 
He had gained not only book knowledge, but the knowledge of practi-
cal military and political affairs that had enabled him to graduate with 
honors from the University of Experience. (Tong 1953, xvi) 
His leadership and strong personality were not surprising considering the 
roots of his moral qualities and his greatness. Dong informed the readers 
that “the key to much that is obscured in the development of Chiang’s 
powerful character is revealed by an understanding of: 1) his family influ-
ence, 2) the historical setting of his time of birth and, 3), his early topo-
graphical surroundings” (Tong 1953, 2; on the importance of his provincial 
origins in analysis of Chiang see Taylor, Huang 2012, 103). It was within 
his family and native community that his basic moral values – such as total 
commitment to the public good – had been preserved and learnt. Dong em-
phasized that most of Chiang’s political actions were just the reflection of 
his adherence to a set of values channelled in the pursuit of the public good, 
and not of personal power. Even political and military defeats provided oc-
casion to show this commitment. Dong dedicates several pages to Chiang’s 
temporary retreat from the political scene after the Shanghai repression 
in 1927, when he moved to a Buddhist temple in Xikou. The biographer 
explains that this was a chance for the Generalissimo to show how he was 
always motivated by the highest dedication to the public interest. 
Why Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, at the seeming apex of his military 
career, accepted retirement so submissively will seem inexplicable to 
many readers. Throughout his career, Chiang has always been willing to 
eliminate himself when others felt he had become an obstacle to unity. 
(Tong 1953, 92) 
In order to justify this interpretation, Dong recalls the impressions of for-
eign journalists who went to interview Chiang and discovered an inspired, 
sober and strong leader for China and not a power-hungry militarist.
Attired in a long grey gown, he might well have been a monk in this 
setting, but his steady eyes and stern, clear-cut features, and his erect 
military bearing, indicated the soldier he is. (Tong 1953, 96) 
His words were never vague and one could not help but feel that his 
mind worked fast and clearly. Here indeed has a strong character, a 
leader of the type that China needs so badly; and one could not doubt 
his sincerity. (Tong 1953, 98)
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According to Dong Xianguang, even Chiang’s conversion to Christianity 
was first of all an example of the high moral qualities and strength of his 
personality. What counted was that, in the practice of his Christian faith, 
Chiang showed the same serious attitude he possessed in the political and 
military field. 
It was characteristic of Chiang in deciding to become a Christian, he 
was to follow the act by whole-hearted consecration to his new creed. 
To Chiang, Christianity has been an inspiration which he has carried 
devoutly into his daily life. After entering the Christian faith he set aside 
inviolably a portion of each day which he devotes to solitary prayers and 
devotions. Not even the most urgent State business has permitted to 
interrupt him doing his prayer period. To Chiang, Christianity has been 
not a thing of rituals, but a deep personal experience. Although he was 
to be the ruler of a largely non-Christian nation, he has never permitted 
opportunistic considerations to silence his public participation in Chris-
tian activities, nor his public avowals of his religion. (Tong 1953, 104)
Dong’s biography of Chiang was explicitly a mirror of the leader’s self-
representation on the public stage. As a product of a man of the Guomind-
ang’s propaganda apparatus, this official portrait was evidently consistent 
with the message Chiang himself aspired to convey to the international 
public opinion: Chiang was a trustworthy leader, deserving respect, ad-
miration and political support, able to think and act for his people’s sake. 
Moreover he was able to guide the Chinese to develop those virtues –such 
as self-discipline and endurance – which lay at the very heart of his rise 
as the Chinese national military and political leader, but which were also 
fundamental for creating a rejuvenated and strong China. These virtues 
were rooted in Chinese tradition, which was consistent with the goal of 
modernization and were the foundation of Chinese national identity. 
This official work, which transformed a “soldier” in a political leader 
and a moral guide for all the Chinese nation, was further elaborated in 
some biographies of Chiang Kai-shek written by Westernized Chinese in-
tellectuals abroad. 
These biographies were based on official sources and did not contra-
vene the directives of Nationalist official propaganda, as they were also 
connected to the Nationalist diplomatic networks. Nevertheless, though 
their authors shared the same goal of Dong’s biography, they conceived 
their mission as that of ‘cultural brokers’ between China and the West. 
The portrait of the leader they built served to celebrate Chiang, but it also 
revealed their own aspiration to shape the cultural identity of their country 
in the global discourse about China. 
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2 The Sustaining Power of the Past:  
Zhang Xinhai’s Asia’s Man of Destiny
Exploring the moral and cultural dimensions of Chiang’s personality and 
life and elevating him to the “epitome of his race” (Chang 1944, x) was 
the fundamental concern of the biography written by Zhang Xinhai (Chang 
Hsin-Hai) and published in New York in 1944 under the title Chiang Kai-
shek. Asia’s Man of Destiny. 
Zhang was a Westernized intellectual, whose career concerns lay mostly 
in Nationalist bureaucracy for foreign relations. Zhang had studied in 
Shanghai and later obtained a Ph.D. in English Literature from Harvard 
in 1922. As one of the founders of the liberal magazine The China Critic, 
he was close to famous liberal cosmopolitan intellectuals like Lin Yutang 
(Sima 2012). But from the early 1920s, he became involved in diplomacy, 
though he also taught English Literature at Beijing University. In 1928, he 
accepted a post for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving in Portugal and 
Poland as Ambassador. He was back in Nanjing in 1933, where he taught 
English literature. In 1942 he was sent to the United States to contribute 
to Chinese cultural diplomacy efforts during the war. Actually, he was Song 
Ziwen’s man, Song being at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the 
Chinese Embassy in Washington (Wu 1993). 
Zhang’s biography of Chiang seems to have enjoyed quite a large cir-
culation, since it was translated into German in 1945 in Zurich, in French 
in 1946 and – with a different title – in Danish in 1947. As the author ex-
plains in his long introduction, it sprang from the decision to satisfy the 
several requests received from foreign friends upon his arrival in the Unit-
ed States. There Zhang had realized that “in spite of the many channels of 
information which were open to the American public, the understanding 
of China and things Chinese was both limited and quite often inaccurate” 
(Chang 1944, i). There was great curiosity surrounding China and espe-
cially regarding Chiang Kai-shek, but, as Zhang emphasized, “only one of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s own countrymen, who was at the same time familiar 
with the West and its literature and history, should undertake the task” (ix) 
of satisfying their curiosity. As foreign friends reminded him that “Surely it 
should be your duty to bring us and the Western world nearer to him and 
him to us” (ix), Zhang had decided to study the subject and write a book 
about Chiang Kai-shek.
Hoping to bridge the gap between the West and China’s leader, and at 
the same to project a positive image of China to educated American pub-
lic opinion, Zhang also wanted his work to have a literary value, taking 
as his model the English biographer, Lytton Strachey. Actually, Zhang’s 
goals were greater than just to offer a narrative of the main events in the 
Generalissimo’s life. He wanted to provide the reader with an erudite, yet 
readable introduction to the links binding Chiang, Chinese civilization and 
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Sun Yat-sen, presenting Chiang as the champion of Chinese traditional 
virtues and the finest interpreter of Chinese nationalism and modern trans-
formation. In his biography, therefore, are long digressions into Chinese 
history from the Opium Wars, the unequal treaties and especially Sun 
Yat-sen and his ideas. 
Aware of the relevance that the ideal of “democracy” could have in the 
American readership’s eyes, Zhang described Chiang as the only leader 
capable of putting into practice Sun Yat-sen’s political thought and plans, 
building a “social democracy in which constitutional powers will, accord-
ingly to old Chinese conceptions, reside in the people and thereby cre-
ate a perfect State” (Chang 1944, 143). This perfect State was inherently 
democratic, since, as Zhang argues, democracy was ever the essence of 
Chinese political thought from antiquity. Drawing upon from Sun’s teach-
ings, Chiang was driving his people towards a future of progress and de-
mocracy based on the spiritual legacy of ancient Chinese tradition. This 
was the newest and greatest contribution of the man, and an intellectual 
and political challenge of global relevance. 
Aspiring to make of Chiang’s life an exemplary tale of Chinese virtues, 
Zhang divides his narrative into three parts evoking fundamental Chinese 
values: “Devotion”, Chiang’s infancy and youth, “Loyalty”, Chiang’s expe-
rience in the Republican and Nationalist revolutions, and lastly, “Fulfil-
ment”, Chiang’s history and role after the establishment of the Nanjing 
government. 
So, the first part is aimed at showing how the young orphan Chiang was 
respectful and devoted to family traditional values, under the enlightened 
guide of his mother and his grandfather, studied and worked hard to suc-
ceed and began to nourish patriotic feelings inspired by national military 
and patriotic heroes such as Yue Fei. 
The second part is mainly dedicated to Sun Yat-sen and to the faith that 
Chiang held in the father of the nation, shown in his participating in the 
revolution and defending Sun from the Guangdong militarist Chen Jiuming. 
Demonstrating his military and political capacities and his loyalty to the 
Chinese nation during the Northern Expedition, Chiang fought the Com-
munists in 1927 to preserve the success of the national revolution. 
The third part of the biography is dedicated to Chiang’s role as the leader 
of China during the Nanjing decade, to his plans for national regenera-
tion – from the New Life Movement to National Reconstruction – up to the 
Xi’an incident and his role during the War of Resistance and further, to the 
Cairo Conference in 1943. Chiang is portrayed as a strong leader wanting 
to restore order to Chinese society and culture, building its material and 
spiritual progress on the basis of the revival of the same ancient virtues 
which inspired his own life. China, in Zhang’s view, was at that time in a 
state of confusion where “ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign customs 
were hopelessly mixed up” (229), a problem that Chiang aspired to solve. 
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One of the main topics addressed by Zhang in his depiction of Chiang 
is the relationship between Chinese civilization and the world on the one 
side and the connection between Chinese tradition and modernity on the 
other. The author’s main concern is to demonstrate how China, in order 
to become modern, should not betray its traditional identity. The great-
ness of Chiang was to have understood this truth and put it into practice:
To the student of sociology and history, the interesting question is 
whether it is possible to create a new and progressive society that can 
withstand the strain of modern conditions on the basis of values that 
are an inalienable part of a society that was so radically different in 
structure. It is Chiang Kai-shek’s belief that they are compatible. And 
I think that he has thus, either consciously or unconsciously, grasped 
the secret of China’s long and vigorous history. The secret is in China’s 
ability to absorb the new into the matrix of the old. The principle of 
continuity has ever been the most vital principle in the history of China. 
(Chang 1944, 9) 
Zhang supports his argument explaining, for example, the symbolic mean-
ing of several of Chiang’s actions from an historical and cultural perspec-
tive, though without overlooking the new elements in his style of govern-
ment. One example is his description of the presidential couple’s trip in 
the Western regions in 1935:
There was little rest for the couple during this extended tour of the 
historic provinces from which Chinese culture had arisen and which 
seemed so neglected. Without an airplane such a journey would have 
been impossible. It was the first time in the history of China that a ruler 
and his consort had covered so large an area of the land over which 
they ruled. It was nevertheless done in the best historic tradition. Chi-
nese rulers from the earliest times felt the need of national itineraries 
in order personally to learn the condition of the people and to seek the 
means of improving their lot. 
The journey was indeed a historic performance. It had its effect in 
two ways. The people of China had heard a great deal about the coun-
try’s leading man, and how they had made his personal acquaintance. 
At the same time it had brought unity between the different sections 
of the country, something that had not been entirely done before. But 
more than that, the journey symbolized the direction of China’s future 
development and expansion. China’s growth had historically been from 
north to south, from west to east. Chiang, in this journey, indicated his 
intense interest and preoccupation with the development of the country 
from east to west. (237-8)
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The historic importance of the Western regions, the cradle of Chinese civi-
lization, for the future of the country was not ignored by a leader so aware 
of the weight of tradition. Moreover “it was from these capitals also that 
the initiative for an intercourse of cultures was made”. If China was histori-
cally open to foreign cultures and exchanges, the virtues which had shaped 
and guided traditional Chinese society were nonetheless fundamental to 
point modern leaders like Sun and Chiang along the right political path:
The moral development must begin with the word xiao, devotion to one’s 
parents. That was why Sun Yat-sen impressed upon his countrymen that 
the truth of Chinese civilization had its own foundation to stand upon, 
that it was imperative that there should be no imitation of Western 
superficialities, especially with regard to the worship of might as the 
guiding principle of national and international life. (241)
A full portrait of Chiang as an embodiment of this China open to the world 
but firmly and confidently anchored in its own tradition and values is of-
fered by Zhang in a chapter called “The Sustainable Power of the Past”. 
As a leader of China, Chiang could not simply be understood according to 
Western standards, but should be appreciated by understanding his debt 
to the great civilization of which he was the current best expression. 
It is only logical that people in Europe and America should judge Chiang 
Kai-shek according to the standards which they themselves know best, 
but any attempt to do so will not result in a complete understanding of 
the man. He is completely friendly to foreign visitors and his mind is 
receptive to all constructive ideas wherever they come from. In fact he 
keeps a secretarial staff busy bringing him information about new books 
and publications about which he desires to know something. But the fact 
remains that Chiang’s whole background and training are so thoroughly 
Chinese, and he draws so heavily on Chinese learning and scholarship 
that it is impossible to conceive him apart from this Chinese milieu. (220) 
This because: 
No great leader in Chinese history can have a permanent influence on 
his people without himself being an example of virtues and qualities 
which are traditionally considered by the Chinese as being indispensable 
to such a person. (220) 
Zhang informs the reader that, even if Chiang was a military man, his 
thoughts and actions were mostly inspired by the Chinese classics he read, 
and by the examples of the philosopher Wang Yangming and the great Qing 
stateman Zeng Guofan. His strength depended on his spiritual resources. 
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As a traditional scholar, Chiang paid utmost attention to moral self-scrutiny 
following the example of Confucius. Moreover, he practiced meditation 
according to Buddhist teaching in order to purify his mind. Finally, he had 
become Christian to enlarge his spiritual foundation. Zhang argues that 
Chiang’s conversion to Christianity was not a refusal or a relinquishment of 
Chinese tradition, but rather an expansion of Chiang’s spirit. He attempts 
to make of Chiang the symbol of a China naturally ready to accept foreign 
cultural imports without by this weakening her identity. Chiang personified 
a China even more cosmopolitan than the West. 
Chiang Kai-shek’s spiritual foundation will forever remain in the great-
ness of China’s historical past. His belief in Christianity is no conversion; 
it is enlargement, development, and expansion. If, conversely, Christians 
are also willing to regard Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism in the 
spirit for a dispassionate search of truth, then we are on the way to a 
real universal brotherhood of men for which we have been groping but 
have failed to reach. We are too much confined to institutions, which are 
not an essential part of the spirit and become therefore circumscribed 
in our outlook. But the true life of the spirit is full and all-embracing and 
welcomes other kindred truths. Chiang Kai-shek’s life is a demonstration 
of this eternal principle. (223)
This feature of Chinese culture, according to Zhang, had important po-
litical consequences. Chiang’s leadership demonstrated that the greatest 
contribution China could make to the world could be the importance of 
moral law in the behaviour not only of men, but also of nations. Chiang 
embodied the identity of China in the world, that of a civilization whose 
essence was spiritual and moral, and for these reasons truly cosmopolitan.
Reflecting the cultural nationalism of its author, a Westernized Chi-
nese intellectual conscripted into the service of government propaganda, 
Zhang’ s book portrays Chiang’s rise first to the national and then to the 
international scene as the projection of Chinese tradition onto the world 
stage. But he strives to persuade readers that this tradition was open and 
cosmopolitan, attempting to universalise its core values. His main concern 
was to make Chiang’s ‘Chineseness’ the embodiment of the global ideals 
of progress and democracy adapted to the national context. Thanks to Chi-
ang, the author suggests, finally Chinese tradition could find the place it 
deserved in the international world as a lively and worthy source of values 
and ideas. “It is Chiang’s task, thus, to create a new and better China and, 
through China, a new and better world” (Chang 1944, 9).
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3 Chiang and His China in the Works of Xie Shoukang  
and Lin Qiusheng
The global ambitions of Nationalist propaganda nourished the appearance 
of works on Chiang Kai-shek in several other Western languages. Conti-
nental Europe’s public opinion was actually considered just as important 
as the English-speaking world’s for Chinese international communication 
strategy, and some works on Chiang Kai-shek were published in French 
and in German by Chinese intellectuals working in Europe. 
The first biography of Chiang published in Europe was written in French 
by Xie Shoukang (Sie Cheou Kang). Xie was another Western-educated in-
tellectual employed in diplomacy by the Nationalist government’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and especially in cultural diplomacy during the war. As 
a government student, Xie had studied political science in France and Bel-
gium, and in 1923 received a Ph.D. in Economics from the Free University 
of Brussels. He was active in the political organizations of Chinese students 
in Europe in 1920, and back in China in 1929 he became Director of the 
Literature Department of the National Central University in Nanjing, be-
fore being sent to the Chinese Embassy in Belgium. His career in foreign 
affairs developed in Europe until, in 1941, he was appointed first Chinese 
ambassador to the Holy See, a position he was able to cover only in 1943. 
Xie was actually a Chinese intellectual astride two worlds. His expertise 
in French language and literature awarded him membership of the Belgian 
Royal Academy of French Language and Literature in 1946. Author of 
several theatrical works and essays in French, and a well-known painter, 
Xie actually contributed with his literary and artistic skills to Nationalist 
propaganda in Europe publishing, in Brussels in 1941, Le Maréchal Chiang 
Kai-shek. Son enfance, sa jeunesse (Tang 2013). A second edition was 
printed in Switzerland, Berne 1943, and a third in Paris after the end of the 
war, in 1946. The book was finally translated into English in Taipei in 1954. 
Like Zhang Xinhai, Xie committed himself to act as a bridge between 
China and the West in the intellectual and cultural realms. In his intro-
duction, Xie quoted the Latin translation of a text by Mencius and made 
reference to Plutarch to explain how a universal law in History held that 
the history of a great people was always characterized by the difficulties 
and problems they had to overcome from the youngest age in order to 
strengthen their nature and rise to glory. The key factors in the life of the 
protagonists of History were to be traced in their childhood and youth. 
Consequently, the secrets of Chiang Kai-shek’s greatness were buried in 
facts not known to everybody, in those early years the West was unaware 
of. With this book, Xie wished to fill that vacuum of knowledge, making 
clear how Chiang’s personality and leadership had developed from his 
experience as a child and a young man in China and that these traits were 
deeply rooted in Chinese tradition and culture. In the preface to the third 
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edition in 1946, Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Minister in China in the first 
decade of the 1900s, and also Minister of Foreign Affairs after the fall of 
Fascism in Italy, seems to have understood the spirit of Xie’s book. 
Sie explained Chiang, because he has intinctly [sic] felt, as a true Chi-
nese, that a man is what his family, his surroundings and his ancesters 
[sic] have made him. That is why these pages show us Chiang Kai-shek 
such as he is and not otherwise. (Sie 1946, iv) 
Actually, as Xie himself acknowledges, the main source for his narrative 
was an official one: the twenty volumes of the records from Chiang’s diary 
edited by Mao Sicheng in 1937 with the title Minguo shiwunian yiqian de 
Chiang Kai-shek xiansheng (Chiang Kai-shek before 1936). The content of 
these published records was revised by Chiang himself before publication, 
and they became the standard source for biographies of Chiang’s early life. 
Xie claims he received Mao’s work from Chiang’s personal secretary, Chen 
Bulei. Though this act suggests that Xie’s decision to write a biography 
of the Generalissimo was akin to an official assignment, Xie affirms in the 
introduction that the idea of writing it had come to him as early as 1931, 
when he had the chance to meet Chiang personally. 
Xie provides the readers with a long, vivid narrative, in which all chap-
ters are introduced by proverbs or aphorisms which summarize the basic 
meaning of each section. Long dialogues between the protagonists hint at 
the author’s interest for the theatre. On the whole, Chiang’s personal his-
tory is again presented as deeply embedded in Chinese civilization. In the 
first chapter, Xie starts his narrative by tracing the origins of the Chiangs 
to the early era of Chinese history. Chiang’s ancestors were descended 
from Bailing, the third son of the Duke of Zhou, who established Chiang’s 
estate in Henan. Over the centuries they moved South, producing Buddhist 
doctrines in the Middle Ages and scholars from the Song Dynasty on (4). 
Later, a branch moved to Xikou and from that branch, which in time de-
veloped and increased in number, the Generalissimo was born. Orphaned 
as a child, he owed his moral education to his grandfather and his mother, 
an education inspired by Buddhist and Confucian values. Following their 
teachings and examples, the young Chiang was slowly inspired by the old 
masters, demonstrating from an early age his courage, concentration, 
strong will and respect for Chinese culture. 
His qualities as a young man were discovered and appreciated by all 
the masters Chiang Kai-shek met. They guided him in the study of great 
Confucian Statesmen such as Zeng Guofan, but also in the discovery of 
the revolutionary ideals of Sun, which directed Chiang’s patriotic spirit 
towards personal engagement in political action. Breaking with the social 
conventions of his birth-place, all these meetings and events prompted 
him to become a military man in order to save the Chinese nation from 
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the dramatic crisis it had been thrown into by the Manchus and foreign 
imperialism, but whose deep cause he soon discovered lay in the weakness 
of its leaders and people. 
In Xie’s narrative, two main figures shaped the development of Chiang’s 
personality and rise to power. The first was Chiang’s mother, whose sup-
port for her gifted child never wavered, resisting all social pressures, and 
above all, instilling in him the spiritual values of self-discipline and pub-
lic ethics which made him become a great leader. The second was Chen 
Qimei, who spurred and guided Chiang to become a loyal revolutionary 
and follower of Sun Yat-sen. The book was actually dedicated to one of 
Chen’s nephews, Lifu, the powerful head of the CC clique. More than Sun 
himself, it is Chen Qimei who figures strongly in the account of Chiang’s 
participation in the revolutionary movement. 
Devotion to his mother and to his mentor, Chen, are the fundamental 
quality of Chiang’s personality that Xie Shoukang chose to highlight and 
that, according to him, was at the same time the very essence of Chiang’s 
‘Chineseness’. Chiang’s greatest ability was his capacity to reconcile his 
duties towards the family, and especially his mother, and his duty towards 
the nation. The affection he nourished towards her was the same as the 
affection he felt for the motherland. He was a good son of China because 
he was a good son for his mother Wang. When his mother died, he could 
channel all his devotion into the nation with the same spirit that had moti-
vated his filial attitude towards his mother. In the same vein, Xie describes 
Chiang as an affectionate and caring father to his two sons Jingguo and 
Weiguo, the suggestion being that he could well become a good father for 
all his compatriots. 
Besides the centrality attributed to Chiang Kai-shek’s family values 
and personal relations as the source of his civic values, Xie describes the 
Generalissimo as a scholar, placing great emphasis on his fondness for 
philosophy and poetry, quoting verses Chiang had composed in signifi-
cant moments in his life and explaining how the thought of Neoconfucian 
philosophers like Wang Yanming shaped Chiang’s attitude towards life. 
Chiang’s revolution was mainly the restoration of Chinese values, and a 
strong sense of continuity with the past was the greatest source of his 
legitimacy as the leader of Chinese nation.
A similar argument was developed in the biography of Chiang written 
in German by Li Qiusheng, a Chinese intellectual which played a key-role 
in the relationships between Nationalist China and Germany. The efforts 
Nationalists channelled towards German public opinion during the war 
were a complex enterprise which actually reflected the complicated re-
lationship between the two countries during these years (Leutner 1998; 
Glang 2014). When the war froze relations between Germany and China, 
Lin strove to maintain the cultural relations between the two countries. 
Lin Qiusheng had studied Germany, and in the 1930s acted as one of the 
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most important informers regarding German affairs for Chiang Kai-shek 
and his entourage. He was a lecturer at Berlin University and Guomind-
ang activist, member of the Chinese Supreme National Defence Council 
(Liang 1978, Leutner 1998). Besides his role as a political link between 
pro-China elements in German political and military milieux and Chiang 
Kai-shek, Lin was the founder of a Chinese propaganda paper in Berlin, 
the China Post, which he hoped could balance what he perceived as nega-
tive information about China in Germany. Moreover, from the late 1930s, 
he wrote several academic works about Chinese traditional culture in 
German. Though Lin stayed in Berlin until 1941, in 1938 the Chinesische 
Kultur-Dienst (China Cultural Service), an institute founded by Lin as a 
tool of cultural diplomacy in Berlin, moved to Zurich. The declared goal 
of the Institute was to improve knowledge of Chinese culture without 
any political affiliation, and, during the war, it published several works 
in German concerning Chinese traditional culture, art and philosophy. 
Not surprisingly, considering the cultural agenda of the Guomindang’s 
propaganda abroad, political essays on Chiang and translations of Chi-
ang’s works were also published by the institute. In 1936 Lin had already 
published the German translation of Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Unification 
and Reconstruction. While in Zurich in 1943 Lin published a short essay 
under the title Chiang Kai-shek. Erneurer und Einiger Chinas. Eine Skizze 
(Chiang Kai-shek. Renovator and Unifier of China). As the author wrote on 
the first page, the book had been written for the “sixth anniversary of the 
Japanese aggression on China” and it was mainly dedicated to explaining 
what were, according to the author, the key factors of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
leadership and vision which supported Nationalist China’s military capac-
ity to resist Japanese aggression. 
More than Chiang’s life and personality, or history as a revolutionary 
leader, Lin wanted to highlight Chiang’s philosophy of the State and his 
belonging to the great Chinese political and philosophical tradition. He 
explains to his readers that Chiang had been able to unite and revive Chi-
nese traditional ethics being on the one hand similar to Qin Shi Huangdi, 
as a great military chief and unifier of China, and on the other, inspiring 
himself with the teaching of Confucius, the master who did not create 
but transmitted the teachings of the old Sages of Antiquity. In Lin’s per-
spective, Chiang embodied the two most important original Chinese State 
philosophies, the Legalist and the Confucian, which had been the basis of 
China’s past greatness.
This was China’s peculiar and intellectually independent path to emerg-
ing national strength: 
The new form of government and its creator Chiang Kai-shek because 
of their simplicity and naturalness could seem not sufficient in the eyes 
of many Europeans. But in the immense force attached in these simple 
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teaching words, you will find the keys for understanding the renewal of 
China and its emerging form of government. The key can be found in 
Sun Yat-sen’s words: “China depends on its own path and can imitate 
neither the Western conception of life nor the Western idea of power. 
(Lin 1943, 41) 
Chiang was the embodiment of the true spirit of the Chinese State, a State 
which was built first on the Confucian ethos, whose values had also been 
at the root of Chinese military capacity to resist Japanese aggression, a 
capacity which depended on the unity of the nation. The revival of an-
cient values had been the basis for the mobilization of all the officers and 
people for the sake of the nation and therein lay the strength of Chiang’s 
leadership. 
We can see that what the greatest part of Chiang Kai-shek’s construction 
and renewal achieved has been the return of the ancient Chinese ethos 
in everyday life, the restoration of loyalty, righteousness and concord 
among the people, as is represented by the promulgation of the New 
Life Movement. Without it, all the bravery and fearlessness would have 
been vain. (Lin 1943, 45) 
All in Lin’s pamphlet, from the reproduction of Chiang’s calligraphy, to 
the few pictures portraying Chiang dressed as an old Confucian scholar, 
contributed to evoking the image of the Generalissimo as an embodiment 
of Chinese values and culture. Chiang’s power was not that of a revolution-
ary but of a renovator along the path of his ancestors, a reformer able to 
drive his people to discover again the source of their identity and strength. 
Moreover he was obviously a Statesman, since he was fighting to create 
a strong and unified State, the only dimension within which the Chinese, 
as individuals and a community, could fully achieve the moral standards 
worthy of their glorious past. According to Lin, this had to be recognized 
as sufficient basis for Chiang’s legitimization as a leader able to project 
again the greatness of the Chinese past onto its future. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
In the propaganda war which China fought during the resistance war and 
the second world war, the persona of Chiang Kai-shek played a fundamen-
tal role. In the domestic and international contexts as well, the Chinese 
leader was depicted as the personification of the Chinese people’s capacity 
to resist foreign aggression and fight for their own freedom against foreign 
imperialism. Nationalist China aspired to carve out a space in a media 
landscape dominated by Western media and to speak with its own voice, 
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working to increase its ability to play a part on the world stage, taking 
part in the translational debate about the war and especially defining the 
place of China and its leader in the world that war was shaping. 
Westernized Chinese intellectuals working for Chiang’s diplomacy were 
called to play a fundamental role in this scenario to achieve this aim. As 
the examples illustrated in this article show, the call was effective. 
Each of the authors and works considered in this article had received a 
foreign education at the highest level, in the United States and in Europe, 
and were modern cosmopolitan intellectuals well-versed in foreign cul-
tures, literature and society. Nevertheless, they did not hesitate to place 
their skills at the service not only of the Republic of China but of the cel-
ebration of the leader himself. 
As a matter of fact, the works of these writers were essentially an am-
plification of the discourse already developed by the Chinese domestic 
propaganda apparatus aimed at legitimizing Chiang as the central leader 
of China. The image of Chiang offered by these writers was, consistently 
with the aspiration of Chiang himself, that of, together, a military leader 
and a modern Statesman, but also a Confucian scholar, a devoted son, a 
loyal comrade, a good husband and father for his sons and all the Chinese 
citizens. 
But insofar as they addressed foreign public opinion, these portraits 
had a greater objective. They all wanted first of all to persuade readers 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘Chineseness’, not only reversing the perception of 
their country as a weak, corrupt and divided country, but rather suggest-
ing that modern China’s cultural identity and political present and future 
were rooted in the past and had to be understood on its own terms. The 
recounting of Chiang’s life had to sum up all Chinese native philosophical 
and moral tradition, but also reflect a new Chinese cosmopolitanism and 
openness to the world. Wrapped up in Chiang’s persona, the contradictions 
between Chinese tradition and modernity which had dominated political 
and intellectual dynamics since the nineteenth century were to be seen 
as finally solved.
In this perspective, the leader’s life and personality were made a means 
to at last project modern Chinese cultural nationalism onto the global 
scene. Actually, these biographies were not only hagiographies of the lead-
er; they were the reflection of Guomindang’s attempt to affirm China’s 
importance in the world from a cultural point of view. Emphasizing the 
cultural genealogy of the Chinese leader and his being the embodiment of 
the highest values of Chinese – and Asian – civilization, they were aimed 
at reversing what they perceived as a marginalization of Chinese tradition 
in political and cultural global imaginary. 
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